Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV03705, Date: 2024-11-25 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Alejandra Padilla’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs as sanctions against Defendant Feast Foods, LLC is granted in the in the total amount of $53,136.00, comprised of $52,575.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred from the abandoned arbitration proceeding and $561.00 in costs.

Plaintiff Alejandra Padilla (“Padilla”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding her attorneys’ fees and costs as sanctions against Defendant Feast Foods, LLC (“Feast”) (“Defendant”) in the amount of $56,700.00 and costs in the amount of $561.00, following this Court’s order withdrawing the action from arbitration due to Defendant’s failure to timely pay arbitrator’s fees. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§1281.98, 1281.99.)

Defendant’s 11/12/24 request for judicial notice of the docket, pleadings and records on file with the Los Angeles Superior Court in Case No. 20STCV03485, captioned Martha Hernandez v. Feast Foods, LLC is denied as irrelevant.

Defendant’s 11/12/24 request for judicial notice of the docket, pleadings and records on file in this action, including without limitation the Declaration of Crystal Sainz Ayala in Support of Motion to Compel Arbitration, filed in this action on September 20, 2023, is denied because this Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket.

Defendant’s 11/12/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Chami (“Chami”) are sustained as to Nos. 1 and 4, and overruled as to Nos. 2, 3, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14.[1]

On February 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Defendant asserting claims for retaliation, unpaid wages, and related claims arising out of her employment.

On September 18, 2023, Defendant filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration, which Plaintiff opposed on October 6, 2023.

On October 19, 2023, this Court granted Defendants’ Motion to Compel Arbitration and ordered the matter to arbitration. Shortly thereafter, the matter was submitted to AAA to administer the arbitration. (Decl. of Chami ¶6, Exh. A.)

On May 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed her Motion for An Order Withdrawing the Case from Arbitration Per C.C.P. Section 1281.98, and a hearing was set for August 16, 2024. (Decl. of Chami ¶17).

Defendant executed a stipulation regarding the Court granting Plaintiff’s motion to withdraw from arbitration and July 24, 2024, the parties filed a Stipulation and Proposed Order Withdrawing the Case from Arbitration Per C.C.P. §1281.98 on July 24, 2024. This Court promptly signed the order, and the matter was withdrawn from arbitration on July 25, 2024. (7/25/24 Joint Stipulation.)

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on August 22, 2024. Defendant filed its opposition on November 12, 2024.[2] Plaintiff filed her reply on November 18, 2024.

If the employee or consumer withdraws the claim from arbitration and proceeds in a court of appropriate jurisdiction pursuant to paragraph (1) of subdivision (b), both of the following apply:

(1) The employee or consumer may bring a motion, or a separate action, to recover all attorney’s fees and all costs associated with the abandoned arbitration proceeding. The recovery of arbitration fees, interest, and related attorney’s fees shall be without regard to any findings on the merits in the underlying action or arbitration.

(2) The court shall impose sanctions on the drafting party in accordance with Section 1281.99.

C.C.P. §1281.99 states: “[t]he court shall impose monetary sanctions against a drafting party that materially breaches an arbitration agreement pursuant to . . . subdivision (a) of Section 1281.98, by ordering the drafting party to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees and costs, incurred by the employee or consumer as a result of the material breach.” (C.C.P. §1281.99(a), emphasis added.)

Here, after protesting that the FAA exclusively controlled in this instance, per stipulation, Defendant withdrew its claim from arbitration pursuant to C.C.P. §1281.98. (See 7/25/24 Joint Stipulation.) Defendant thereby waived any argument that C.C.P. §1281.98 was inapplicable. Therefore, Plaintiff is entitled under C.C.P. §1281.98(c)(1) to bring the instant motion to “to recover all attorney’s fees and all costs associated with the abandoned arbitration proceeding.” Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is proper and she is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs associated with the abandoned arbitration proceeding.

The California Supreme Court has determined the lodestar method is the proper mechanism to calculate attorneys’ fees under C.C.P. §425.16(c). (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1136.) To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Defendant’s counsel. The “reasonable hourly rate” applicable under the lodestar method is the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Id. at pg. 1096.)

Plaintiff’s Counsel declares her hourly rate is $750 per hour. (Decl. of Chami ¶¶21, 35, Exh. J.) The Court determines based on its experience that Plaintiff’s Counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable in her community of practice.

The verified time entries of the attorneys are entitled to a presumption of credibility, which extends to an attorney’s professional judgment as to whether time spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“We think the verified time statements of the attorney as officers of the court are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”].) “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)

Here, Plaintiff is seeking recovery of attorneys’ fees only related to the administration of the arbitration, the opposition to Defendant’s petition compelling arbitration, the motion vacating the order compelling arbitration and the instant motion for fees as a result of the order vacating arbitration, spanning from September 18, 2023, through the filing of the instant motion on August 22, 2024.

Plaintiff’s counsel declares she billed 71.60 hours related to the arbitration in this matter. (Decl. of Chami ¶21, Exh. J.)

Plaintiff’s counsel also declares that she anticipates spending another 3.0 hours preparing a reply brief to any opposition filed by Defendant to the instant fee motion, and 1.0 hour preparing for and appearing for the hearing on the instant motion scheduled for November 25, 2024. (Decl. of Chami ¶22.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion requests total of 75.60 hours spent on this matter that is associated with the arbitration and reimbursable under C.C.P §§1281.98-1281.99. (Decl. of Chami ¶¶21-23, Exh. J.)

Defendant opposes Plaintiff’s motion on the basis Plaintiff’s fees are not reasonable. (Opposition, pgs. 8-10.) Defendant does not cite to specific examples in its motion of hours that were excessive or unreasonable. (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 488 [“In challenging attorney fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence. General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated to not suffice.”].) Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Defendant argues that Plaintiff should not be awarded the attorneys’ fees of $4,125.00 related to discovery conducted during the arbitration because discovery will also be done in the state court action. The Court agrees. These fees were not not specific to the arbitration proceedings.

Plaintiff requests costs in the amount of $561.00. Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s request for costs, and such costs are substantiated in Plaintiff’s invoices. (See Decl. of Chami, Exh. N.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for costs incurred from the arbitration is granted in the amount of $561.00.

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the total amount of $53,136.00, comprised of $52,575.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred from the abandoned arbitration proceeding and $561.00 in costs.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The Court notes there is no Objection No. 5.

[2] The Court notes Defendant’s opposition is labeled on the docket at “Memorandum of Points and Authorities” and does not provide the Court notice that the filing is indeed the Defendant’s Opposition Plaintiff’s Motion for Attorney’s Fees. Defendant’s counsel is advised to remedy this issue in future filings before this Court. Continuing the practice of filing documents with ambiguous titles creates the potential of this Court not reviewing Defendant’s improperly labeled filings.