Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV06287, Date: 2025-04-22 Tentative Ruling

Defendants Dorcy Inc. dba Conscious Co-Parenting Institute’s and Dorcy Pruter’s motion for summary judgment is granted.

Defendants Dorcy Inc. dba Conscious Co-Parenting Institute (“Dorcy Inc.”) and Dorcy Pruter (“Pruter”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for summary judgment against Plaintiffs Jenna Noble’s (“Noble”) and Michael Eisenberg’s (“Eisenberg”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) second amended complaint (“SAC”) on the grounds that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and Defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Plaintiffs’ sole remaining claim for promissory estoppel. (Notice Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §437c.)

Defendants’ 4/11/25 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Rich Petrie (“Petrie”) are sustained as to Nos. 1 and 2, and overruled as to Nos. 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, and 12.

Defendants’ 4/11/25 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Michael Eisenberg (“Eisenberg”) are sustained as to Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, and 22.

Defendants’ 4/11/25 request for judicial notice of (1) “Joint Stipulation Re: Continuing Dates in Scheduling Order to Facilitate Global Resolution of the Case,” filed on August 13, 2021, as Document No. 189 in Noble v. Dorcy Inc., et al., U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal. Case No. 2:19-cv-8646 (“Federal Action”) (D-COE, Exh. 3); (2) “Civil Minutes – General,” filed on August 13, 2021, as Document No. 190 in the Federal Action (D-COE, Exh. 4); and (3) “Civil Minutes – General,” filed on October 12, 2021, as Document No. 195 in the Federal Action (D-COE, Exh. 7), is granted.

Plaintiffs filed their initial Complaint on February 7, 2023, against Defendants. Plaintiffs filed their first amended complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants on November 21, 2023.

Plaintiffs filed the operative SAC on March 20, 2024, alleging two causes of action against Defendants: (1) intentional misrepresentation- fraud in the inducement; and (2) promissory estoppel. On July 16, 2024, this Court sustained Defendants’ demurrer to the 1st cause of action without leave to amend. (7/16/24 Minute Order.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants made a clear and unambiguous promise to Plaintiffs that in exchange for Plaintiff filing a dismissal of the criminal charges against Pruter by the Canadian Crown Attorneys’/ Prosecutor’s Office (Information Number 19-75005953) and in consideration of the settling of the Federal Action, Defendants would pay Plaintiffs $75,000. (SAC ¶58.)

Plaintiffs allege they reasonably and justifiably relied on said promises and trusted Defendants to fulfill their promises. (SAC ¶59.)

Plaintiffs allege they agreed to enter into a stipulation to request a continuance of all pending scheduling order deadlines to facilitate the settlement and immediately contacted Detective Rich Petrie, who works in 52nd Division of the Toronto Police Service as a Detective (No. 2232) to dismiss the sexual assault against Pruter. (SAC ¶60.)

Plaintiffs allege that on August 13, 2021, the court vacated all case deadlines in the Federal Action and ordered the parties to file a dismissal to comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 41 by October 11, 2021. (SAC ¶61.)

Plaintiffs allege that on August 20, 2021, Detective Rich Petrie emailed E&A stating that he had spoken with the Assistant Crown Attorney and received authorization from her to withdraw the criminal charge of sexual assault against Pruter. (SAC ¶62.) Plaintiffs allege Detective Petrie also made clear that once a criminal charge is withdrawn, the charge is permanently closed and will not be prosecuted. (SAC ¶62.)

Plaintiffs allege Noble’s former counsel, Eisenberg & Associates (“E&A”), forwarded Detective Petrie’s email to counsel for Defendants explaining that once the Crown Attorney withdrew the criminal charges against Pruter, all conditions precedent would be satisfied and payment would be due on September 2, 2021. (SAC ¶63.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants did not perform their promise to pay Plaintiffs the promised $75,000. (SAC ¶64.)

Plaintiffs allege as a direct and foreseeable result of Defendants’ failure to perform their promise, Plaintiffs have been greatly injured in that both the Federal Action against Defendants and the criminal charges against Pruter were dismissed without Plaintiffs being paid the promised $75,000 under the settlement. (SAC ¶65.)

Defendants filed the instant motion on January 29, 2025. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on April 2, 2025. Defendants filed their reply on April 11, 2025.

A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. (C.C.P. §437c(c).)

In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court must “consider all of the evidence” and all of the “inferences” reasonably drawn therefrom (C.C.P. §437c(c)) and must view the evidence and inferences “in the light most favorable to the opposing party.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843; see Ragland v. U.S. Bank National Association (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 182, 199.)

“The elements of a promissory estoppel claim are ‘(1) a promise clear and unambiguous in its terms; (2) reliance by the party to whom the promise is made; (3) [the] reliance must be both reasonable and foreseeable; and (4) the party asserting the estoppel must be injured by his reliance.’ [Citation.]” (U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. State of California (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 887, 901, internal citation omitted.)

Defendants argue the condition to their promise was never satisfied, and therefore their promise never became enforceable under promissory estoppel law. (Motion Memo, pg. 6, citing City of Los Angeles v. Anchor Casualty Co. (1962) 204 Cal.App.2d 175, 182.)

Defendants cite to the opinion of expert, Gerald Chipeur in support of this argument. Chipeur’s opinion letter states, “It is our opinion that the Attorney General of Canada or of a province (“Crown”), or any other person in Canada, has the power to relay an information under the Criminal Code, provided

that the trial of the accused has not commenced.” (Defendant’s Disputed Separate Statement of Fact [“D-DSSF”] 3; D-COE pg. 109 at ¶3, Exh. 9.) Defendants met their burden on summary judgment, shifting the burden to Plaintiffs to demonstrate there exists a triable issue of material fact as to whether the alleged promise became enforceable under promissory estoppel law.

Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden to raise a triable issue of material fact by citing admissible evidence. Specifically, Plaintiffs cite to the Declaration of Petrie, which is made under penalty of perjury under the laws of Canada and not the laws of California. (C.C.P. §2015.5; Kulshrestha v. First Union Commercial Corp. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 601, 611 [“Far from being surplusage, the statutory phrase that petitioner ignored discloses California’s interest in preventing and punishing perjury even as to documents signed outside the state. It seems clear that out-of-state declarations offend section 2015.5, and are not deemed sufficiently reliable for purposes of that statute, unless they follow its literal terms.”].) The evidence cited in the Declaration of Petrie to raise a triable issue of material fact is therefore inadmissible.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court