Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV07614, Date: 2024-08-30 Tentative Ruling

Defendant County of Los Angeles’ motion to quash service of summons of Plaintiff Latoya Moreno’s complaint is granted.

Defendant County of Los Angeles (“County”) (“Defendant”) moves to quash service of summons of Plaintiff Latoya Moreno’s (“Moreno”) (“Plaintiff”) Complaint on the grounds that the Complaint combines forcible entry and detainer claims with other claims, and therefore cannot support the issuance of a five-day summons. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§1167.4, 418.10; CRC, Rule 3.1327.) Defendant also moves on the grounds that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action for forcible entry and forcible detainer as the Complaint on its face makes clear that the time period for such actions found in C.C.P. §1172 ran out over a year before the filing of the Complaint. (Notice of Motion, pgs. 2-3.)

Plaintiff filed her operative Complaint on April 5, 2023, alleging eight causes of action against Defendant: (1) forcible entry; (2) forcible detainer; (3) civil trespass; (4) conversion; (5) injunctive relief; (6) declaratory relief; (7) breach of contract; and (8) intentional infliction of emotional distress, arising from her tenancy at 7701 E. Slauson Avenue, Room 223, Los Angeles, California 90040 (“Subject Premises”), which is owned by Defendant. (Complaint ¶¶1-2.)

Defendant filed the instant motion on June 21, 2024. Plaintiff filed her opposition on August 19, 2024. Defendant filed its reply on August 23, 2024.

“A motion to quash service is the proper method for determining whether the court has acquired personal jurisdiction over the defendant through service of the five-day unlawful detainer summons.” (Delta Imports, Inc. v. Municipal Court (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 1033, 1035.) “If the underlying complaint fails to state a cause of action for unlawful detainer, then use of the five-day summons is improper, and the defendant is entitled to an order quashing service as a matter of law.” (Id.)

A demurrer is the proper procedure for challenging the sufficiency of a complaint. A motion to quash is the proper method to challenge service of summons where no unlawful detainer is pled. (Id. at pg. 1036.) This follows because the special five-day summons can only be used with an unlawful detainer complaint. (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 397.) (Compare Borsuk v. Appellate Division of Superior Court (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 607, 616-617.)

Motions to quash can be used where there are no unlawful detainer claims, but cannot be used “to argue the plaintiff failed to comply with the pleading requirements specific to unlawful detainer actions set out in [C.C.P.] section 1166” or to contest the truth of the complaint’s allegations. (Stancil, 11 Cal.5th at pg. 391.)

An unlawful detainer action is a special summary proceeding, the primary purpose of which is to obtain the possession of real property in the situations specified by statute. (Childs v. Eltinge (1973) 29 Cal.App.3d 843, 852-853; Union Oil Co. v. Chandler (1970) 4 Cal.App.3d 716, 721.) The sole issue before the court in an unlawful detainer action is the right to possession. (Green v. Superior Court (1974) 10 Cal.3d 616, 633-634.)

In Chase v. Peters (1918) 37 Cal.App.358, a plaintiff bringing an unlawful detainer action was awarded property taxes, which was reversed because the claim was based on breach of a covenant in the lease which is not within the scope of an

unlawful detainer proceeding. (Id., at pg. 362; see Vasey v. California Dance Co. (1977) 70 Cal.App.3d 742, 746-748.)

[A] defendant may file a motion to quash under section 418.10, subdivision (a)(1) for lack of personal jurisdiction where the unlawful detainer five-day summons is defective because it is not supported by the accompanying complaint. Personal jurisdiction is conferred only where the statutory requirements for service of process are fulfilled, so an unlawful detainer defendant may use a motion to quash a defective summons. [Citation.] Valid service of process in an unlawful detainer case requires that the plaintiff serve on the defendant the five-day summons unique to unlawful detainer cases alongside a complaint that pleads a claim for unlawful detainer as defined in section 1161. No unlawful detainer summons — and no five-day response timeline — is possible if it’s [sic] supported by a complaint that, for example, only alleges a completely different cause of action, such as a contract or tort claim rather than an unlawful detainer claim.

Plaintiff’s Complaint improperly combines the forcible entry and forcible detainer causes of action with the other five causes of action. The only triable issues in unlawful detainer actions are the right to possession and incidental damages resulting from the unlawful detention. (Martin-Bragg v. Moore (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 367, 385; Larson v. City & County of San Francisco (2011) 192

Cal.App.4th 1263, 1297.) Unlawful detainer or forcible detainer actions cannot be tried in conjunction with other causes or claims, except with the mutual consent of the parties. (Childs, 29 Cal.App.3d at pg. 852.)

Here, Plaintiff has attempted to combine a forcible entry and forcible detainer action, which would fall under C.C.P. Chapter 4 entitled “Summary Proceedings for Obtaining Possession of Real Property in Certain Cases,” with various other claims, namely declaratory relief, injunctive relief, conversion, breach of contract, and intentional infliction of emotional distress, none of which fall under Chapter 4 of the C.C.P. Plaintiff is not permitted to combine these claims given the forcible detainer actions have a shorter response date of five days, depriving Defendant the 30-day period it would have originally had to respond to the causes of actions.

The filing under Chapter 4 of the C.C.P. also affects discovery time periods. (See C.C.P. §2030.020(c) [when discovery may be served]; C.C.P. §2030.260(b) [reducing the response time to discovery to five (5) days]; see also C.C.P. §2031.260(b) [only five (5) days to respond to document demands]; C.C.P. §2033.250 [five (5) days to respond to Requests for Admissions].) Plaintiff also attempts to recover various compensatory damages through the tort or contract-based cause of actions. However, such damages are unrecoverable in unlawful detainer actions as the primary purpose of the action is to obtain possession of the property. (Green, 10 Cal.3d at pgs. 633-634.)

Further, the statutory procedure for forcible detainer and forcible entry requires that the action be brought before the defendant has continuously held possession of the property for one year before the action was filed. (See C.C.P. §1172.) Plaintiff’s causes of action fail to meet that requirement and admit that failure by stating the timeline in the verified pleading.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that on April 6, 2021, she was picked up by the Los Angeles Department of Public Social Services, subsequent to which Defendant entered the premises. (Complaint ¶¶9, 13.) Plaintiff acknowledges that, to date, she remains locked out of the premises, has not been allowed into the premises at all, and that Defendant continues in possession of the premises. (Complaint ¶¶14, 19, 22.) Plaintiff filed her Complaint on April 5, 2023, nearly two years after being allegedly dispossessed from the premises. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant had been in actual possession of the premises more than one whole year before the commencement of this action. (Complaint ¶22.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s forcible entry and detainer action is barred. The critical time period Plaintiff could have asserted her claims for unlawful detainer was during the one year before the filing date of April 5, 2023, going back to April 5, 2022. The Complaint concedes that Defendant was in possession of the Subject Premises for that entire period of time.

As stated in C.C.P. §1172 “such a showing is a bar to the proceedings,” and here the showing/facts necessary to act as a bar to the proceedings are admitted in a verified pleading.

In Wilson v. Carson, the Court of Appeal stated “a proceeding in forcible entry and detainer, an action would not lie in this case, for the reason, if for no other, that it appears defendant had been in the quiet possession of the premises for a period of more than one year prior to the institution of the suit (section 1172, Code Cov. Proc.).” (Wilson v. Carson (2010) 14 Cal.App.570, 572.)

Here, Plaintiff’s verified complaint admits the facts needed to show that an action for forcible detainer or entry does not lie because Defendant had been in actual possession of the premises more than one year before the commencement of this action. (See Complaint ¶¶14, 19, 22.)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s Complaint is barred by the statutory scheme because her unlawful detainer causes of action lack the minimal requirements to state a viable cause of action for forcible detainer or forcible entry. (Stancil, 11 Cal.5th at pgs. 390-391.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s motion to quash Plaintiff’s service of summons is granted.

Defendant’s motion to quash service of summons is granted. The Court continues the Case Management Conference and sets a hearing on an Order to Show Cause why the case should not be dismissed and/or Plaintiff’s counsel sanctioned $250 for failing to file proof of service of the complaint on November 8, 2024, at 8:30 a.m. in Department 71.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court