Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV08164, Date: 2023-05-24 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV08164    Hearing Date: May 24, 2023    Dept: 71

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

1200 MANAGEMENT LLC, 

 

         vs.

 

JAYCEE UFIE, et al.

 Case No.:  23STCV08164

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  May 24, 2023

 

Defendant Jaycee Ufie’s demurrer, in pro per, to the complaint of Plaintiff 1200 Management, LLC, is overruled.

 

          Defendant Jaycee Ufie (“Ufie”) (“Defendant”), in pro per, demurs to Plaintiff 1200 Management, LLC’s (“1200 Management”) (“Plaintiff”) complaint.  Defendant demurs on the grounds that Plaintiff has failed to allege that Plaintiff has standing to sue in Plaintiff’s Complaint and pursuant to Article 14.6 of Chapter IV of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (“LAMC”) “Temporary Protection of Tenants During Covid-19 Pandemic” and the County of Los Angeles Eviction Moratorium.  (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 2; C.C.P. §430.10.)

 

On April 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed its complaint in the instant action for unlawful detainer (“UD”) against Defendant and non-moving Defendants Maria Ufie (“Ufie”) and Lisa Kaslov (“Kaslov”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  Plaintiff alleges it entered into a two-year written commercial lease with Defendants on or about November 1, 2018, for the property located at 600 S Spring St R107, Los Angeles, CA 90014 (“Subject Property”).  (See Complaint ¶¶3a, 6a-b, 7a.) 

 

On April 24, 2023, Defendant filed the instant demurrer. Plaintiff filed its opposition on April 27, 2023.  As of the date of this hearing Defendant has not filed a reply.

 

Legal Standard

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [citing text].)  A demurrer can be utilized where the complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery (e.g., dates pleaded in complaint show statute of limitations has run).  (Guardian North Bay, Inc. v. Superior Court (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 963, 971-972; Estate of Moss (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 521, 535 [citing text]; Alexander v. Exxon Mobil (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1236, 1250 [finding rule inapplicable based on fact issues re accrual].)

 

“Face of the complaint” includes matters shown in exhibits attached to the complaint and incorporated by reference, or in a superseded complaint in the same action.  (Frantz v. Blackwell (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 91, 94; Barnett v. Fireman’s Fund Insurance Co. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 500, 505 [“[W]e rely on and accept as true the contents of the exhibits and treat as surplusage the pleader’s allegations as to the legal effect of the exhibits.”]; George v. Automobile Club of Southern California (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1112, 1130 [“trial court was not required to credit plaintiff’s allegations that extrinsic evidence ‘renders the insurance contract at issue here ambiguous’” where language of policy attached to complaint showed otherwise].)

 

Summary of Demurrer

 

In support of her demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint, Defendant argues the Subject Property is a residential unit with sleeping quarters and a full kitchen, rather than a commercial lease as alleged in the Complaint, and the tenancy should therefore be treated as a residential tenancy and all of the eviction laws relating to residential property should apply, specifically City of Los Angeles Ordinance Number 187737, codified as Chapter XVI of LAMC Article 5 §165.03(H)(2) Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance of the City of Los Angeles.  (Demurrer, pg. 5.)  Defendant argues the property at issue in this case is subject to both Article 14.6 of Chapter IV of LAMC “Temporary Protection of Tenants During Covid-19 Pandemic” and Los Angeles County Eviction Moratoriums because it is located in the City of Los Angeles and the County of Los Angeles.  (Demurrer, pg. 5.)  Defendant argues Plaintiff lacks standing pursuant to C.C.P. §367 because Plaintiff is not the real party in interest and is not authorized to bring this UD action against Defendant.  (Demurrer, pg. 7.) 

 

Eviction Control Protections

 

Defendant argues that although the instant UD case is for a commercial lease, Defendant was forced to sign a Commercial Lease by the Lessor and the Subject Property is actually a residential unit with sleeping quarters and a full kitchen and the tenancy should be treated as a Residential Tenancy and all of the Eviction laws relating to Residential Property should apply, including City of Los Angeles Ordinance Number 187737, codified as Chapter XVI of LAMC Article 5 § 165.03(H)(2) Just Cause for Eviction Ordinance of the City of Los Angeles. (Demurrer, pg. 5.)

 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (Blank, 39 Cal.3d at pg. 318.)  A demurrer can be utilized where the complaint itself is incomplete or discloses some defense that would bar recovery (e.g., dates pleaded in complaint show statute of limitations has run).  (Guardian North Bay, Inc., 94 Cal.App.4th at pgs. 971-972.)  Here, the Court must take the pleadings on the face of Plaintiff’s complaint and exhibits as true and can only take notice of matters outside of the pleading that are judicially noticeable and indisputably true; Defendant’s assertion that the tenancy is for a residential unit is not an indisputably true judicially noticeable fact.  (Evid. Code §§451, 452; Fremont Indemnity Co. v. Fremont General Corp. (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 97, 114, quoting Cruz v. County of Los Angeles (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 1131, 1134 [“[J]udicial notice of matters upon demurrer will be dispositive only in those instances where there is not or cannot be a factual dispute concerning that which is sought to be judicially noticed.”].)

 

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint is overruled on the basis of eviction control protections.

 

Standing

         

Facts appearing in exhibits attached to the complaint are given precedence over inconsistent allegations in the complaint.  (Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th 1131, 1145-1146 [finding complaint’s allegations re anticipated hospital charges contradicted by attached agreement, signed by plaintiff, listing hospital’s charges]; Stella v. Asset Management Consultants, Inc. (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 181, 193-194 [finding complaint’s allegations of delayed discovery of fraud contradicted by documents attached as exhibits to complaint].)

 

Defendants argues Plaintiff lacks standing to bring the instant UD action because it is not the real party in interest and has failed to allege (a) it is a party to the lease or rental agreement (or, assignee of the principal’s interest) and (b) if it is suing as a party to the lease or rental agreement, that it executed the lease/rental agreement in its own name for the principal’s benefit pursuant to a management agreement with the principal, detailing the means by which the authority was conferred.  (Demurrer, pg. 7.)

 

Plaintiff’s complaint states Plaintiff is owner of the Subject Property.  (Complaint ¶4.)  However, Exhibit 1 to Plaintiff’s complaint states that the parties to the commercial lease are Defendant and 600 Tower LLC.  (Complaint, Exh. 1.)  While the party to the lease agreement, 600 Tower LLC, is not the Plaintiff alleged in the complaint to be the owner of the Subject Property, the exhibit does not contradict the allegations in the complaint and is therefore not an inconsistent pleading.  (See Moran v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2016) 3 Cal.App.5th at pgs. 1145-1146.)

 

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s complaint on the basis of standing is overruled.

 

Conclusion

 

Defendant’s demurrer, in pro per, to Plaintiff’s complaint is overruled without leave to amend.

 

 

Dated:  May ____, 2023

                                                                                                                                                

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court