Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV08665, Date: 2024-07-03 Tentative Ruling

Defendants Gregory Yates’ and The Law Offices of Gregory Yates’ unopposed demurrer to pro per Plaintiff Edgar Guzman’s complaint is sustained without leave to amend as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action.

Defendants Gregory Yates (“Yates”) and the Law Offices of Gregory Yates (“Law Office”) (collectively, “Defendants”) demur unopposed to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action in pro per Plaintiff Edgar Guzman’s (“Guzman”) (“Plaintiff”) complaint (“Complaint”) [erroneously labeled First Amended Complaint] on the following bases: (1) the face of the complaint and matters subject to judicial notice defeat at least an essential element for each cause of action alleged; (2) each cause of action is barred by the statute of limitations; (3) the alleged facts, even if true, would fail to support any of the causes of action alleged; and (4) each cause of action is so vague and confusing that it is fatally uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).)

Defendants’ 4/25/24 request for judicial notice of the March 14, 2024, Notice of Ruling and Minute order in the instant case is denied because the Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket.

Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Defendants on April 19, 2023, alleging eight causes of action: (1) breach of fiduciary duty; (2) fraudulent misrepresentation; (3) conversion; (4) fraudulent concealment; (5) constructive fraud; (6) breach of oral agreement; (7) breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; and (8) unjust enrichment.

Plaintiff’s Complaint arises from Plaintiff’s alleged entitlement to a settlement in the amount of $525,000.00 in a class action lawsuit. (See Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants sent a letter to Plaintiff with a check enclosed in the amount of $55,000.00, which was significantly less than it should have been. (Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges he was severely injured and could not cognitively investigate the amount of the settlement until years later when he began to recuperate, and through later discovery by a paralegal, Plaintiff found out the truth that his settlement was a low amount. (Complaint ¶12.)

On April 25, 2024, Defendants filed the instant demurrer. As of the date of this hearing no opposition was filed.

Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.) A declaration must be filed with a demurrer regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).)

Defendants’ counsel declares he met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiff on April 9, 2024. (Decl. of Robinson ¶4.) Defendants’ counsel declares the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the instant demurrer. (See Decl. of Robbins ¶4.) Defendants’ counsel’s declaration is sufficient under C.C.P. §430.41(a). Accordingly, the Court will consider the instant demurrer.

Defendants demur to each cause of action the Complaint on bases they fail to state facts sufficient to plead a cause of action, are impermissibly uncertain, and are barred by the statute of limitations. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 4-5; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f), 340.6, 338.)

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

A demurrer must be sustained without leave to amend absent a showing by plaintiff that a reasonable possibility exists that the defect can be cured by amendment. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; Lacher v. Superior Court (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 1038, 1043.)

Breach of Fiduciary Duty, Constructive Fraud, Breach of Oral Agreement, Breach of the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing, & Unjust Enrichment (1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, & 8th COAs)

C.C.P. §340.6 applies to all wrongful acts or omissions by an attorney, other than actual fraud. (Quintilliani v. Mannerino (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 54 [claims for breach of fiduciary duty against an attorney]; Stoll v. Superior Court (1992) Cal.App.4th 1162; Vafi v. McCloskey (201l) 193 Cal.App.3d 874 [actions for malicious prosecution].) The statute of limitations for C.C.P. §340.6 is within one year after the plaintiff discovers, or through the use of reasonable diligence should have discovered, the facts constituting the wrongful act or omission, or four years from the date of the wrongful act or omission, whichever occurs first. (C.C.P. §340.6(a).)

Plaintiff alleges that the original settlement was made when he was under duress with a head injury, economic duress, and undue influence, and Defendants took advantage of Plaintiff and his severe head injury. (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges he meets the requirement for delayed discovery and equitable tolling of the statute of limitations based on new, later discovery on or about December 29, 2018. (Complaint ¶2.)

Defendants provided copies of the transcript of the status meeting taken on May 26, 2009, before Hon. Magistrate Judge Carla M. Woehrle in Multi-Ethnic Immigrant Workers Organizing Network et al., v. City of Los Angeles, et al., U.S. District Court, C.D. Cal., Case No. CV-07-3072. (D-RJN, Exh. 1.) At the May 26, 2009, status meeting, the record states:

Court: . . . All right. We had a further settlement discussion with Mr. Yates and Mr. Guzman and myself just a few moments ago in chambers. And I want to get everyone’s understanding clear on the record with regard to a final resolution of the settlement as it effects Mr. Guzman individually.

And Mr. Guzman, what we discussed was an agreement—there had previously been the signed agreement for a $50,000 payment to you. And the number has now been agreed, and this is by Mr. Yates and you, that the number will be $55,000. And is that Correct?

Mr. Litt: The payment will—it will be available to Mr. Guzman in the full amount. It will be up to Mr. Guzman whether he wants it in the full amount because nobody can guarantee how it effects his SSI payment.

The Court: Okay. So that—if you want it all at once Mr. Guzman, it will be paid all at once. Okay?

Plaintiff Guzman: Because again, I did not put myself in this situation, the City did. Why should I—

Plaintiff Guzman: But I—but you ordered that I would not lose my SSI because that’s the only thing I want to—

The Court: No, I can’t. No one can order that. That’s an issue that is a completely separate legal issue.

The Court: It will be important for you to talk to a lawyer about it. It will be important and that’s why Mr. Yates—that’s why Mr. Yates has agreed to do that.

The Court: I said—what I’m saying now, Mr. Guzman—let’s make it clear—is that no one is making any promises or agreements about what happens with your SSI. Everyone will be trying to make it work for you so that you don’t lose your SSI and that’s why Mr. Yates is setting up a consultation with you for a lawyer who is a specialist. But I don’t know the answer to that so I’m certainly not promising it, Mr. Litt doesn’t know the answer to that and Mr. Yates doesn’t know the answer to that.

The transcript reflects that on May 26, 2009, Plaintiff acknowledged before the court that he understood he would receive $55,000 of the settlement, that he accepted the $55,000 settlement amount, and that he was to consult with separate counsel regarding his SSI benefits and Yates’ expense. There was no later opportunity for Plaintiff to learn that he was to receive $55,000 in proceeds from the settlement at issue. Plaintiff’s August 16, 2021, complaint filed in now-dismissed LASC Case No. 21STCV30112 includes a copy of a letter from Law Office, dated June 7, 2010, stating the $55,000 check was enclosed. (D-RJN, Exh. 3.) There is no reason for the statute of limitations to be equitably tolled based on late-discovered facts or duress from Defendants.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the 1st, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action is sustained without leave to amend.

Actions for fraud are subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (See C.C.P. §338(d) [“An action for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake. The cause of action in that case is not deemed to have accrued until the discovery, by the aggrieved party, of the facts constituting the fraud or mistake.”].)

Therefore, Plaintiff’s causes of action for breach of fraudulent misrepresentation and fraudulent concealment are governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in C.C.P. §338 and are time-barred.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the 2nd and 4th causes of action is sustained without leave to amend.

An action for taking, detaining, or injuring goods or chattels is subject to a three-year statute of limitations. (See C.C.P. §338(c)(1).)

Plaintiff alleges he discovered the alleged conversion no later than December 29, 2018. (Complaint ¶¶2, 4, 14.) Accepting the allegation of conversion as true, the statute of limitations for conversion expired, at the latest, by June 29, 2022.

Therefore, Plaintiff’s cause of action for conversion governed by the three-year statute of limitations set forth in C.C.P. §338 and is time-barred.

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the 3rd cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

The necessary elements of a cause of action for Fraud are: (1) the false representation of material facts (or, in the case of fraudulent concealment, active concealment of material facts); (2) knowledge of falsity; (3) the intent to deceive or induce detrimental reliance; (4) actual and reasonable detrimental reliance on the false representations; and (5) resulting damage. (Civ. Code §§1709, 1710; CACI 1900; Molko v. Holy Spirit Association (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1108.)

Fraud “must be pled specifically; general and conclusory allegations do not suflice.” (Small v. Fritz Cos., Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) A plaintiff must plead “how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the [fraudulent] representations were tendered.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645.) This stringent pleading requirement is justified by the fact that fraud allegations constitute a serious attack on a person’s character and fairness requires that the complete details of the charge be given to allow for the preparation of a defense. (Committee On Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197.)

“The law is well established that actionable misrepresentations must pertain to past or existing material facts. Statements or predictions regarding future events are deemed to be mere opinions which are not actionable.” (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469, internal citation omitted.)

Plaintiff fails to allege misrepresentations of fact that Defendants made with the requisite specificity. Plaintiff merely alleges legal conclusions and promises of future conduct. (See id.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ demurrer to the 2nd and 4th causes of action is sustained.

Defendants’ unopposed demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is sustained without leave to amend as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court