Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV12481, Date: 2023-12-15 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff The People of the State of California, acting by and through the California Department of Transportation’s unopposed motion for an order for possession of the property designated in the complaint on file in this proceeding as Parcel 81710-1 is granted. Plaintiff is authorized to take possession of Parcel 81710-1 on Tuesday, January 30, 2024.

Plaintiff The People of the State of California, acting by and through the California Department of Transportation (“State”) (“Plaintiff”) moves unopposed for an order for possession of the property designated in the complaint on file in this proceeding as Parcel 81710-1. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §1255.410.) Plaintiff requests this Court immediately issue an order for possession of Parcel 81710-1, authorizing Plaintiff to take possession of Parcel 81710-1 on Tuesday, January 30, 2024, or on the thirtieth (30th) day following the date of service of the order, whichever is later. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2.)

Plaintiff is currently engaged in a project on Pacific Coast Highway/State Route (SR)-1 from Paseo De Las Delicias in Redondo Beach to Dewey Street in Santa Monica (“Project”) in order to preserve and extend the life of the existing pavement adjacent too SR-1 and to improve ride quality (e.g., Caltrans is upgrading existing curb ramps to bring them into compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), repairing concrete pavement, reconstructing bus pads, etc.). (Decl. of Dan Murdoch ¶4.)

Defendant Lincoln Inn, LLC, is the record owner of real property at 2447 Lincoln Blvd, Venice, CA 90291 (“Subject Property”). The right of way required from the Subject Property consists of 175 square feet in Highway Easement. The larger parcel is located within the Venice neighborhood in the city of Los Angeles. It comprises 16,492 square feet of land and is improved with a motel, The Lincoln Inn. (Decl. of Dan Murdoch ¶6.)

Plaintiff filed the operative complaint in Eminent Domain on June 1, 2023, seeking to acquire by eminent domain of Parcel 81710-1. Parcel 81710-1 is described as follows:

For State Highway purposes, a Highway Easement, in, to, over and across that portion of Lot 7 of Tract No. 1112, in the City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, State of California, as shown on a map recorded in Book 17, Page 120 of Maps in the Office of the County Recorder of said Los Angeles County, lying southeasterly and northeasterly from the following described line:

COMMENCING at the intersection of the centerline of Lincoln Boulevard with the centerline of Coeur D’Alene Avenue as shown on Tract No. 18591, filed in Book 529, Pages 1 and 2 of Maps in said Office of the County Recorder of Los Angeles County; thence along said centerline of Lincoln Boulevard North 59°40'23" West 41.89 feet; thence leaving said centerline at a right angle South 30°19'37" West 50.00 feet to a point on the southwesterly right-of-way line of said Lincoln Boulevard lying parallel with and 50.00 feet southwesterly from said centerline, said point being the TRUE POINT OF BEGINNING; thence South 54°48'35" West 3.12 feet; thence South 15°10'37" East 13.00 feet; thence South 84°28'22" East 13.81 feet to the northwesterly right-of-way line of said Coeur D’Alene Avenue as shown on said Tract No. 18591, said point being the point of terminus.

The bearings and distances in the herein above described lines are based on the California Coordinate System North American Datum (NAD) 1983, Zone 5. Divide grid distance by a combination factor of 1.00001180 to obtain ground distance.

References to the centerlines of Lincoln Boulevard and Coeur D’Alene Avenue noted herein refer to centerlines re-established per Caltrans SR 18084.

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on September 15, 2023. On December 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition. As of the date of this hearing no opposition has been filed.

At the time of filing the complaint or at any time after filing the complaint and prior to entry of judgment, the plaintiff may move the court for an order for possession under this article, demonstrating that the plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain and has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.

The motion shall describe the property of which the plaintiff is seeking to take possession, which description may be by reference to the complaint, and shall state the date after which the plaintiff is seeking to take possession of the property. The motion shall include a statement substantially in the following form: “You have the right to oppose this motion for an order of possession of your property. If you oppose this motion you must serve the plaintiff and file with the court a written opposition to the motion within 30 days from the date you were served with this motion.” If the written opposition asserts a hardship, it shall be supported by a declaration signed under penalty of perjury stating facts supporting the hardship.

“The plaintiff shall serve a copy of the motion on the record owner of the property and on the occupants, if any. The plaintiff shall set the court hearing on the motion not less than 60 days after service of the notice of motion on the record owner of unoccupied property. If the property is lawfully occupied by a person dwelling thereon or by a farm or business operation, service of the notice of motion shall be made not less than 90 days prior to the hearing on the motion.” (C.C.P. §1255.410(b).)

“If the motion is not opposed within 30 days of service on each defendant and occupant of the property, the court shall make an order for possession of the property if the court finds each of the following: (A) The plaintiff is entitled to take the property by eminent domain. (B) The plaintiff has deposited pursuant to Article 1 (commencing with Section 1255.010) an amount that satisfies the requirements of that article.” (C.C.P. §1255.410(d)(1).)

Plaintiff established that it is entitled to take the property by eminent domain. (C.C.P. §1255.410(d)(1)(A).) Plaintiff is a public entity with condemnation authority pursuant to C.C.P. §§1230.010-1273.050 (particularly C.C.P. §§1240.510 and 1240.610) (“Eminent Domain Law”), and Article 1, Section 19 of the California Constitution.

A public entity may not commence an eminent domain proceeding until its governing body has adopted a Resolution of Necessity (“RON”). (C.C.P. §1245.220.) The governing body for the State of California, Department of Transportation, is the California Transportation Commission. (C.C.P. §1245.210(e).)

On March 23, 2023, at a meeting held in Los Angeles, California, the California Transportation Commission passed and adopted RON No. C-22252, declaring that the property that is the subject of this proceeding is necessary for state highway purposes. (Decl. of Farr ¶7, Exh. A.) A resolution adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to the Eminent Domain Law conclusively establishes that the parcel described is necessary for the construction of a necessary public project. (C.C.P. §1245.250.)

Plaintiff has also established it made a deposit of the probable amount of just compensation. (C.C.P. §§1255.410(d)(1)(B), (d)(2)(B).) On May 26, 2023, Plaintiff deposited with the State Treasurer the sum of $17,000 pursuant to C.C.P. §1255.010(a), representing the probable amount of compensation for the taking of Parcel 81710-1. (Decl. of Romero ¶3, Exh. A.)

Assuming, arguendo, the motion is opposed, Plaintiff can establish that it has an overriding need to possess the subject property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case, and that the State will suffer a substantial hardship if the application for possession is denied or limited. (C.C.P. §1255.410(d)(2)(C).) Plaintiff has established that acquisition of the subject parcel is necessary for the construction of a necessary public project because (a) the California Transportation Commission passed and adopted RON No. C-22252, declaring that the property that is the subject of this proceeding is necessary for state highway purposes, and (b) a resolution adopted by the governing body of the public entity pursuant to the Eminent Domain Law conclusively establishes that the parcel described is necessary for the construction of a necessary public project. (C.C.P. §1245.250.)

Plaintiff has an overriding need for prejudgment possession of Parcel 81710-1 because the construction of the Project as a whole will be delayed without it, as timely construction on the subject property is critical and necessary to the timely completion of the Project. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶8.) Plaintiff seeks to acquire a highway easement over 175 square feet from the subject parcel, encompassing existing sidewalk and curb adjacent to SR-1. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶¶4-5.) Said acquisition is part of the Project, a public project which mainly seeks to upgrade existing curb ramps to comply with the ADA and to repair concrete pavement adjacent to SR-1. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶4; Decl. of Farr ¶5.)

Plaintiff’s Deputy District Director for the Division of Design for District 7 of the State of California, Department of Transportation, Gregory Farr (“Farr”), declares that work on the Project will be carried out in sequences according to Project sections, or corridors. (See Decl. of Farr ¶8.) Farr declares this in part explained by Plaintiff’s contractual requirement to obtain prejudgment possession of all parcels within a Project section to ensure its contractors have concurrent access to all of them. (Decl. of Farr ¶6.) Plaintiff’s contractors require concurrent access to several parcels of land in a given Project section in order to work on their final design, acquisition, and construction in parallel/synchrony. (Decl. of Farr ¶8.) Only through concurrent access to all parcels in a given Project section can the State’s contractors timely complete construction of a given section and the Project, overall. (Decl. of Farr ¶8.)

Here, Plaintiff’s Right of Way Division has determined that pre-judgment possession of Parcel 81710-1 is needed to complete Projected-related construction on that parcel, as well as all other parcels that encompass the Project section concerned. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶6; Decl. of Farr ¶6.) Thus, the sequenced construction on the subject property will need to be carried out well before trial of the underlying action. However, if Plaintiff cannot obtain prejudgment possession of the subject property, then construction for the affected Project section will be delayed, which in turn will delay construction/progress of the overall Project. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶8; Decl. of Farr ¶9.)

In addition, Plaintiff has an overriding need for prejudgment possession of the subject property to mitigate its liability/losses and to ensure funding for the Project. Only through prejudgment possession of the subject parcel can the State avoid construction delays, promptly advance construction of the Project, and ensure continued funding necessary to construct the Project. (Decl. of Farr ¶9.) Therefore, Plaintiff can establish that it has an overriding need to possess the subject property prior to the issuance of final judgment in the case.

Plaintiff can also establish that it will suffer a substantial hardship if the instant application for prejudgment possession is denied or limited in that (1) construction of the Project will be delayed and costs will increase (i.e., costs of labor and material) because (a) the Project for which this parcel is being acquired must be advertised for construction by a certain date, (b) the selected contractor will need concurrent access to multiple parcels of the affected corridor, including the subject parcel, to complete the Project, or else the State will have to suspend the Project, leading to continued difficulties and safety concerns for the motoring public, and (c) the State will have to pay delay damages to the contractor in the amount of $16,000 per workday. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶8; Decl. of Farr ¶10.)

Finally, the hardship to the State if prejudgment possession is denied or limited outweighs any arguable hardship to the defendants. First, delays in acquiring the subject property will immediately delay construction in the Project section concerned and will affect the overall construction of the Project, which will lead to increased costs in labor and services. (Decl. of Farr ¶10.) Plaintiff could also lose millions of dollars already invested in the Project and it could be exposed to abandonment costs, as well. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶8; Decl. of Farr ¶10.)

In contrast, the appraised value of the subject property that the State seeks to acquire is $17,000. (See Decl. of Romero ¶3, Exh. A.) The current property owner will receive at minimum this amount as just compensation in condemnation. Further, the State previously negotiated in an effort to reach a resolution for possession with the property owner, but to no avail. (Decl. of Murdoch ¶10.) The defendant owner has made no allegations tending to show it will suffer any hardship if it receives the just compensation sooner, upon an order of pre-judgment possession, rather than later, after final judgment.

Plaintiff’s unopposed motion for an order for possession of the property designated in the complaint on file in this proceeding as Parcel 81710-1 is granted. Plaintiff is authorized to take possession of Parcel 81710-1 on Tuesday, January 30, 2024.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court