Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV13766, Date: 2023-08-17 Tentative Ruling

Defendants’ request for attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on the instant motion is denied.

Defendants Amazon.com, Inc. (“Amazon Inc.”), Amazon.com Services LLC [erroneously sued as Amazon.com Services LLC, Inc.] (“Amazon LLC”), David Herrera (“Herrera”), Elizabeth Colmenero (“Colmenero”), Elisa Lopez (“Lopez”), and Beth Galetti (“Galetti”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to transfer Plaintiff Lachelle Harris’ (“Harris”) (“Plaintiff”) entire action to the Superior Court for the County of San Bernardino on the ground that Plaintiff’s selection of the Superior Court for the County of Los Angeles was improper. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§396b, 397(a), 399.) Defendants also request attorneys’ fees and expenses incurred on the instant motion in the amount of $3,800. (Notice of Motion, pg. 3; C.C.P. §396b(b).)

On June 14, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Defendants alleging fifteen causes of action: (1) breach of express and implied contract; (2) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (3) violation of California Constitution; (4) harassment in violation of California Government Code §§12900 et seq.; (5) retaliation in violation of California Government Code §§12900 et seq.; (6) discrimination in violation of California Government Code §§12900 et seq.; (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (8) violation of Business & Professions Code §17200; (9) fraud; (10) negligent misrepresentation; (11) concealment; (12) violation of Labor Code §1198.5; (13) negligent management; (14) violation of Labor Code §1102.5; and (15) violation of the California Fair Pay Act, arising from Plaintiff’s employment at a fulfillment center as a Fulfillment Associate beginning on September 10, 2020 and ending with her termination on May 4, 2022, while Plaintiff was on a disability leave of absence after pregnancy.

Defendants filed the instant motion on July 19, 2023. Plaintiff filed her opposition on August 4, 2023. Defendants filed their reply on August 10, 2023.

“The court may, on timely motion, order transfer of an action ‘[w]hen the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court.’ [Citations] The moving party must overcome the presumption that the plaintiff has selected the proper venue. [Citation] Thus, ‘[i]t is the moving defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the plaintiff’s venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds.’ [Citation] In opposing the motion to change venue, ‘[t]he plaintiff may bolster his or her choice of venue with counter-affidavits consistent with the complaint’s theory of the type of action but amplifying the allegations relied upon for venue.’ [Citation.]” (Fontaine v. Superior Court (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 830, 836.)

If venue is proper in either of several counties (i.e., actions triable at defendant’s residence or elsewhere), defendant must do more than merely show residence in another county. Rather, defendant has the burden of “negating the propriety of venue as laid on all possible grounds”: i.e., it must show that the county selected by plaintiff was not the place of injury or contracting, etc. (Karson Industries, Inc. v. Superior Court (1969) 273 Cal.App.2d 7, 8-9.)

For venue purposes, actions are classified as “local” or “transitory.” (Brown v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 477, 482 n.5.) To determine whether an action is “local” or “transitory,” the Court looks to the “main relief sought.” (Id.) Where the main relief sought is personal, the action is transitory; however, where the main relief involves rights to real property, the action is local. (Id.) In transitory actions against individual defendants, the general rule of venue is applicable, where the county in which the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper county for the trial of the action. (See C.C.P. §395(a); see also Brown, 37 Cal.3d at pg. 483.) Under C.C.P. §395, “residence” means “actual bodily presence in the place combined with a freely exercised intention of remaining there permanently or for an indefinite time.” (See Enter v. Crutcher (1958) 159 Cal.App.2d Supp. 841, 845.)

Venue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made. (Brown, 37 Cal.3d at pg. 482, citing Haurat v. Superior Court (1966) 241 Cal.App.2d 330, 337.) In Brown v. Superior Court, the Brown Court held that the special provisions of the FEHA venue statute control in cases involving FEHA claims joined with non-FEHA claims arising from the same facts; thus, C.C.P. §395 does not apply. (Id. at pg. 487.)

The FEHA venue provision provides as follows: “The superior courts of the State of California shall have jurisdiction of actions brought pursuant to this section, and the aggrieved person may file in these courts. An action may be brought in any county in the state in which the unlawful practice is alleged to have been committed, in the county in which the records relevant to the practice are maintained and administered, or in the county in which the aggrieved person would have worked or would have had access to the public accommodation but for the alleged unlawful practice, but if the defendant is not found within any of these counties, an action may be brought within the county of the defendant’s residence or principal office.” (Gov. Code §12965(c)(1)(E)(3), emphasis added.)

Defendants failed to meet their burden to establish that Plaintiff’s venue selection is not proper under any of the statutory grounds in Gov. Code §12965(c)(1)(E)(3), and Plaintiff is entitled to the presumption that her choice of venue is proper. (Fontaine, 175 Cal.App.4th at pg. 836.) Plaintiff bolsters the presumption that her choice of venue is proper by submitting evidence in her counter-affidavit that “but for the Defendants’ conduct [she] would have been employed in and worked in Los [Angeles] County”; and “[b]ut for Defendants’ refusal to provide [her] with [accommodation] [she] would have worked remotely for/or in Los Angeles County at any one of Defendants’ many Los Angeles County locations that were options including: any Amazon warehouse sort center in LA County, there are several categories of Amazon warehouses: Fulfillment centers (Fcs), Sortation centers (SCs), Delivery stations (Dss), including #LGB1 – 2417 E. Carson St, Long Beach, California, 90810 – Los Angeles County.” (Decl. of Harris ¶¶2, 5.)

Defendants’ argument that Plaintiff has not worked in Los Angeles County, remotely or otherwise, are not supported by the Declaration of Ruiz; rather, Ruiz states that as a Human Resources Business Partner, “[t]he personnel

records available to [her] reflect details such as an employee’s site location, schedule, and requests for transfer. These records reflect that, at the time of Plaintiff’s termination, she was scheduled to continue working at LGB7 in San Bernardino County” and that Ruiz is “not aware of Plaintiff requesting a transfer from LGB7 or Amazon granting a transfer from LGB7.” (Decl. of Ruiz ¶5.) Ruiz’s declaration does not state that Plaintiff did not request an accommodation to work within her restrictions, which included remote work due to COVID and in Los Angeles County.

In light of the Court’s ruling on the motion, Defendants’ request for reasonable fees and expenses incurred on the instant motion is denied.

Defendants’ request for reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on the instant motion is denied.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court