Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV15107, Date: 2023-11-01 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV15107 Hearing Date: November 1, 2023 Dept: 71
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE RULING
| FAB 5, LLC, vs. ALAN NEEDLE, et al. | Case No.: 23STCV15107 Hearing Date: November 1, 2023 |
Defendants Tucalota Creek Ranch’s, Alan Needle’s, and Kay Needle’s unopposed motion to transfer venue to Riverside County Superior Court is granted.
Defendants’ request for sanctions is denied.
Defendants Tucalota Creek Ranch (“TCR”), Alan Needle (“Alan”), and Kay Needle (“Kay”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move unopposed to transfer the venue in this action to the Riverside County Superior Court. (Notice of Motion, pg. 1; C.C.P. §§396b(a), 397(a).) Defendants also move for an award of reasonable expenses and attorneys’ fees incurred in the making the instant motion. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §396b(b).)
Procedural History
Plaintiff Fab 5, LLC (“Fab 5”) filed its initial complaint on June 28, 2023. Fab 5 and Robert Lindholm (“Lindholm”) (collectively, Plaintiffs”) filed the operative first amended complaint (“FAC”) on July 5, 2023, for a single cause of action for declaratory relief.
Defendants filed the instant motion on August 1, 2023. Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition on October 26, 2023. Defendants filed their reply on October 26, 2023.
Discussion
C.C.P. §395.5 provides that a corporation may be sued in the county “where the contract is made or is to be performed, or where the obligation or liability arises, or the breach occurs; or in the county where the principal place of business of such corporation is situated . . . .”
C.C.P. §395 states, in relevant part, “the superior court in the county where the defendants or some of them reside at the commencement of the action is the proper court for the trial of the action.” (C.C.P. §395.) “The right of a defendant to have an action brought against him tried in the county in which he has his residence is an ancient and valuable right, which has always been safeguarded by statute and is supported by a long line of judicial decisions.” (Cholakian & Associates v. Superior Court (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 361, 371.)
Generally, “[v]enue is determined based on the complaint on file at the time the motion to change venue is made.” (Cholakian & Associates, 236 Cal.App.4th at pg. 367.) “[A]ll ambiguities will be construed against the pleader to the end that a defendant shall not be deprived improperly of his fundamental right to have the cause tried in the county of his residence.” (Bybee v. Fairchild (1946) 75 Cal.App.2d 35, 37.) Additionally, a defendant may submit declarations and evidence in support of the motion to transfer venue. (Archer v. Superior Court of Humboldt County (1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 417, 419.)
“The general rule is that the defendant is entitled to have an action tried against him in the county of his residence unless the proceeding comes under” an exception. (Hardy v. White (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 550, 552.) Once a defendant demonstrates that it is not a resident of the plaintiff’s chosen venue, “the burden is on the plaintiff to show that the case comes clearly within one of the statutory exceptions to the general rule that actions are triable in the place of the defendant’s residence.” (Archer, 202 Cal.App.2d at pg. 420.)
Here, TCR is a California Corporation with its principal place of business in Riverside County, California. (Decl. of A. Needle ¶3.) Further, Fab 5 entered into the Contract with TCR in Riverside County, California. (Decl. of K. Needle
¶6; Decl. of Culver ¶3, Ex. A at ¶6.) The training and care of the horses, which is the underlying basis for this suit, occurred at TCR in Riverside County. (Decl. of Culver ¶3, Ex. A at ¶7.) No underlying factual aspect of this suit has occurred in Los Angeles County. The mere location of Plaintiff’s home in Los Angeles County and the location from where Lindholm drafts and sends electronic correspondence to the Defendants does not make it the proper venue for this suit.
Alan and Kay reside at TCR in Riverside County and have at all relevant times related to this suit. (Decl. of A. Needle ¶4; Decl. of K. Needle ¶3.) Having shown that their county of residence is Riverside County, the burden on this motion shifts to Plaintiffs to show that one of the exceptions to venue at the defendant’s place of residence applies. Plaintiff does not oppose the instant motion and therefore does not meet his burden to demonstrate an exception to venue applies.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for change of venue is granted.
Sanctions
Upon granting a motion to transfer, a court is authorized to award the moving party expenses and attorneys fees related to the motion. (C.C.P. §396b(b).). In determining whether that order for expenses and fees shall be made, the court shall take into consideration (1) whether an offer to stipulate to change of venue was reasonably made and rejected, and (2) whether the motion or selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law the party making the motion or selecting the venue knew or should have known. (C.C.P. §396b(b).).
Based on the declaration of Lindholm, the Court determines Plaintiff’s selection of venue was made in good faith given the facts and law Lindholm, in pro per, knew or should have known. (See Decl. of Lindholm ¶¶4-6.)
Accordingly, Defendant’s request for attorneys’ fees is denied.
Conclusion
Defendants TCR’s, Alan’s, and Kay’s unopposed motion to transfer venue to Riverside County Superior Court is granted.
Defendants’ request for sanctions is denied.
Plaintiff is to pay all transfer fees.
Moving Party to give notice.
| |
| Hon. Daniel M. Crowley |
| Judge of the Superior Court |