Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV15666, Date: 2023-10-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV15666 Hearing Date: October 11, 2023 Dept: 71
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE
RULING
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WOW MEDIA INC.,
vs. DOES 1 THROUGH 20. |
Case
No.: 23STCV15666 Hearing Date: October 11, 2023 |
Plaintiff Wow Media Inc.’s motion for leave to serve
discovery is granted.
Plaintiff Wow Media Inc. (“Wow Media”)
(“Plaintiff”) moves for this Court to grant it leave to serve discovery
notwithstanding the 20-day hold on deposition notices after service of the
summons in C.C.P. §2025.210(b). (Notice
of Motion, pg. 2.)
Plaintiff filed the instant motion on October
2, 2023. On October 9, 2023, Non-party Davidson
Kempner Capital Management, LP (“Davidson Kempner”) specially appeared to file
an untimely opposition. On October 10,
2023, Plaintiff filed a response.
Plaintiff objects to consideration of
Davidson Kempner’s untimely opposition.
The Court, in its discretion, considers Davidson Kempner’s untimely
opposition.
Discussion
Plaintiff
requests that the Court issue an Order (1) granting leave to serve third-party
discovery in this action, and (2) approving the Subpoena issued out of LASC
directed at Davidson Kempner, dated July 21, 2023 (“Los Angeles Subpoena”),
pursuant to which a New York subpoena was issued on July 27, 2023 (“New York
Subpoena”) in an abundance of caution to end any dispute over whether it can
proceed with discovery.
C.C.P.
§474 allows a plaintiff who is ignorant of a defendant’s identity to commence
suit before the statute of limitations runs by using a fictitious name for that
defendant and then amending the complaint when the defendant’s true name is discovered.
If the statute’s requirements are
satisfied, the amendment relates back, and the substituted defendant is
considered to have been a party from the action’s start. (Hahn v. New York Brake LLC (2022)
77 Cal.App.5th 895, 897-898.)
“The
test [to determine in a plaintiff has properly invoked C.C.P. §474] is whether,
at the time the complaint was filed, the plaintiff ‘was ignorant of the facts
giving [her] a cause of action against the person.’ [Citation.] The focus is on
the facts that the plaintiff knew, not on whether the
plaintiff subjectively knew she had a cause of action based on those facts.
[Citation.]” (Id. at pg. 899,
citations omitted.)
“Code
of Civil Procedure ‘[s]ection 474 allows a plaintiff in good faith to delay
suing particular persons as named defendants until [plaintiff] has knowledge of
sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to believe liability is
probable.’ ‘[S]ection 474 does not impose upon the plaintiff a duty to go in
search of facts she does not actually have at the time she files her original pleading.’”
(Fuller v. Tucker (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 1163, 1172, citations omitted.)
Plaintiff
is obligated to act diligently in amending its Complaint and this Court will expect
this Action to proceed without delay. (A.N.
v. County of Los Angeles (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1058, 1065-1069 [requiring
diligence in amending complaint]; Bernson v. Browning-Ferris Industries
(1994) 7 Cal.4th 926, 936 [approving use of §474 and discovery to identify wrongdoers
but noting that the statute of limitations will not be tolled indefinitely].) “[A] plaintiff may not disregard reasonably
available avenues of inquiry which, if vigorously pursued, might yield the
desired information.” (Bernson, 7
Cal.4th at pg. 936.)
C.C.P.
§474 does not require the naming and service of a known defendant in order to
initiate a lawsuit and commence discovery.
(See C.C.P. §474.) To
require the inclusion and service of a named party prior to the commencement of
discovery would defeat the entire purpose of the statute, which is to preserve
a plaintiff’s legal rights while it pursues discovery necessary to find
defendants and, if appropriate, amend the complaint. (See Optical Surplus, Inc. v. Superior
Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 776, 783 [holding C.C.P. §474 provides a method
for adding defendants after the statute of limitations has expired, but only
when the plaintiff is actually ignorant of the facts establishing a cause of action
against the party to be substituted for a Doe defendant]; Grinnell Fire Protection
System Co. v. American Savings & Loan Ass’n (1986) 183
Cal.App.3d 352, 359 [holding C.C.P. §474 “is liberally construed . . . [and] a
plaintiff will not be refused the right to use a Doe pleading even where the
plaintiff’s lack of actual knowledge is attributable to plaintiff’s own
negligence”].)
C.C.P.
§§1986 and 1987, which establish the rules for issuance of subpoenas, do not
include any limitation on when subpoenas may be served relating to service of
summons on a defendant. Further, C.C.P.
§2025.210(b) states, “The plaintiff may serve a deposition notice without leave
of court on any date that is 20 days after the service of the summons on, or
appearance by, any defendant. On motion with or without notice, the court, for
good cause shown, may grant to a plaintiff leave to serve a deposition notice
on an earlier date.”
Plaintiff
has demonstrated good faith in its delay suing particularly named defendants
until it has knowledge of sufficient facts to cause a reasonable person to
believe liability is probable.
Specifically, Plaintiff has demonstrated that the “Outdoor Advertising
Review,” dated June 16, 2022 (“OAR”) was first transmitted by email from FHWA
to Steven Keck, Caltrans’ Acting Director, on June 23, 2022. (Decl. of Alger ¶14, Exh. G.)
Plaintiff
demonstrated Srikanth Balasubramanian (“Balasubramanian”), Deputy Division
Chief of Caltrans Division of Traffic Operations, forwarded the OAR to others
within Caltrans by email and suggested a meeting with Caltrans’ incoming
Director, Tony Tavares (“Tavares”) and the Caltrans Legal Department “either
late next week or the July 4th week.” (Decl. of Alger ¶14.) Balasubramanian told the recipients within
the agency, “I want us to be prepared with our actions as soon as we can, before
discussing this with others internally or externally.” (Decl. of Alger ¶14, Exh. H, emphasis added.)
Plaintiff
has demonstrated the OAR questioned the legality of nine of Plaintiff’s digital
displays in Inglewood, on the basis that two of the sign structures (located on
the right-of-way for La Cienega Boulevard) were visible from Interstate 405,
and seven other digital billboards were visible from surface streets that
qualified as “principal arterials” subject to the state Outdoor Advertising
Act, Bus & Prof. Code §§5200-5486 (“OAA”), but had not received permits
from Caltrans. (Decl. of Alger
¶15.)
Plaintiff
has demonstrated the OAR was erroneous in alleging that Plaintiff’s surface
street digital displays in Inglewood were unlawful and subject to federal and
state highway regulations, further confirmed by Caltrans at a meeting on
January 19, 2023, between Balasubramanian and City representatives. (Decl. of
Alger ¶17, Exh. J.) Balasubramanian
wrote: “Caltrans has determined that it lacks prescriptive and enforcement
jurisdiction over local roads, which are part of the National Highway System
but not part of the State Highway System. Caltrans’ current State legislated
oversight authority is limited to State Highway System with regards to ODA
enforcement. Therefore, Caltrans has determined that it has jurisdiction only
over two of the nine displays that are located within 660 feet of the State
highway right-of-way.” (Decl. of Alger ¶17, Exh. J) Balasubramanian further acknowledged that
Caltrans had approved Plaintiff’s displays near the San Diego Freeway. (Decl. of Alger ¶17, Exh. J)
Plaintiff
demonstrated that the OAR was improperly transmitted to Davidson Kempner – in a
manner that was not privileged – supported by internal emails at Caltrans that
were produced to Plaintiff pursuant to requests under the California Public
Records Act. Plaintiff demonstrates this
based on the fact that George Anzo, Jr., Caltrans’ ODA Permits Manager, did not
meet with Heidi Quintrell, Acting Chief of Encroachment and Outdoor Advertising
Permits, regarding the OAR prior to July 7, 2022. (Decl. of Alger ¶22, Exh. L.) Plaintiff demonstrated Tavares, the Caltrans
Director, was not briefed on the OAR until July 12, 2022. (Decl. of Alger ¶22, Exhs. M-N.) Emails show that officials at Caltrans were
putting the OAR on the agenda for an upcoming Traffic Operations Board meeting
on July 22, 2022. (Decl. of Alger ¶22, Exh.
O.) Plaintiff demonstrates these
discussions ultimately resulted in Tavares’ response to the FHWA on August 17,
2022, and the transmittal of the OAR by Caltrans to the mayor of Inglewood on
August 31, 2023 – two months after the OAR came into the possession of Louis
Littman at Davidson Kempner. (Decl. of
Alger ¶22.)
Plaintiff
sufficiently demonstrates that it does not have knowledge of the person who circulated
the OAR, but that Davidson Kempner has information that would be useful in
identifying potential defendants in the instant action.
Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to leave to serve third-party discovery in this action and approving the
Los Angeles Subpoena is granted.
Conclusion
Plaintiff’s
motion for leave to leave to serve third-party discovery in this action and
approving the Los Angeles Subpoena is granted.
Moving
Party to give notice.
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Hon. Daniel M. Crowley |
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Judge of the Superior Court |