Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV15747, Date: 2024-10-10 Tentative Ruling

Plaintiff Renard Louis’ motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is granted. Plaintiff may file the proposed first amended complaint with the Court.

Plaintiff filed his initial Complaint on July 6, 2023, alleging nine causes of action against Defendant County of Los Angeles (“County”) (“Defendant”): (1) discrimination on the basis of race (Gov. Code §12940(a)); (2) discrimination on the basis of marital status (Gov. Code §12940(a)); (3) discrimination on the basis of disability (Gov. Code §12940(a)); (4) failure to reasonably accommodate (Gov. Code §12940(m)); (5) failure to engage in the interactive process (Gov. Code §12940(n)); (6) violation of the California Family Rights Act (Gov. Code §§12945.2 et seq.); (7) harassment (Gov. Code §12940(j)); (8) failure to prevent discrimination/harassment (Gov. Code §12940(i)); and (9) retaliation (Gov. Code §12940(h)). (See Complaint.)

Plaintiff filed the instant motion on July 3, 2024. Defendant filed its opposition on September 30, 2024. Plaintiff filed his reply on October 3, 2024.

“The court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer. The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” (C.C.P. §473(a)(1).)

“Trial courts are vested with the discretion to allow amendments to pleadings ‘in furtherance of justice.’ That trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding, has been established policy in this state since 1901.” (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488-489.)

CRC Rule 3.1321(a) requires that a motion to amend must: “[i]nclude a copy of the proposed . . . amended pleading . . . [and] state what allegations in the previous pleading are proposed to be [deleted and/or added], if any, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number, the [deleted and/or additional] allegations are located.”

CRC Rule 3.1324(b) provides, as follows: “[a] separate declaration must accompany the motion and must specify: (1) [t]he effect of the amendment; (2) [w]hy the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) [w]hen the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) [t]he reasons why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”

Plaintiff’s motion substantially complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(a). The motion includes a copy of the proposed FAC. (Notice of Lodging Proposed FAC, Exh. A.) Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration sets forth the allegations proposed to be added and deleted, and where, by page, paragraph, and line number. (Decl. of Edwards ¶¶13, 15, Exh. 10.)

Plaintiff’s motion substantially complies with CRC Rule 3.1324(b). Plaintiff submitted a separate declaration of his counsel that specifies the effect of the amendments and explains why the amendments are necessary and proper. (Decl. of Edwards ¶¶17-20.) Plaintiff asserts the substantive amendments are necessary because they disclose further acts of retaliation, which were unknown at the time the initial Complaint was filed. (Decl. of Edwards ¶¶19(A)-(B).)

Plaintiff’s counsel states when the facts giving rise to substantive amended allegations were discovered and why the request for amendment was not made earlier. Plaintiff’s counsel declares, “[t]he additional adverse employment actions mentioned above did not occur until January 2024. On or about January 26, 2024, the County informed Plaintiff that his Long-term disability claim had been denied. . . . Consequently, on January 31, 2024, Plaintiff submitted his notice of retirement.” (Decl. of Edwards ¶19(B).)

Plaintiff’s counsel declares, “Plaintiff could not have amended the Complaint prior to the accrual of the Whistleblower cause of action and the completion of the exhaustion of his administrative remedies pursuant to California Government Code Section 910.” (Decl. of Edwards ¶24.) Plaintiff’s counsel further declares, “the proposed amendments were not made earlier due to Plaintiff’s and my unavailability. At the time Plaintiff was forced to retire, his current medical condition became exacerbated, and he was unavailable for a period of time, thereafter. During this same period, my father (who had resided with me for the past 10 years) required extra attentive home medical care. Sadly, in mid-January 2024 my father passed away. As the executor of my father’s estate, I was required to organize, orchestrate and execute all undertakings for my late father and memorial activities in Southern California and in February 2024, memorial activities and burial in New York. Upon my return to California, I had to reengage with my cases, address the affairs of my late father, and grapple with the grief of losing a parent. [¶] In early March 2024, I began transitioning full-time back into the office. Immediately, I had to prepare for the deposition of Plaintiff’s supervisor, Jimmy Tsai, whose deposition proceeded on March 18, 2024. Jimmy Tsai’s deposition was concluded on May 7, 2025, during a second session. Based on information, Plaintiff’s counsel received from the first session of Jimmy Tsai’s deposition testimony, Plaintiff’s counsel began assessing the tasks and timing to research, compose and finalize the contents of a Government Tort Claim for a Whistle Blower claim, which included conversations with Plaintiff.” (Decl. of Edwards ¶25.)

Defendant’s argument that Plaintiff’s proposed amendment should be denied on the basis Plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing the motion is unavailing. The policy favoring amendment is so strong that denial of leave to amend can rarely be justified: “If the motion to amend is timely made and the granting of the motion will not prejudice the opposing party, it is error to refuse permission to amend and where the refusal also results in a party being deprived of the right to assert a meritorious cause of action or a meritorious defense, it is not only error but an abuse of discretion.” (Morgan v. Superior Court (1959) 172 Cal.App.2d 527, 530.) Defendant argues it would be prejudiced by the Court granting the instant motion because “it would allow Plaintiff to avoid compliance with the Government Tort Claims Act, which bars Plaintiff’s suit.” (Opposition, pg. 6.) Defendant’s argument is not well taken. Asserting a claim against a Defendant is not grounds for prejudice; rather, it is the standard procedure to present grievances to the judiciary.

Prejudice exists where the amendment would result in a delay of trial, along with loss of critical evidence, added costs of preparation, increased burden of discovery, etc. (Magpali v. Farmers Group, Inc. (1996) 48 Cal.App.4th 471, 486-488; see P & D Consultants, Inc. v. City of Carlsbad (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 1332, 1345; Fisher v. Larsen (1982) 138 Cal.App.3d 627, 649, [leave to amend properly denied where P knew for over five months claims had not been properly pleaded and took no action to amend until after summary judgment granted against it].)

It is improper for this Court to consider the validity of the proposed amended pleading on the instant motion; after leave to amend is granted, Defendant will have the opportunity to attack the validity of the amended pleading. (See Kittredge Sports Co. v. Superior Court (1989) 213 Cal.App.3d 1045, 1048; Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 739, 760 [“[T]he better course of action would have been to allow [plaintiff] to amend the complaint and then let the parties test its legal sufficiency in other appropriate proceedings”].)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his Complaint and file the proposed FAC is granted.

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend his Complaint is granted. Plaintiff is ordered to file the proposed FAC with the Court within 10 days.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court