Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV16166, Date: 2024-09-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV16166    Hearing Date: September 19, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Saloumeh Rahimi’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the amount of $25,273.50.00.

Plaintiff’s request for costs is granted in the amount of $1,111.51.

Plaintiff Saloumeh Rahimi (“Rahimi”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding her a total of $25,273.50 in attorneys’ fees against Defendants Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (“PCNA”) and Beverly Hills Porsche (“BH Porsche”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  (Notice of Motion, pgs. i-ii; Civ. Code §§1794(d).)  Plaintiff also requests costs in the amount of $1,111.51.  (Notice of Motion, pg. ii.)  Plaintiff moves for an award of her reasonable fees, costs, and expenses as the prevailing party pursuant to the accepted Release and Settlement Agreement (“Settlement Agreement”) accepted and signed by Plaintiff on May 22, 2024.  (Notice of Motion, pg. ii.)   

Background

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”).  On May 22, 2024, Plaintiff accepted a Settlement made by Defendants in the amount of $49,000.00 plus attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses by motion.  (Decl. of Saeedian ¶25.) 

On June 20, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys’ fees and a memorandum of costs.  On September 6, 2024, Defendants filed their opposition.  On September 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed her reply.

Discussion

Civil Code §1794(d) provides that a buyer who prevails in an action under that section, “shall be allowed by the court to recover as a part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and the prosecution of such action.”

Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to the Settlement Agreement.  (See Decl. of Saeedian ¶25.)  Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is proper.

Civil Code §1794(d)

Civil Code §1794(d) provides, “[i]f the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”

Reasonable Fees

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiff’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Plaintiff’s Counsel declares the following hourly rates: (1) Michael Saeedian at $695.00 per hour; (2) Christopher Urner at $525.00 per hour; and (3) Jorge Acosta at $350.00 per hour and $250.00 per hour for his work as a law clerk.  (Decl. of Saeedian ¶¶2-5, 9, 11, Exh. A.)  Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated her counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable in their community of practice in their specialized area of law.  (Decl. of Saeedian ¶12.) 

Defendants’ opposition objects to the reasonableness of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates.  (Opposition, pgs. 11-14.)  Defendants’ objection is unavailing, as is their citation to Mikhaeilpoor v. BMW of North America, LLC for the premise that the simplicity of this case warrants a reduction of Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rates.  The relative complexity or simplicity of a case typically is not a factor in establishing a reasonable hourly rate. Rather, that factor is used to evaluate the reasonableness of the number of billable hours claimed by counsel.  (Blum v. Stensen (1984) 465 U.S. 886, 898 [“The novelty and complexity of the issues [is] . . . fully reflected in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel and thus do not warrant an . . . adjustment in a fee based on the number of billable hours times reasonable hourly rates”]; see also Perdue v. Kenny A. (2010) 559 U.S. 542, 552 [rejecting use of novelty or complexity of a case as grounds for enhancement because those factors are “‘presumably . . . fully reflected in the number of billable hours recorded by counsel’”].)  The lodestar method yields a fee that is presumptively sufficient to achieve the objective of being adequate enough to attract competent counsel but not to produce a windfall.  (Id.)  Further, Defendants do not provide a basis for their suggested hourly rates of $350 and $150 per hour.

The Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s rates to be reasonable and do not warrant a reduction. 

Billed Hours

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.”  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

In this case, the declarations and billing records provided by Plaintiff’s counsel are sufficient to meet the burden of proving the reasonableness of the claimed fees in terms of amounts and tasks. To satisfy this burden, evidence and descriptions of billable tasks must be presented in sufficient detail, enabling the court to evaluate whether the case was overstaffed, the time attorneys spent on specific claims, and the reasonableness of the hours expended.  (Lunada Biomedical v. Nunez (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 459, 486-487.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on 54.3 hours Plaintiff’s counsel spent litigating this case through the instant motion, and includes estimated time for reviewing Defendants’ opposition, preparing a reply, and attending the hearing on the instant motion.  (See Decl. of Saeedian ¶28, Exh. A at pg. 7 of 7.)  The fees incurred are reasonable, as captured in the billing records submitted to this Court.  (Decl. of Saeedian ¶28, Exh. A.)  Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing records reflect the actual time and clear descriptions of services performed in connection with litigating this case.  Although the submission of such detailed time records is not necessary under California law, if submitted, such records “are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.)

Defendants object to several of Plaintiff’s requested fees on the basis they were not reasonably incurred.

First, Defendants object to “half of the [billing] entries . . . for some form of broad communications/correspondences with Plaintiff and numerous duplicate entries related to reviewing the file, document production, calendaring, saving documents to the file, and accessing the court docket regarding case status and update file regarding same.”  (Opposition, pg. 7.)  Defendants’ objection is not well taken; general arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)  Therefore, Defendants fail to meet its burden to challenge these unspecified fees.

Second, Defendants object to billing entries for Jorge L. Acosta because they are “rife with administrative tasks and broad block billing of duplicative entries for ‘settlement discussions.’”  (Opposition, pg. 7.)  Defendants’ objection is not well taken; Defendants again fail to cite to specific block-billed entries.  Defendants’ list of entries that are “block-billed” do not meet courts’ definitions of block-billing.  The phrase “block billing” refers to billing for “a block of time” expended on multiple tasks “rather than itemizing the time spent on each task.”  (Heritage Pacific Financial, LLC v. Monroy (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 972, 1010.)  Here, the billing entries cited are for singular tasks billed for 0.1-0.2 of an hour.  These tasks appear itemized and are not for blocks of time.  Therefore, Defendants fail to meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s requested attorneys’ fees in the total amount of $25,273.50.

Costs

Plaintiff requests a total of $1,111.51 in costs in the instant motion.  Defendants do not challenge Plaintiff’s request for costs, nor did Defendants file a motion to tax costs.  (See Opposition.)

Accordingly, the Court grants Plaintiff’s request for costs in the total amount of $1,111.51.

Conclusion

Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the total amount of $25,273.50.

Plaintiff’s request for costs is granted in the total amount of $1,111.51.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  September _____, 2024