Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV16259, Date: 2023-12-04 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV16259 Hearing Date: December 4, 2023 Dept: 71
Superior
Court of California
County
of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE
RULING
|
JOSE J. LICEA, vs. GLOBAL
COMMUNICATIONS GROUP, INC. |
Case No.:
23STCV16259 Hearing Date: December 4, 2023 |
Specially Appearing Defendant
Global Communications Group, Inc.’s motion to quash service of summons is
granted.
Specially Appearing Defendant
Global Communications Group, Inc. (“GCG”) makes a special appearance to quash
the summons served on it in the instant matter for lack of personal
jurisdiction. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2;
C.C.P. §418.10.)
Request for Judicial Notice
Plaintiff’s
11/17/23 request for judicial notice is denied.
Background
On July 12, 2023, Plaintiff
filed his operative complaint against GCG alleging five causes of action: (1) California
Unauthorized Access to Computer Data Act (Pen. Code §502); (2) California
Invasion of Privacy Act (Pen. Code §§630-638); (3) invasion of privacy; (4) intrusion
upon seclusion; and (5) publication of private information, arising from
Plaintiff’s visit to Defendant’s website and communication with GCG. (See Complaint.)
On October 13, 2023, GCG made
a special appearance to file the instant motion. On November 17, 2023, Plaintiff filed his opposition. On November 27, 2023, GCG filed its reply.
Motion to Quash
“When a motion to quash is
properly brought, the burden of proof is placed upon the plaintiff to establish
the facts of jurisdiction by a preponderance of the evidence.” (Aquila, Inc. v. Superior Court (2007)
148 Cal.App.4th 556, 568.) When a
defendant moves to quash service of the summons and complaint, the plaintiff
has “the burden of proving the facts that did give the court jurisdiction, that
is the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Coulston v. Cooper (1966) 245
Cal.App.2d 866, 868; see also Elkman v. National States Insurance Co.
(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1312-1313 [“Where a nonresident defendant
challenges jurisdiction by way of a motion to quash, the plaintiff bears the
burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that minimum contacts
exist between the defendant and the forum state to justify imposition of
personal jurisdiction.”].)
California’s long-arm statute
permits a court to exercise personal jurisdiction on any basis consistent with
state or federal constitutional principles.
(C.C.P. §410.10.) “When a
defendant moves to quash service of process on jurisdictional grounds, the
plaintiff has the initial burden of demonstrating facts justifying the exercise
of jurisdiction. Once facts showing
minimum contacts with the forum state are established, however, it becomes the
defendant’s burden to demonstrate that the exercise of jurisdiction would be
unreasonable.” (Vons Companies, Inc. v. Seabest Foods, Inc. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 434,
449, citations omitted.) Plaintiffs must
meet their initial burden by a preponderance of competent and relevant
evidence, as shown in affidavits and documentary evidence. (See Ziller Electronics Lab GmbH v.
Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 1222, 1232-1233.)
“Personal jurisdiction may be either general or specific.
A nonresident defendant may be subject to the general jurisdiction of
the forum if his or her contacts in the forum state are ‘substantial . . .
continuous and systematic.’ In such a case, ‘it is not necessary that the
specific cause of action alleged be connected with the defendant’s business
relationship to the forum.’ Such a defendant’s contacts with the forum are so
wide-ranging that they take the place of physical presence in the forum as a
basis for jurisdiction.” (Vons Companies, Inc., 14 Cal.4th at pgs. 445-446, citations omitted.)
“If the nonresident defendant
does not have substantial and systematic contacts in the forum sufficient to
establish general jurisdiction, he or she still may be subject to the specific jurisdiction of the forum, if
the defendant has purposefully availed himself or herself of forum benefits,
and the ‘controversy is related to or ‘arises out of’ a defendant’s contacts
with the forum.’” (Id. at pg. 446, citations omitted.)
The purposeful availment test is only satisfied if the defendant
purposefully and voluntarily directs its activities toward California so that
the defendant should expect, because of the benefits it receives, to be subject
to jurisdiction here based on its contacts with California. (Snowney v. Harrah’s Entertainment, Inc.
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 1054, 1062.)
Purposeful availment occurs when a nonresident defendant purposefully
directs its activities at California residents, deliberately engages in
significant activities here, or creates “continuing obligations” between itself
and California residents. (Id. at
pg. 1063.)
“To determine whether a Web
site is sufficient to establish purposeful availment, we first look to the
sliding scale analysis described in [Zippo Manufacturing Co.] v.
Zippo Dot Com, Inc. (W.D.Pa.1997) 952 F.Supp. 1119. (See Pavlovich,
supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 274, 127 Cal.Rptr.2d 329, 58 P.3d 2.) ‘At one end
of the spectrum are situations where a defendant clearly does business over the
Internet. If the defendant enters into contracts with residents of a foreign
jurisdiction that involve the knowing and repeated transmission of computer
files over the Internet, personal jurisdiction is proper. [Citation.] At the
opposite end are situations where a defendant has simply posted information on
an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in foreign jurisdictions. A
passive Web site that does little more than make information available to those
who are interested in it is not grounds for the exercise [of] personal
jurisdiction. [Citation.] The middle ground is occupied by interactive Web
sites where a user can exchange information with the host computer. In these
cases, the exercise of jurisdiction is determined by examining the level of
interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs
on the Web site.’ (Zippo, at p. 1124.)” (Id., emphasis added.)
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence that GCG has sufficient contacts with California for this Court to
exercise general jurisdiction over it.
Plaintiff’s opposition does not explicitly argue the issue of general
jurisdiction, and therefore concedes this Court lacks general jurisdiction over
GCG. (See Opposition, pg. 8.)[1]
Plaintiff fails to demonstrate by a preponderance of
evidence that GCG has sufficient contacts with California for this Court to
exercise specific jurisdiction over it.
In tort cases, the “purposeful availment” requirement for
specific jurisdiction is satisfied where the defendant engages (1) in
intentional actions, (2) expressly aimed at the forum state, (3) causing harm,
the brunt of which is suffered—and which the defendant knows is likely to be
suffered—in the forum state. (Jewish
Defense Organization, Inc. v. Superior Court (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 1045,
1057, citing Calder v. Jones (1984) 465 U.S. 783.) Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. involved
a suit for defamation that was subject to a motion to quash. The Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. Court
stated that in defamation cases, the foreseeability element of the Calder
test requires more than the likelihood that the defamatory statement might be
published in the forum state; rather, it requires a foreseeability that the
risk of injury would arise in that state.
(Id. at pg. 1058-1059.) The
Jewish Defense Organization, Inc. Court stated, “[t]here is an
insufficient basis in this record to conclude that California is [plaintiff’s]
principal place of business, or that the alleged defamation was targeted at
California or would cause the brunt of the harm in California. Accordingly,
there is insufficient evidence showing defendants’ minimum contacts with
California under the analysis set out in cases dealing with defamation by
nonresidents.” (Id. at pg. 1059.)
Plaintiff’s
Complaint fails to allege facts regarding GCG’s site interactivity to subject
it to a specific jurisdiction analysis for an interactive website. Plaintiff alleges in his unverified complaint
that he “believes that Defendant generates a minimum of eight percent of
revenues from its website based upon interactions with Californians (including
instances in which the website operates as a ‘gateway’ to sales), such that the
website ‘is the equivalent of a physical store in California.’” (Complaint ¶1.) Such an allegation is not sufficient to allege
the interactivity and commercial nature of the exchange of information that
occurs on GCG’s website. (Mihlon v.
Superior Court (1985) 169 Cal.App.3d 703, 710 [“An unverified complaint has
no evidentiary value in determination of personal jurisdiction.”].)
Plaintiff’s declaration submitted in his opposition states,
“[i]n June 2023, I visited the website at https://gcgcom.com/ (the “Website”),
and watched a video. I did not, however, become a customer of Defendant Global
Communications Group, Inc.’s services advertised on the Website.” (Decl. of Licea ¶2.)
Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration states, “[t]he Website
has a hyperlink named ‘SCHEDULE A CONSULTATION’ near the top bottom of its
homepage, which if clicked, takes the user to a landing page at the webpage at:
https://gcgcom.com/schedule-consultation/. The landing page of the Website has
a fillable form allowing an user to contact Defendant by inputting the user’s
name, email address, telephone number, subject, and message.” (Decl. of Ferrell ¶5.) Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration further
states, “[t]he Website has a hyperlink in the bottom footer of its homepage
entitled “Contact Us”, which if clicked, takes the user to a landing page
entitled “Contact Us” at: https://gcgcom.com/contact/. The landing page of the
Website has a fillable form allowing an user to contact Defendant by inputting
the user’s name, email address, telephone number, subject, and message.” (Decl. of Ferrell ¶6.) Plaintiff’s counsel declares, “[t]he Website
has a webpage entitled ‘Downloadable Brochures’ in which the user can download
12 different marketing brochures from a webpage at: https://gcgcom.com/resources/brochures/.” (Decl. of Ferrell
¶7.) Defendant’s counsel declares, “Defendant’s
Website does not notify users that the access of California residents to use the
Website is in any way restricted or precluded.”
(Decl. of Ferrell ¶8.)
Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to demonstrate by a
preponderance of the evidence that all jurisdictional criteria are met to
justify imposition of personal jurisdiction.
None of the evidence submitted in Plaintiff’s declarations demonstrates
the commercial nature of the exchange of information that occurs on GCG’s
website such that it is subject to an analysis as an interactive website. (Snowney, 35 Cal.4th at pg. 1062.) Under an analysis
as a passive website that has simply
posted information on an Internet Web site which is accessible to users in
foreign jurisdictions, there can be no such justification for exercising
personal jurisdiction. (Id.)
GCG also submitted evidence
refuting Plaintiff’s claim that GCG availed itself of doing business in
California. GCG’s CEO, Joel St. Germain
(“St. Germain”), declares, “GCG is a business technology consulting firm that
delivers a host of cloud-based, data center, and Internet technologies to a
range of corporate customers to improve their day-to-day operations. GCG does
not generally sell or market its software or services to individual consumers.” (Decl. of St. Germain ¶3.) St. Germain declares, “[n]o revenue is
generated from GCG’s website, as it is not possible to purchase products or services
via GCG’s website. GCG generates no revenue from California, from its website
or otherwise.” (Decl. of St. Germain
¶7.) St. Germain declares that GCG has
no customers located in California and has never targeted California with
California-specific advertisements.
(Decl. of St. Germain ¶¶7-8.)
Assuming, arguendo,
Plaintiff met its burden on this motion and shifted the burden to GCG to
demonstrate the exercise of jurisdiction would be unreasonable, GCG met its
burden. (Doe v. Damron (2021) 70
Cal.App.5th 684, 693, as modified (Nov. 9, 2021).) Relevant interests include, among others, the
forum state’s interest in adjudicating the case, the plaintiff’s interest in
obtaining convenient and effective relief, and the burden on the defendant of
appearing in the forum. (Id.) GCG has no offices, property, or employees in
California, and therefore all GCG’s witnesses reside out of state. (See Decl. of St. Germain ¶¶ 5-6; Roman
v. Liberty University, Inc. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 670, 684 [weighing
heavily factor in personal jurisdiction analysis where “most of the witnesses”
were beyond the subpoena power of California courts].) While California has substantial interests in
protecting its residents in lawsuit alleging torts, such interests “simply do
not make California a ‘fair forum’” on their own, which is especially true here
because Plaintiff can point to no contacts between GCG and California that are
related to his claims. (See Kulko v.
Superior Court of California In & For City & Court of San Francisco
(1978) 436 U.S. 84, 100-101.)
Accordingly, GCG’s motion is
granted.
Conclusion
Specially Appearing Defendant GCG’s motion to quash service
of summons is granted.
Plaintiff to give notice.
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|
Hon. Daniel M. Crowley |
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Judge of the Superior Court |
[1] The Court also notes Plaintiff’s Complaint states that GCG
is a Colorado company located in Centennial, Colorado. (Complaint ¶4.)