Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV16293, Date: 2025-03-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV16293    Hearing Date: March 14, 2025    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Plaintiff Jonathan Morales’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the total reduced amount of $36,909.76.  Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $31,045.00, and Plaintiff’s costs are granted in the total amount of $5,864.76.

Plaintiff Jonathan Morales (“Morales”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding him attorneys’ fees and against Defendant American Honda Motor Co., Inc. (“AMH”) (“Defendant”) in the total amount of $55,364.64, consisting of attorneys’ fees and costs in the amount of $36,909.76 and a 0.5 multiplied in the amount of $18,454.88.  (Notice of Motion, pgs. i-ii; C.C.P. §1794(d).) 

Background

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Act”).  On October 23, 2024, the parties reached a settlement agreeing to pay Plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to Civil Code §1794(d) by way of a motion (“Settlement Agreement”).  (Decl. of Ledbetter ¶2, Exh. 1.)  Under Section 1 of the Settlement Agreement, the parties agreed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for this instant motion.

On November 12, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant motion.  Defendant filed its opposition on February 26, 2025.  Plaintiff filed his reply on March 4, 2025.

Discussion

Under Song-Beverly, a buyer who prevails in their action is entitled to an award “as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual lime expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.”  (Civ. Code §1794(d).)

Here, Plaintiff is the prevailing party per parties’ Settlement Agreement and is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs.  (Decl. of Ledbetter ¶2, Exh. 1 at §1.)

Reasonable Fees

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiff’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.”  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Plaintiff’s Counsel declares the following hourly rates of the attorneys who worked on this case: (1) Thomas K. Ledbetter ($450.00/hour); and (2) Keily Deluis (Paralegal) ($200.00/hour).  (Decl. of Ledbetter ¶12.)  Defendant argues in opposition that Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate is excessive and not commensurate with rated clients would pay for attorneys with similar experience.  (Opposition, pgs. 12-14.)  A declaration of Plaintiff’s counsel is sufficient evidence of the market rates charged in the legal community, especially where no evidence is presented to the contrary.  (See Davis v. City of San Diego (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 893, 902-904; Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  The Court finds Plaintiff’s counsel’s rate to be reasonable and does not warrant a reduction.

Billed Hours

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.”  (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on the 68.9 hours spent by his attorney litigating this case.  (Decl. of Ledbetter ¶12, Exh. 2.)  Defendant argues Plaintiff should not be awarded any fees or costs incurred after Defendant’s June 11, 2024, §998 Offer.  (Opposition, pgs. 8-9.)  Defendant’s argument is unavailing in light of the fact that the terms of Defendant’s §998 Offer were inferior to Plaintiff’s recovery under the Settlement Agreement.  For example, the §998 Offer was a cash offer of $15,000 to Plaintiff.  (Decl. of Barakat ¶7, Exh. F.)  In comparison, the Settlement Agreement was for $20,000 cash to Plaintiff.  (Decl. of Ledbetter ¶2, Exh. 1 at §1.) This represents a 33% increase in settlement proceeds to Plaintiff.  Further, there are other terms in the Settlement Agreement that were more favorable than the §998 Offer.  For example, the §998 Offer had a 90-day deadline for Defendant to make payment whereas the Settlement Agreement was a 45-day deadline.  (Compare Decl. of Barakat ¶7, Exh. F at §3 with Decl. of Ledbetter ¶2, Exh. 1 at §1.)  Therefore, the Court declines Defendant’s request to limit Plaintiff’s recovery to fees or costs incurred after Defendant’s June 11, 2024.

Defendant’s generalized objections to Plaintiff’s billed fees are also unavailing.  General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)  Therefore, Defendant did not meet its burden to challenge these fees.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the requested amount of $31,045.00.

Multiplier

          Plaintiff requests a 0.5 multiplier. Given the routine work done in this case and the results obtained in this lemon law area, a multiplier is not appropriate. Any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rates, which the Court has found to be reasonable.

Costs

The California legislature intended the word “expenses” in the Act to cover outlays not included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs,” and the legislative history of the Act further demonstrates that the legislature exercised its power to permit the recovery by prevailing buyers of a host of litigation expenditures.  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.)  “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.”  (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

Here, Plaintiff submitted his costs with the instant motion.  Defendant does not challenge Plaintiff’s costs for any reasons not already addressed by this Court, and such costs are presumed to be proper.

Accordingly, Plaintiff is entitled to costs in the requested amount of $5,864.76.

Conclusion

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $31,045.00, and Plaintiff’s costs are granted in the total amount of $5,864.76.  Plaintiff’s motion is granted in the total reduced amount of $36,909.76.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  March _____, 2025