Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV17456, Date: 2023-11-16 Tentative Ruling

Defendant Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., dba Athens Services’ motion for attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff WasteXperts, Inc. is granted in the total amount of $142,616.40.

Plaintiff WasteXperts, Inc.’s request for sanctions against Defendant Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., dba Athens Services is denied.

Defendant Arakelian Enterprises, Inc., dba Athens Services (“Athens”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order awarding its attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff WasteXperts, Inc. (“WasteXperts”) (“Plaintiff”) in the total amount of $142,616.40. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §425.16(c).)

Plaintiff’s 3/11/24 request for judicial notice of the (1) Notice of Entry of Order Granting Defendant’s Special Motion to Strike; and (2) Notice of Entry of Judgment filed and served by Athens in this action is denied, as the Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket.

On July 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed their operative complaint (“Complaint”) against Defendant and dismissed defendant The City of Los Angeles (“City”) (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging a single cause of action for declaratory relief. On November 16, 2023, this Court granted Defendant’s special motion to strike (“Anti-SLAPP Motion”) Plaintiff’s Complaint. (10/16/23 Minute Order.) On December 7, 2023, Judgment was entered in this case, stating Defendant shall recover its fees and costs of suit, including attorneys’ fees and costs pursuant to C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1), following a noticed motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. (12/7/23 Judgment.)

On February 29, 2024, Defendant filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed its opposition. On March 15, 2024, Defendant filed its reply.

Plaintiff objects to Defendant’s motion as untimely under CRC, Rule 3.1702, on the basis Defendant’s motion was filed sixteen days past the time for filing based upon the trigger date of the notice of entry of judgment.

CRC, Rule 3.1702(d) provides: “For good cause, the trial judge may extend the time for filing a motion for attorney’s fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation.” (CRC, Rule 3.1702(d).) The time limits under the Rule are not jurisdictional. (State Farm General Insurance Co. v. Lara (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 197, 213; Jones v. Goodman (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 521, 542.) “Flexibility is built into Rule 3.1702 through subdivision (d), which allows a judge ‘[f]or good cause’ to ‘extend the time for filing a motion for attorney’s fees in the absence of a stipulation or for a longer period than allowed by stipulation.’” (Robinson v. U-Haul Co. of California (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 304, 326.)

Based on Defendant’s showing for good cause that it reserved the hearing on the instant motion on November 21, 2023, for earliest possible date for a fee motion, the Court extends Defendant’s time for filing the instant motion. (Motion, pg. 23.) Therefore, the Court will consider Defendant’s motion.

C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1) provides, in part, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” California law makes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant mandatory. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [“[u]nder Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney’s fees.”].) Here, Defendant was the prevailing party in the Anti-SLAPP Motion. (See 10/16/23 Minute Order.) Accordingly, Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees is proper and it is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.

The California Supreme Court has determined the lodestar method is the proper mechanism to calculate attorneys’ fees under C.C.P. §425.16(c). (See Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 1136.) To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Defendant’s counsel. The “reasonable hourly rate” applicable under the lodestar method is the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Id. at pg. 1096.)

Defendant’s Counsel declares the following hourly rates: (1) Ronald B. Turovsky ($1,190.00 per hour); (2) Kishan Barot ($850.00 per hour); and (3) Erin E. Cazares M. Sanzo ($501.50 per hour). (Decl. of Turovsky ¶¶5-13, Exhs. 1-6.) Defendant’s Counsel declares Defendant was invoiced at a 15% discount from Manatt’s standard 2023 rates, and the amounts sought in this motion reflect the discount given to Defendant. (Decl. of Turovsky ¶6.) The Court determines based on its experience that Defendant’s Counsel’s hourly rates are reasonable in their community of practice.

An anti-SLAPP motion is complex in nature and requires the submission of declarations and evidence akin to a motion for summary judgment or a preliminary injunction. Defendant argues the Anti-SLAPP motion in the instant case involved an exposition of multiple procedural concepts prohibiting the relitigation of claims, including in the context of the anti-SLAPP statute: (1) claim and issue preclusion, (2) the prohibition against collateral attacks, (3) comity between superior court judges, and (4) a trial court’s lack of jurisdiction over issues on appeal. (Motion, pg. 12.) Defendant’s efforts resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s Complaint. Accordingly, Defendant’s requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable.

The verified time entries of the attorneys are entitled to a presumption of credibility, which extends to an attorney’s professional judgment as to whether time spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“We think the verified time statements of the attorney as officers of the court are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”].) “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)

Here, the billing statement of the attorneys’ fees and costs incurred on the motion and the declarations by counsel demonstrate the reasonableness of the time spent on this case. (See Decl. of Turovsky ¶¶5-7, Exhs. 1-2.) Defendant’s Counsel declares the bulk of the work on the Anti-SLAPP motion was divided between Ronald Turovsky, the senior partner on this case who was familiar with the previous complaint and anti-SLAPP motion, partner Kishan Barot, with the assistance of associate Erin E. Cazares M. Sanzo. (See Decl. of Turovsky ¶¶11-13, 16, Exhs. 4-6.) Defendant’s Counsel declares the following hours billed: (1) Ronald B. Turovsky (64 hours or $76,160); (2) Kishan Barot (73.7 hours or $62,645); and (3) Erin E. Cazares M. Sanzo (7.6 hours or $3,811.40). (Decl. of Turovsky ¶7, Exh. 2.)

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to Defendant’s motion are unavailing because its objections to Defendant’s request for fees does not point to the specific items challenged with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence; general arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice. (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

In light of the Court’s ruling on the instant motion, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions against Defendant is denied.

Defendant’s motion for attorneys’ fees is granted in the total amount of $142,616.40.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court