Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV18160, Date: 2025-05-27 Tentative Ruling

Defendants’ special motion to strike is granted in part as to as to Defendant Janelle Holden, D.D.S. for the 3rd, 4th, and 5th causes of action, and denied as to the 1st, 2nd, and 6th causes of action.

Defendants Janelle Holden, D.D.S. (“Holden”) and Janelle Holden, D.D.S., Inc. (“Holden Practice”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike the complaint of Plaintiff Dr. Maryam Bakhtiyari, D.D.S. (“Bakhtiyari”) (“Plaintiff”) on the grounds that (1) each cause of action in Plaintiff’s Complaint against Defendants arises from alleged conduct by Defendants in furtherance of their right of free speech under the United States Constitution or California Constitution in connection with a public issue or an issue of public interest, and (2) Plaintiff cannot establish that there is a probability she will prevail on her causes of action against Defendants. (Notice of Amended Motion, pg. 2; C.C.P. §425.16.)

Plaintiff’s 12/6/23 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Peter F. Finn (“Finn”) is sustained as to Nos. 1 and 2.

Defendants’ 12/12/23 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Bakhtiyari is sustained as to Nos. 2, 4, 5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, and 27, and overruled as to Nos. 3, 7, 16, 17, 18, 25, 26, and 28.

Defendants’ 12/12/23 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Jessica Aguiar (“Aguiar”) is overruled as to No. 29.

Defendants’ 12/12/23 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Jill Levine (“Levine”) is sustained as to No. 34, and overruled as to Nos. 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, and 36.

Defendants’ 12/12/23 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Olga Barton (“Barton”) is sustained as to No. 37, 38, 39, 41, 42, and 43, and overruled as to No. 40, 44, 45, and 46.

Defendants’ 12/12/23 evidentiary objection to the Declaration of Renee Tinker (“Tinker”) is sustained as to No. 49 as to “The specialist reassured me that there were not problems being caused by the braces,” and “But the specialist reassured me that there were no problems,” but otherwise overruled, and overruled as to No. 48, 50, 51, and 52.

Defendants’ 9/28/23 request for judicial notice of Plaintiff’s complaint is overruled as this Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket.

Plaintiff is a licensed dentist practicing in Manhattan Beach. (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges she is highly decorated because of her hard work, which has resulted in her many achievements. (Complaint ¶7.) Plaintiff alleges she is diplomate and board-certified with the American Board of Dental Sleep Medicine, the International Board of Orthodontics and the American Board of Craniofacial Pain. (Complaint ¶7.) Plaintiff alleges her dental office has served her community for the past 15 years. (Complaint ¶7.) Plaintiff alleges the focus of her practice is non-invasive and non-extraction orthodontics, temporo-mandibular joint (TMJ) and sleep apnea, all areas which do not require any additional professional degrees or certifications beyond a DDS degree. (Complaint ¶8.)

Plaintiff alleges Holden is a licensed dentist practicing in Manhattan Beach. (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges Holden has shared a number of mutual patients with Plaintiff over the years. (Complaint ¶9.) Plaintiff alleges Holden does not practice in the same field of dentistry as Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶9.) Plaintiff alleges Holden specializes in pediatric dentistry. (Complaint ¶9.) Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Holden does not practice and has none or negligible experience practicing in the fields of orthodontics, craniofacial pain management or sleep apnea. (Complaint ¶9.)

Plaintiff alleges Holden has maliciously made false and defamatory statements about Plaintiff to other medical professionals and/or patients, including false accusations about Plaintiff's dental practices and capabilities. (Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges Holden’s untrue statements falsely accused Plaintiff of incompetence, unprofessional conduct, and characterized her dental procedures as outdated, “hocus-pocus,” dangerous, and harmful. (Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges, specifically, Holden has repeatedly stated to Plaintiff’s patients that Plaintiff is not licensed and/or competent to practice orthodontics. (Complaint ¶10.) Plaintiff alleges Holden further stated to multiple patients of Plaintiff who saw Holden that Plaintiff’s work and plan were outdated and incorrect (even though the treatments in some cases were ongoing and unfinished); that Plaintiff was not competent to perform the contracted dental services for the patient; and that the patient should cancel her contract with Plaintiff mid-treatment to continue with a different dentist. (Complaint ¶11.) Plaintiff alleges these false statements were made both directly and indirectly to potential patients, existing patients, and the broader dental community, causing harm to Plaintiff’s practice, professional standing, and personal reputation. (Complaint ¶12.)

Plaintiff alleges the above statements were false. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges California does not have any separate licensing requirements for the practice areas of orthodontics or craniofacial pain management. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges she is licensed to practice in the aforementioned dental fields by virtue of her being a licensed dentist. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges Holden’s statements were intended to make patients and other medical professionals believe that Plaintiff lacked the professional qualifications to practice in her chosen fields. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges the above-referenced false and defamatory statements have caused significant harm to the Plaintiff’s professional and personal reputation. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Holden made the aforementioned statements out of professional jealousy, with the intent to harm Plaintiff’s practice and reputation. (Complaint ¶14.)

On July 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative complaint in this case against Defendants, alleging six causes of action: (1) defamation; (2) slander per se; (3) trade libel/product disparagement; (4) intentional interference with economic advantage; (5) negligent interference with economic advantage; and (6) unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq.). On September 28, 2023, Defendants filed the instant anti-SLAPP motion. On November 9, 2023, Defendants filed their amended anti-SLAPP notice of motion, indicating the hearing date was continued. Plaintiff filed her opposition on December 6, 2023. Defendants filed their reply on December 12, 2023.

On December 19, 2023, this Court heard argument on the instant motion and denied Defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion. (12/19/23 Minute Order.) Defendants timely appealed this Court’s ruling on the motion.

On January 16, 2025, the Court of Appeal reversed this Court’s ruling on the motion, determining that Defendants met their burden to show that the claims asserted by Plaintiff arose from activity that was protected under the catchall provision of the anti-SLAPP statute. (3/19/25 Remittitur, pgs. 17-20.) The Court of Appeal remanded the matter to this Court to consider whether Plaintiff has shown a probability of prevailing on her claims and expressed no view on Plaintiff’s probability of prevailing. (3/19/25 Remittitur, pgs. 20, 22.)

“Litigation of an anti-SLAPP motion involves a two-step process. First, ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the defendant has engaged.’ [Citation.] Second, for each claim that does arise from protected activity, the plaintiff must show the claim has “at least ‘minimal merit.’ [Citation.]” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal. 5th 995, 1009, citations omitted.) As to the second step inquiry, a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim “may not rely solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible evidence.” (Sweetwater Union High School District v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940, citations omitted.)

A plaintiff opposing a special motion to strike has the burden to “state [] and substantiate [] a legally sufficient claim.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 88 & 93.) “‘Put another way, the plaintiff “must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.”’ [Citations.]” (Id. at pgs. 88-89.) To that end, the plaintiff must present competent evidence, “that would be admissible at trial.” (HMS Capital, Inc. v. Lawyers Title Co. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 204, 212.) “[D]eclarations may not be based upon ‘information and belief’ [citation]” and documents submitted without the proper foundation will not be considered. (Id.) The complaint, even if verified, is insufficient to carry the plaintiff’s shifted burden. (Roberts v. Los Angeles County Bar Association (2003) 105 Cal.App.4th 604, 614; Karnazes v. Ares (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 344, 354 [“pleadings do not constitute evidence”]; see also Burke, Anti-SLAPP Litigation (The Rutter Group, Civil Litigation Series 2018 § 5:13) [“To satisfy prong two, the plaintiff must submit admissible evidence that if credited is sufficient to sustain a favorable judgment against the legal theories asserted by the defendant.”].)

The Court of Appeal stated, “Analyzing Defendant’s alleged defamatory statements using the two-step inquiry set forth in [FilmOn.com, Inc. v. DoubleVerify, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 133], we find that Defendant has met her burden to show the alleged statements fell within the anti-SLAPP statute’s catchall provision, section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4).” (3/19/25 Remittitur, pg. 17.) The Court of Appeal also determined that Defendants’ alleged statements “bore a functional relationship to the public issue of a dentist’s qualifications and competence. Whether true or false, the purpose and effect of Defendant’s alleged statements about Plaintiff’s qualifications, competence, and the quality of her work, was to contribute to the public issue of a dentist’s qualifications to practice orthodontics.” (3/19/25 Remittitur, pg. 19, emphasis added.)

Accordingly, this Court does not revisit Prong 1 of Defendants’ motion and proceeds to Prong 2 of its analysis to evaluate whether Plaintiff has provided sufficient evidence to demonstrate a probability of prevailing against Defendants.

With respect to the corporate entity defendant, Holden, D.D.S., Inc., our review of the complaint reveals that other than naming the entity as a defendant in the caption, Plaintiff makes no factual allegations against Holden, D.D.S., Inc. The complaint is legally insufficient to support any claim against Holden, D.D.S., Inc., and we instruct the trial court to grant the anti-SLAPP motion as to Holden, D.D.S., Inc.

Because the trial court concluded Defendant Holden’s statements were not protected speech under the anti-SLAPP statute, it did not consider whether Plaintiff met her burden to demonstrate that he claims had minimal merit.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion is granted as to Holden Practice, and the Court will proceed with the remainder of its Prong 2 analysis only as to Defendant Holden.

“The elements of a defamation claim are (1) a publication that is (2) false, (3) defamatory, (4) unprivileged, and (5) has a natural tendency to injure or causes special damage. ‘In general, . . . a written communication that is false, that is not protected by any privilege, and that exposes a person to contempt or ridicule or certain other reputational injuries, constitutes libel.’ The defamatory statement must specifically refer to, or be ‘of [or] concerning,’ the plaintiff.” (Jackson v. Mayweather (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1240, 1259, internal citations omitted.)

“A statement is defamatory when it tends ‘directly to injure [a person] in respect to [that person’s] office, profession, trade or business, either by imputing to [the person] general disqualification in those respects which the office or other occupation peculiarly requires, or by imputing something with reference to [the person’s] office, profession, trade, or business that has a natural tendency to lessen its profits.’” (Issa v. Applegate (2019) 31 Cal.App.5th 689, 702, internal citation omitted.)

Private-figure plaintiffs must prove actual malice to recover punitive or presumed damages for defamation if the matter is one of public concern. They are only required to prove negligence to recover damages for actual injury to reputation. (Khawar v. Globe International (1998) 19 Cal.4th 254, 273-274, emphasis added.)[1]

“To prove actual malice . . . a plaintiff must ‘demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the defendant realized that his statement was false or that he subjectively entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his statement.’” (Id. at pg. 275, internal citation omitted.)

Actual malice is judged by a subjective standard; otherwise stated, “there must be sufficient evidence to permit the conclusion that the defendant . . . had a ‘high degree of awareness of . . . probable falsity.’” (Harte–Hanks Communications v. Connaughton (1989) 491 U.S. 657, 688.) To prove this culpable mental state, the plaintiff may rely on circumstantial evidence, including evidence of motive and failure to adhere to professional standards. (Id.; see also Reader’s Digest Association v. Superior Court (1984) 37 Cal.3d 244, 257-258.)

Plaintiff alleges Holden made false oral statements about Plaintiff alleging her incompetence and unprofessional conduct and characterized her dental procedures as outdated, dangerous and harmful. (Complaint ¶16.) Plaintiff alleges Holden made these statements either knowing they were untrue, or with a reckless disregard for the truth thereof. (Complaint ¶16.)

Plaintiff alleges these false statements were made both directly and indirectly to potential patients, existing patients, and the broader dental community, causing harm to Plaintiff’s practice, professional standing, and personal reputation. (Complaint ¶17.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of the false and defamatory statements made by Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered significant economic damages and loss of business, in an amount to be proven at trial. (Complaint ¶18.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ false and defamatory statements against Plaintiff were uttered with malice, insofar as Defendant Holden was also motivated by professional jealousy and bias or prejudice based on Plaintiff’s sex and ethnic background. (Complaint ¶19.) Plaintiff alleges on information and belief that Defendant Holden has made such statements and taken such actions in order to force the Plaintiff out of the Manhattan Beach area, as her race does not belong there, and that the Plaintiff’s ethnic background should not be practicing in the Manhattan Beach community. (Complaint ¶19.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendants’ willful and malicious behavior in connection with their defamatory statements, Plaintiff reserves the right to request punitive damages pursuant to Civil Code §3294. (Complaint ¶20.) Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ wrongful conduct was undertaken in willful, conscious and reckless disregard of the Plaintiff’s rights herein and was both oppressive and malicious within the meaning of Civil Code §3294, thereby entitling Plaintiff to an award of exemplary and/or punitive damages in an amount to be proven at the time of trial. (Complaint ¶20.)

Plaintiff demonstrates a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for defamation against Defendant Holden in the applicable statute of limitations period of one year. (C.C.P. §340(3).) First, the Declaration of Tinker states, “the negative comments kept coming from Dr. Holden throughout the treatment of my son Kevin through January 4, 2023. Beyond merely mentioning a broken bracket here or there, she has stated that Dr. Maryam is not licensed to practice orthodontics, and [attacked] her personally as if Dr. Holden has a grudge against her.” (Decl. of Tinker ¶5, emphasis added.) Tinker’s declaration alleges a false statement made by Defendant Holden to Tinker, in light of the fact that Plaintiff is licensed by the Dental Board of California as a dentist, to which this Court takes judicial notice. (Decl. of Bakhtiyari ¶3; Dental Board of California DCA License Search Dentist License No. 41347.)[2]

Second, the alleged statement is defamatory because it attacks Plaintiff’s profession, trade, or business, namely the practice of orthodontia. (Issa, 31 Cal.App.5th at pg. 702.) Third, the alleged statement is not subject to qualified or absolute privilege. (See Civ. Code §47.)

Fourth, Plaintiff demonstrates she suffered actual damages due to the alleged statement made against her, including “significant amounts of mental distress and aggravation having to deal with the challenges of retaining my patients whose parents witnessed all of the derogatory remarks and insults from Dr. Holden.” (Decl. of Bakhtiyari ¶26.)

Finally, Plaintiff demonstrates Defendant Holden made the alleged statement to Tinker with actual malice. Plaintiff is a licensed general dentist in the State of California and knew or should have known there are no additional requirements necessary for a general dentist to practice orthodontia, and Defendant Holden is a member of the same professional field as Plaintiff and has access to the Dental Board of California’s DCA License Search for her to verify there are no existing additional licenses necessary to practice orthodontia in California. (See Khawar, 19 Cal.4th at pg. 276.) Plaintiff also offers circumstantial evidence of Defendant’s motive, specifically that Defendant Holden’s comments to Tinker about Plaintiff that attacked her personally and stating that Plaintiff “does not know what she is doing in practicing orthodontics.” (Decl. of Tinker ¶¶3, 5; Decl. of Bakhtiyari ¶29.) Further, when Plaintiff met with Defendant Holden for lunch, Defendant Holden suggested that Plaintiff should “go back to school,” demonstrating her disapproval of Plaintiff’s professional qualifications, affiliations, or knowledge in her field of practice. (Decl. of Bakhtiyari ¶27.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff established a probability of prevailing on her causes of action for defamation and slander per se against Defendant Holden. Therefore, Defendant Holden’s anti-SLAPP motion is denied as to the 1st and 2nd causes of action.

“Trade libel is the publication of matter disparaging the quality of another’s property, which the publisher should recognize is likely to cause pecuniary loss to the owner. [Citation.] The tort encompasses ‘all false statements concerning the quality of services or product of a business which are intended to cause that business financial harm and in fact do so.’ [Citation.] [¶] To constitute trade libel, a statement must be false.” (City of Costa Mesa v. D’Alessio Investments, LLC (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 358, 376.)

“To constitute trade libel the statement must be made with actual malice, that is, with knowledge it was false or with reckless disregard for whether it was true or false.” (J-M Manufacturing Co., Inc. v. Phillips & Cohen LLP (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 87, 97.)

“The distinction between libel and trade libel is that the former concerns the person or reputation of plaintiff and the latter relates to his goods.” (Shores v. Chip Steak Co. (1955) 130 Cal.App.2d 627, 630.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden knowingly and maliciously made false statements about Plaintiff’s dental practice and her professional abilities. (Complaint ¶30.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden’s false statements, by their very nature, would be necessarily understood to be disparaging the quality of Plaintiff’s services. (Complaint ¶30.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden knew that her statements regarding Plaintiff’s services were untrue, or at least made them with reckless disregard of the truth or falsity of her statements. (Complaint ¶31.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden knew or should have recognized that a person hearing her statements might act in reliance on the statements, causing Plaintiff to suffer financial loss. (Complaint ¶32.) Plaintiff alleges these false statements were made with the intent to cause, and were a substantial factor in causing, actual financial loss to her. (Complaint ¶33.)

Plaintiff alleges she has suffered pecuniary harm as a result of Defendant Holden’s actions, including lost profits and harm to her professional reputation, in an amount to be determined at trial. (Complaint ¶34.)

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for trade libel because she fails to present evidence that Defendant’s Holden’s alleged statements were a substantial factor in causing actual financial loss to her. Plaintiff merely declares that she can compile a list of patients and produce such patients at trial but cannot attach the list as an exhibit to her declaration because of potential HIPPA rules. (See Decl. of Bakhtiyari ¶33.) There is no reason Plaintiff could not have attached such an exhibit and filed it conditionally under seal with this Court. Plaintiff also provides mere speculation that she suffered economic damage from potential patients who would have come of her for treatment but were dissuaded after hearing false statements from Defendant Holden. (See Decl. of Bakhtiyari ¶36.) As for the declarations of patients, all patients who declare that Defendant Holden tried to dissuade them from working with Plaintiff, such as Tinker, who declares, “Dr. Holden went as far as to send Dr. Maryam an email voicing concerns with [her son’] treatment, and telling [her] that Dr. Maryam’s treatment caused injury to [her] son and that [her] son suffered permanent bone loss” continue to see Plaintiff for their children’s orthodontic treatments. (Decl. of Tinker ¶4; Decl. of Aguiar ¶3.)

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for trade libel against Defendant Holden. Therefore, Defendant Holden’s anti-SLAPP motion is granted as to the 3rd cause of action.

C. Intentional Interference with Prospective Economic Relations & Negligent Interference with Prospective Economic Relations (4th & 5th COAs)

“Intentional interference with prospective economic advantage has five elements: (1) the existence, between the plaintiff and some third party, of an economic relationship that contains the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) intentionally wrongful acts designed to disrupt the relationship; (4) actual disruption of the relationship; and (5) economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s action.” (Roy Allan Slurry Seal, Inc. v. American Asphalt South, Inc. (2017) 2 Cal.5th 505, 512.)

“The elements of negligent interference with prospective economic advantage are (1) the existence of an economic relationship between the plaintiff and a third party containing the probability of future economic benefit to the plaintiff; (2) the defendant’s knowledge of the relationship; (3) the defendant’s knowledge (actual or construed) that the relationship would be disrupted if the defendant failed to act with reasonable care; (4) the defendant’s failure to act with reasonable care; (5) actual disruption of the relationship; (6) and economic harm proximately caused by the defendant’s negligence.” (Redfearn v. Trader Joe’s Co. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989, 1005.)

Plaintiff alleges she had existing economic relationships with numerous patients, giving her a probability of future economic benefits. (Complaint ¶36.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden knew about said relationships before and while committing the aforementioned acts. (Complaint ¶37.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden intentionally interfered with Plaintiff’s prospective economic relations by making false and disparaging remarks about her to potential and existing patients with the purpose of causing harm to her practice. (Complaint ¶38.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant committed the aforementioned acts with the intent to disrupt said relationships; specifically, Defendant made the aforementioned defamatory statements with the intention of causing Plaintiff’s patients to abandon their ongoing treatment plans with Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶39.) Plaintiff alleges Defendant knew that disruption of the relationships between Plaintiff and her patients was substantially certain to occur. (Complaint ¶39.)

Plaintiff alleges that by committing the aforementioned acts, Defendant interfered with said economic and business relationships. (Complaint ¶40.)

Plaintiff fails to demonstrate a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for intentional interference with prospective economic advantage because she fails to produce admissible evidence of actual disruption of a relationship with an identifiable third party and economic harm proximately caused by Defendant Holden’s alleged actions. For the same reasons stated with regard to Plaintiff’s cause of action for trade libel, Plaintiff’s evidence is merely speculative or based on hearsay.

Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to establish a probability of prevailing on her causes of action for intentional interference with prospective economic relations and negligent interference with prospective economic relations against Defendant Holden. Therefore, Defendant Holden’s anti-SLAPP motion is granted as to the 4th and 5th causes of action.

“The UCL prohibits, and provides civil remedies for, unfair competition, which it defines as ‘any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or practice.’ (§ 17200.) Its purpose ‘is to protect both consumers and competitors by promoting fair competition in commercial markets for goods and services.’” (Kwikset Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 51 Cal.4th 310, 320, internal citations omitted.)

“[A] practice may violate the UCL even if it is not prohibited by another statute. Unfair and fraudulent practices are alternate grounds for relief. [Citation.]” (Zhang v. Superior Court (2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden has engaged in unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices, as defined by California Business & Professions Code §17200, including the dissemination of false information about Plaintiff and her dental practice, intended to induce potential patients to refrain from seeking services from Plaintiff. (Complaint ¶52.)

Plaintiff alleges Defendant Holden’s conduct constitutes unfair, unlawful, and fraudulent business practices under California's Unfair Competition Law, Business & Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., which has resulted in lost profits and damage to Plaintiff’s reputation and business. (Complaint ¶53.)

Plaintiff alleges that as a result of Defendant Holden’s unfair business practices, Plaintiff has suffered injury in fact and has lost money or property, including lost business and damage to her professional reputation, in an amount to be proven at trial. (Complaint ¶54.)

Plaintiff alleges she seeks an injunction to restrain Defendant Holden from continuing these unfair business practices and restitution for any unjust enrichment Defendant Holden has obtained as a result of her conduct. (Complaint ¶55.)

Plaintiff demonstrates a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for UCL because she provided evidence of Defendant Holden’s anticompetitive practice in the Declaration of Tinker, which states Defendant Holden disseminated false information to shared clients about Plaintiff’s profession and qualifications. (Decl. of Tinker ¶5 “[S]he has stated that Dr. Maryam is not licensed to practice orthodontics.”].)

Accordingly, Plaintiff established a probability of prevailing on her cause of action for unfair business practices against Defendant Holden. Therefore, Defendant Holden’s anti-SLAPP motion is denied as to the 6th cause of action.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants’ special motion to strike is granted as to Defendant Janelle Holden, D.D.S., Inc. in its entirety. Defendants’ special motion to strike is granted in part as to as to Defendant Janelle Holden, D.D.S. for the 3rd, 4th, and 5th causes of action, and denied as to the 1st, 2nd, and 6th causes of action.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] None of the parties argue any of the parties are public figures or limited-purpose public figures. Therefore, the Court proceeds with its analysis on the basis all parties are private figures, since both parties are dentists operating in Huntington Beach, California. (See Complaint ¶¶7-9.)

[2] The Supreme Court of California recognizes that California law designates an individual as “qualified” to practice orthodontics by virtue of a general dentistry license. (Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Society of Orthodontists (1974) 12 Cal.3d 541, 560.)