Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV19294, Date: 2024-03-14 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV19294 Hearing Date: March 14, 2024 Dept: 71
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
71
TENTATIVE RULING
DAVID
MARVISI, et al., vs. ABRAHIM
BENELYAHU. |
Case No.:
23STCV19294 Hearing Date: March 14, 2024 |
Plaintiffs
David Marvisi’s, Belgrave Portfolio LLC’s, and 2136 Deerfield Property, LLC’s
demurrer to Defendant Abrahim Benelyahu’s answer to Plaintiffs’ first amended
complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to Defendant’s 2nd
through 10th affirmative defenses.
Plaintiffs David Marvisi (“Marvisi”), Belgrave
Portfolio LLC (“Belgrave”), and 2136 Deerfield Property, LLC (“2136 Deerfield”)
(collectively, “Plaintiffs”) demur to Defendant Abrahim Benelyahu’s
(“Benelyahu”) (“Defendant”) answer (“Answer”) to Plaintiffs’ first amended
complaint (“FAC”). (Notice Demurrer,
pgs. 1-2.)
Background
Plaintiffs filed their initial complaint on
August 14, 2023. Plaintiffs filed the
operative FAC against Defendant alleging five causes of action: (1) breach of
oral contract; (2) fraud; (3) unlawful business practices; (4) invasion of
privacy; and (5) declaratory relief.
Defendant filed his Answer to the FAC on January 26, 2024.
Plaintiffs filed the instant demurrer on February
13, 2024. Defendant filed his untimely
opposition on March 11, 2024. As of the
date of this hearing no reply has been filed.
Meet and Confer
C.C.P. §430.41(a) provides in part, “Before
filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet
and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party
who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of
determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the
objections to be raised in the demurrer.”
(C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.)
Plaintiffs’ counsel declares she contacted
Defendant’s counsel via email on February 1, 2024, in an attempt to meet and
confer, and requested a response by February 5, 2024. (Decl. of Landver ¶3.) Plaintiff’s counsel declares Defendant’s
counsel fail to respond to her meet and confer request. (Decl. of Landver ¶4.) Plaintiff’s counsel’s declaration is
insufficient under C.C.P. §430.41(a) because she did not attempt to meet and
confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with Defendant’s
counsel.
However, failure to sufficiently meet and
confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles
County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v.
Hornbrook Community Services District (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Therefore, the Court will consider
Plaintiffs’ demurrer.
Legal Standard
“[A] demurrer tests the legal
sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A
demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially
noticeable. (See Donabedian v.
Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a
demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to
judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their
contents].) For purposes of ruling on a
demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the
reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
A demurrer to an answer is appropriate
when the answer contains allegations proffered in the form of brief legal
conclusions rather than as facts. (FPI
Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 367, 382-386 [affirmative
defenses of fraud in the inducement and failure of consideration, consisting of
“terse” legal conclusions rather than facts, were not well pled, and would not
have survived a demurrer].)
In addition, the affirmative defenses in
an answer are limited to “a statement of any new matter constituting a defense.”
(C.C.P. §431.30(b).) The “new matter” should be an independent
reason which a defendant claims should bar plaintiff from recovery, even if all
of the allegations in the complaint were true. (Walsh v. West Valley Mission Community
College District (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1546 [claim that plaintiff
failed to perform is not an affirmative defense].)
Summary of Demurrer
Plaintiffs demur to Defendant’s Answer on the
basis the second through tenth affirmative defenses are each and all
conclusory, fail to mention facts, are each and all boilerplate, and each and
all allege various purported affirmative defense with no explanation, factual
or otherwise. (Demurrer, pg. 2.)
Discussion
Failure to State a Defense
2nd-10th
Affirmative Defenses
Plaintiffs’
demurrer to Defendant’s 2nd through 10th affirmative defenses to the FAC is
sustained because they contain allegations proffered in the form of brief legal
conclusions rather than as facts. (FPI
Development, Inc., 231 Cal.App.3d at pgs. 382-386.)
Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ demurrer to Defendant’s 2nd
through 10th affirmative defenses to the FAC is sustained with 20 days
leave to amend.
Conclusion
Plaintiffs’
demurrer to Defendant’s 2nd through 10th affirmative defenses to the FAC is
sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
|
Hon.
Daniel M. Crowley |
Judge
of the Superior Court |