Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV24344, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV24344 Hearing Date: October 9, 2024 Dept: 71
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT 71
TENTATIVE RULING
PRISCILLA JAVAHERIAN, vs. EPREMIUM INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, et al. |
Case No.:
23STCV24344 Hearing
Date: October 9, 2024 |
Defendant
Greystar California, Inc.’s unopposed motion to quash service of summons
on The Chadwick Apartments is denied.
Defendant
Greystar California, Inc. (“Greystar”) (“Defendant”) moves unopposed to
quash service of the summons and complaint by Plaintiff Priscilla Javaherian (“Javaherian”)
(“Plaintiff”) on Defendant The Chadwick Apartments (“Chadwick”) on the basis Chadwick
was not served pursuant to any acceptable method under Corporations Code §17701.16. (Notice of Motion, pgs. 2.)
Background
On
October 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Greystar,
Chadwick, Epremium Insurance Agency, LLC (“Epremium”), Tina Yerton (“Yerton”),
and Walter Torres (“Torres”) (collectively, “Defendants”). On March 22, 2024, at 1:12 PM, Plaintiff
served Chadwick with the summons and Complaint at 209 S Westmoreland Ave, Los
Angeles, CA 90004-6109 by substituted service on Gonzalo Soria- Employee. (4/2/24 Proof of Service.) Plaintiff filed a proof of service for the
Complaint on April 4, 2024, indicating that she served Chadwick by substituted
service.
On
July 25, 2024, Greystar filed the instant motion. As of the date of this hearing Plaintiff has
not filed an opposition.
Request
for Judicial Notice
Greystar’s
7/25/24 request for judicial notice of the Grant Deed, dated January 12, 2017,
reflecting that KW Westmoreland TIC, LLC and Chadwick LF Owner acquired title
to the apartment complex commonly known as “The Chadwick Apartments,” (D-RJN,
Exh. 1), is granted.
Motion
to Quash
“A defendant, on or before
the day of his or her time to plead . . . may serve and file a notice of motion
. . . [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of
the court over him or her.” (C.C.P.
§418.10(a)(1), emphasis added.) By
filing such motion, “a defendant makes a special appearance for the narrow
purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction where the summons is defective.” (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11
Cal.5th 381, 393.)
“California is a jurisdiction
which in general requires strict statutory compliance with requirements for
service of original process.” (In re
Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 693-694.)
“Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the Court lacks
jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Ruttenberg
v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 809.)
“In the absence of a
voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the
statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court’s personal
jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Floveyer
International, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 793; see
also Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 [“To establish
personal jurisdiction, it is essential to comply with the statutory procedures
for service of process.”].) “When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by
bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the
existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an
effective service.” (Lebel v. Mai
(2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160, internal quotations omitted.)
Here, Greystar is moving on
behalf of another named Defendant, Chadwick, to quash service of summons. Greystar cites no authority for the
proposition that it has standing to move to quash service of summons on
Chadwick’s behalf. The text of C.C.P.
§418.10(a)(1) explicitly states, “[a] defendant, on or before the last day of
his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good
cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the
following purposes: . . . To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”
(C.C.P. §418.10(a)(1).) Further,
Greystar’s request for judicial notice includes a grant deed for the Chadwick
Apartments that names particular entities who potentially have standing to make
a proper motion to quash as erroneously named entities. (See D-RJN, Exh. 1.) Since those entities, and not Greystar, would
be the proper parties to make the instant motion, the Court must deny the
instant motion.
Accordingly, Greystar’s unopposed
motion to quash is denied.
Conclusion
Greystar’s unopposed
motion to quash service of summons is denied.
Moving Party to give
notice.
|
Hon.
Daniel M. Crowley |
Judge
of the Superior Court |