Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV24344, Date: 2024-10-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV24344    Hearing Date: October 9, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

PRISCILLA JAVAHERIAN, 

 

         vs.

 

EPREMIUM INSURANCE AGENCY, LLC, et al.

 Case No.:  23STCV24344

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  October 9, 2024

 

Defendant Greystar California, Inc.’s unopposed motion to quash service of summons on The Chadwick Apartments is denied.

 

Defendant Greystar California, Inc. (“Greystar”) (“Defendant”) moves unopposed to quash service of the summons and complaint by Plaintiff Priscilla Javaherian (“Javaherian”) (“Plaintiff”) on Defendant The Chadwick Apartments (“Chadwick”) on the basis Chadwick was not served pursuant to any acceptable method under Corporations Code §17701.16.  (Notice of Motion, pgs. 2.)

 

Background

On October 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Greystar, Chadwick, Epremium Insurance Agency, LLC (“Epremium”), Tina Yerton (“Yerton”), and Walter Torres (“Torres”) (collectively, “Defendants”).  On March 22, 2024, at 1:12 PM, Plaintiff served Chadwick with the summons and Complaint at 209 S Westmoreland Ave, Los Angeles, CA 90004-6109 by substituted service on Gonzalo Soria- Employee.  (4/2/24 Proof of Service.)  Plaintiff filed a proof of service for the Complaint on April 4, 2024, indicating that she served Chadwick by substituted service.

On July 25, 2024, Greystar filed the instant motion.  As of the date of this hearing Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

 

Request for Judicial Notice

Greystar’s 7/25/24 request for judicial notice of the Grant Deed, dated January 12, 2017, reflecting that KW Westmoreland TIC, LLC and Chadwick LF Owner acquired title to the apartment complex commonly known as “The Chadwick Apartments,” (D-RJN, Exh. 1), is granted.

 

Motion to Quash

“A defendant, on or before the day of his or her time to plead . . . may serve and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”  (C.C.P. §418.10(a)(1), emphasis added.)  By filing such motion, “a defendant makes a special appearance for the narrow purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction where the summons is defective.”  (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 393.)

“California is a jurisdiction which in general requires strict statutory compliance with requirements for service of original process.”  (In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 693-694.)  “Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the Court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.”  (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 809.)

“In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.”  (Floveyer International, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 793; see also Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 [“To establish personal jurisdiction, it is essential to comply with the statutory procedures for service of process.”].) “When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.”  (Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160, internal quotations omitted.)

Here, Greystar is moving on behalf of another named Defendant, Chadwick, to quash service of summons.  Greystar cites no authority for the proposition that it has standing to move to quash service of summons on Chadwick’s behalf.  The text of C.C.P. §418.10(a)(1) explicitly states, “[a] defendant, on or before the last day of his or her time to plead or within any further time that the court may for good cause allow, may serve and file a notice of motion for one or more of the following purposes: . . . To quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.”  (C.C.P. §418.10(a)(1).)  Further, Greystar’s request for judicial notice includes a grant deed for the Chadwick Apartments that names particular entities who potentially have standing to make a proper motion to quash as erroneously named entities.  (See D-RJN, Exh. 1.)  Since those entities, and not Greystar, would be the proper parties to make the instant motion, the Court must deny the instant motion.

Accordingly, Greystar’s unopposed motion to quash is denied.

 

Conclusion

Greystar’s unopposed motion to quash service of summons is denied.

Moving Party to give notice.

 

Dated:  October _____, 2024

                                                                            


Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court