Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 23STCV29711, Date: 2024-03-12 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV29711    Hearing Date: April 4, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Raymond Hovsepian’s motion for attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff Jaydon Douglas Paull is granted in the total amount of $27,170.00, comprised of $26,580.00 in attorneys’ fees and $570.00 in costs.

Defendant Raymond Hovsepian (“Hovsepian”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order awarding him attorneys’ fees against Plaintiff Jaydon Douglas Paull (“Paull”) (“Plaintiff”) in the total amount of $27,170.00.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 1.)

Background

On December 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed his operative complaint (“Complaint”) against Hovsepian and Defendants Hasti Rahsepar (“Rahsepar”), HDR Law Group, Inc. (“HDR”), and Der Vartanian (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging a single cause of action for abuse of process against Hovsepian, with many other causes of action against non-moving Defendants.  On March 12, 2024, this Court granted Defendant’s special motion to strike (“Anti-SLAPP Motion”) Plaintiff’s cause of action for abuse of process alleged against Hovsepian.  (3/12/24 Minute Order.)

On March 12, 2024, Hovsepian filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees.  On March 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed his opposition.  On March 27, 2024, Hovsepian filed his reply.

Discussion

C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1) provides, in part, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.”  California law makes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant mandatory.  (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [“[u]nder Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney’s fees.”].)  Here, Hovsepian was the prevailing party in the Anti-SLAPP Motion.  (See 3/12/24 Minute Order.)  Accordingly, Hovsepian’s motion for attorneys’ fees is proper and he is entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.

Reasonable Fees

The California Supreme Court has determined the lodestar method is the proper mechanism to calculate attorneys’ fees under C.C.P. §425.16(c).  (See Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 1136.)  To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Defendant’s counsel.  The “reasonable hourly rate” applicable under the lodestar method is the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  “The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.”  (Id. at pg. 1096.)

Hovsepian’s Counsel declares his hourly rate on this matter is $600.  (Decl. of Brooks ¶¶12.)  The Court determines based on its experience that Hovsepian’s Counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable in his community of practice.  (See Decl. of Brooks ¶¶10-12, Exh. C.)

An anti-SLAPP motion is complex in nature and requires the submission of declarations and evidence akin to a motion for summary judgment or a preliminary injunction.  Hovsepian argues the Anti-SLAPP motion in the instant case was labor intensive due largely to the fact that the abuse of process action was laid out over a 513 paragraph Complaint and followed a series of litigated matters and implicated several other related lawsuits.  (Motion, pg. 7; Decl. of Brooks ¶9.)  Hovsepian argues this required his counsel to review and analyze an underlying record in order to understand all of the issues attendant to the Anti-SLAPP motion.  (Motion, pg. 7.)  Hovsepian’s efforts resulted in the dismissal of Plaintiff’s single cause of action alleged against him.  Accordingly, Hovsepian’s requested attorneys’ fees are reasonable.

Billed Hours

The verified time entries of the attorneys are entitled to a presumption of credibility, which extends to an attorney’s professional judgment as to whether time spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation.  (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“We think the verified time statements of the attorney as officers of the court are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”].)  “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.”  (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)

Here, the billing statement of Hovsepian’s counsel’s fees and costs incurred on the motion and the declaration by counsel demonstrates the reasonableness of the time spent on this case.  (See Decl. of Brooks ¶¶5-8, Exh. B.)[1]  Hovsepian argues his counsel expended 36.3 hours litigating the anti-SLAPP motion, in addition to three hours on the instant motion and includes five anticipated hours in connection with reviewing and analyzing the opposition, preparing a reply, appearing at the hearing, and preparing a notice of entry of this Court’s order on the motion.  (See Decl. of Brooks ¶13.)[2]

Plaintiff’s arguments in opposition to Hovsepian’s motion are unavailing because his objections to Hovsepian’s request for fees do not point to the specific items challenged with sufficient arguments and citations to the evidence; general arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Insurance Guarantee Association (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)

Accordingly, Hovsepian’s request for $26,580.00 in attorneys’ fees is granted.

Costs

Hovsepian seeks costs in the amount of $570.00.  (Decl. of Brooks ¶8.)  Defendant does not challenge Hovsepian’s request for costs, and therefore the requested costs are granted pursuant to §425.16(c)(1).

Conclusion

Hovsepian’s motion is granted in the total amount of $27,150.00, comprised of $26,580.00 in attorneys’ fees and $570.00 in costs.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  April _____, 2024