Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV31143, Date: 2025-06-03 Tentative Ruling

All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter.  If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SMCDEPT71@lacourt.org. Do not click on the email address, either copy and paste it or type it into your email. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.

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Defendants One Race Productions, Inc.’s, One Race Films, Inc.’s, Vin Diesel’s, and Samantha Vincent’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action in Plaintiff Asta Jonasson’s complaint is granted without leave to amend.

Defendants One Race Productions, Inc. (“OR Productions”), One Race Films, Inc. (“OR Films”), Vin Diesel (“Diesel”), and Samantha Vincent (“Vincent”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for judgment on the pleadings of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action in Plaintiff Asta Jonasson’s (“Jonasson”) (“Plaintiff”) complaint (“Complaint”). (Notice Motion, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §438; Smiley v. Citibank (1995) 11 Cal.4th 138, 145.)[1]

Defendants’ 4/4/25 request for judicial notice of (1) Plaintiff’s Complaint for Discrimination, filed with the California Civil Rights Department (“CRD”) on December 20, 2023 (D-RJN, Exh. A); (2) 2021 California Assembly Bill No. 2777 (2021-2022) (Reg. Session) (June 24, 2022) (D-RJN, Exh. B); (3) California Bill Analysis, Senate Floor, 2021-2022 Regular Session, Assembly Bill 2777 (Aug. 11, 2022) (D-RJN, Exh. C); (4) California Assembly Bill No. 1619 (2017-2018) (Reg. Session) (D-RJN, Exh. D); (5) California Assembly Bill No. 1510 (2019-2020) (Reg. Session) (D-RJN, Exh. E); (6) California Assembly Bill No. 3092 (2019-2020) (Reg. Session) (D-RJN, Exh. F); (7) California Assembly Bill No. 2777 (2021-2022) (Reg. Session) (D-RJN, Exh. G); (8) 2021 California Assembly Bill No. 2777 (2021-2022) (Reg. Session) (August 11, 2022) (D-RJN, Exh. H); and (9) California Assembly Bill No. 9, § 3, (2019-2020) (Reg. Session) (D-RJN, Exh. I), is granted.

Defendants’ 4/4/25 request for judicial notice of (1) the 6/7/24 minute order in Terri Mendoza v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 23SMCV06082; (2) the December 3, 2024, Ruling on Defendant Bonnie Pan’s Demurrer to Third Cause of Action of First Amended Complaint in John Doe, et al. v. Endemol USA Inc., et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 22STCV01035; and (3) the December 3, 2024 Ruling on Defendant Endemol’s Demurrer to Third Cause of Action of First Amended Complaint in John Doe, et al. v. Endemol USA Inc., et al., Los Angeles Superior Court Case No. 22STCV01035 is denied as irrelevant.

Plaintiff filed her operative Complaint on December 21, 2023, alleging ten causes of action: (1) discrimination in violation of FEHA; (2) hostile work environment in violation of FEHA; (3) retaliation in violation of FEHA; (4) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of FEHA; (5) retaliation in violation of Labor Code §1102.5; (6) retaliation in violation of Labor Code §98.6; (7) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (8) sexual battery; (9) negligent supervision and retention; and (10) intentional infliction of emotional distress.

Defendants filed the instant motion on April 4, 2025. Plaintiff filed her opposition on May 20, 2025. Defendants filed their reply on May 27, 2025.

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself.” (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650; see also Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1055 [“common law ground for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to the statutory ground”].)

The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or be based on facts the court may judicially notice. (C.C.P. §438(d); Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 758-759.)

Where the motion is based on matters the court may judicially notice (under Evidence Code §§452, 453), such matters must be specified in the notice of motion or supporting points and authorities. (Compare C.C.P. §438(d) with Saltarelli & Steponovich v. Douglas (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1, 5 [taking judicial notice of matters in parties’ exhibits in “nonstatutory” motion for judgment on the pleadings].)

Before filing a motion for judgment on the pleadings, the moving party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion. (C.C.P. §439(a), emphasis added.) A declaration must be filed with the motion regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (C.C.P. §439(a)(3).)

Defendants’ counsel’s declaration states that on March 28, 2025, he spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel by phone regarding the instant motion and the parties were unable to resolve the issues raised in this motion. (See Decl. of Hardy ¶3, 4.) Defendants’ counsel’s declaration is proper under C.C.P. §439(a)(3). Therefore, the Court will consider Defendants’ motion.

Discrimination in Violation of FEHA; Hostile Work Environment in Violation of FEHA; (3) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA; (4) Failure to Prevent Discrimination, Harassment, and Retaliation in violation of FEHA (1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th COAs)

Before bringing a civil action for violation of the FEHA, a plaintiff must file a timely and sufficient administrative complaint with the California Civil Rights Division (“CRD”) and obtain a “right-to-sue” notice (Notice of Right to File a Civil Action). (See Gov. Code §§12960, 12965(c).) Exhaustion of administrative remedies under the FEHA is “a jurisdictional prerequisite to resort to the court.” (Johnson v. City of Loma Linda (2000) 24 Cal.4th 61, 70; Campbell v. Regents of Univ. of California (2005) 35 Cal.4th 311, 321.)

Failure to timely file an administrative complaint before commencing suit constitutes grounds for dismissal of any claim asserting FEHA violations. (Martin v. Lockheed Missiles & Space Co., Inc. (1994) 29 Cal.App.4th 1718, 1724; C.C.P. §438(c)(1)(B)(i).)

Notwithstanding any other law, any claim seeking to recover damages suffered as a result of a sexual assault that occurred on or after the plaintiff’s 18th birthday that would otherwise be barred before January 1, 2023, solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired, is hereby revived, and a cause of action may proceed if already pending in court on January 1, 2023, or, if not filed by that date, may be commenced between January 1, 2023, and December 31, 2023.

Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was harassed on September 10, 2010. (Complaint ¶¶26-31.) In 2010, the deadline to file an administrative complaint with the CRD was one year. Under the applicable one-year statute, Plaintiff had until September 2011 to file an administrative complaint. Plaintiff failed to do so, and therefore, her FEHA claims expired over twelve years before she filed her lawsuit. Plaintiff’s FEHA claims are, therefore, all time barred. This incurable procedural defect requires dismissal of the first, second, third, and fourth causes of action. (See Campbell v. Regents of University of California (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 311, 321.)

On October 10, 2019, California passed Assembly Bill No. 9, also known as the Stop Harassment and Reporting Extension (“SHARE”) Act. The SHARE Act extended the one-year deadline to file an administrative complaint to three years. Effective January 1, 2022, to be timely, an administrative complaint must be filed with the CRD within three years of the date the alleged unlawful practice occurred. (Gov. Code §12960(e)(5).)

Assembly Bill No. 9, Section 3, (2019-2020) (Reg. Session) was enacted to amend Government Code §§12960 and 12965 relating to the limitation of actions and expressly states that “[t]his act shall not be interpreted to revive lapsed claims.” (D-RJN, Exh. I at Sec. 3.) Therefore, any claims that already lapsed prior to January 1, 2022, were not revived under the amended statute.

There are no published California court decisions that directly address whether C.C.P. §340.16 revives the CRD administrative filing deadline. For that reason, Defendants’ analysis of case law analyzing an analogous statute, C.C.P. §340.1 is instructive in interpreting C.C.P. §340.16.

The California Supreme Court in Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, analyzed the distinction between an administrative deadline and a statute of limitations.

The Shirk Court addressed the question of whether an administrative filing deadline is a statute of limitations:

In 2002, the Legislature added a statutory provision that “revived” for the calendar year 2003 those causes of action for childhood sexual molestation that would otherwise have been barred “solely” by expiration of the applicable statute of limitations. Does that provision also apply when a plaintiff suing a public entity has failed to first present a timely claim to the entity, as required by the government claims statute? Our answer is “no.”

(Shirk v. Vista Unified School District (2007) 42 Cal.4th 201, 204, superseded by statute.)

This question is analogous to the one presently at issue: Whether C.C.P. §340.16—which revives causes of action for sexual assault barred “solely because the applicable statute of limitations has or had expired”—applies when a plaintiff has failed to first timely exhaust her administrative remedies, as required by C.C.P. §340.16(e)(1). The Shirk Court concluded that the plaintiff’s “causes of action . . . were barred by expiration of the time for presenting a claim” under the government claims statute even before considering “the public policies underlying the claim presentation requirement of the government claims statute.” (Shirk, 42 Cal.4th at pg. 213.)

Plaintiff’s attempt to distinguish the Government Claims Act from FEHA is unavailing. FEHA’s administrative claim filing requirement is “functionally equivalent” to the Government Claims Act process. (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 744, 764.) Both processes “serve as a similar function”; namely, to “provide an administrative forum whereby discrimination disputes may be resolved short of coming to Court.” (Snipes v. City of Bakersfield (1983) 145 Cal.App.3d 861, 869; Garcia v. Los Angeles Unified School District (1985) 173 Cal.App.3d 701, 711-712 [stating FEHA’s administrative claim process is the equivalent of the Government Claims Act presentation requirement].)

Plaintiff’s FEHA claims are time-barred because she failed to timely exhaust her administrative remedies by filing a CRD complaint within one year of the alleged adverse action, a jurisdictional requirement for a FEHA lawsuit. (See Foroudi v. Aerospace Corp. (2020) 57 Cal. App. 5th 992, 1002.) Plaintiff cites no authority for the proposition that C.C.P. §340.16 applies to FEHA’s administrative exhaustion requirement.

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action is granted without leave to amend.

Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings of Plaintiff’s 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action is granted without leave to amend.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The Court notes Defendants do not move for judgment on the pleadings of Plaintiff’s 5th, 6th, 7th, 8th, 9th, or 10th causes of action.