Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 23STCV31619, Date: 2024-11-22 Tentative Ruling

Defendants Estrella Radio Broadcasting of California LLC’s and Estrella Media’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs against Plaintiff Mariam Motta is granted in the reduced total amount of $39,948.92, comprised of $32,407.30 in attorneys’ fees incurred on the Anti-SLAPP Motion, $6,555.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred on the instant motion, and $986.62 in costs.

Defendants Estrella Radio Broadcasting of California LLC’s (“Radio”) and Estrella Media’s (“Media”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move for an order awarding them attorneys’ fees and costs against Plaintiff Mariam Motta (“Motta”) (“Plaintiff”) in the total amount of $114,063.52, comprised of $97,221.90 for fees incurred in connection with their special motion to strike (“Anti-SLAPP Motion”), $986.62 in costs, and $15,855.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred in the preparation of the instant motion. (Notice of Motion, pg. 2.)

Plaintiff’s 11/8/24 evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Robison (“Robison”) are overruled as to Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6.

On December 27, 2023, Plaintiff filed her Complaint against Defendants alleging five causes of action: (1) Violation of California Equal Pay Act (Labor Code §1197.5); (2) FEHA Sex Discrimination (Gov. Code §12940(a)); (3) FEHA Retaliation (Gov. Code §12940(h)); (4) FEHA Failure to Prevent (Gov. Code §12940(k)); and (5) Private Attorneys’ General Act of 2004 (Labor Code §2698 et seq.). On February 28, 2024, Defendants filed their Anti-SLAPP Motion.

This Court heard argument on the Anti-SLAPP Motion on May 30, 2024, and took the matter under submission. On June 12, 2024, this Court issued its ruling on submitted matter, granting Defendants’ Anti-SLAPP Motion in part and denying in part. (6/12/24 Minute Order.) This Court denied Defendants’ motion as to Plaintiff’s allegations in her FEHA Retaliation cause of action at ¶44 at pgs. 10:24-26, 11:5-7. This Court granted Defendants’ motion as to the remaining factual allegations in Plaintiff’s FEHA Retaliation cause of action. (6/12/24 Minute Order at pg. 1.)

On August 12, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees. On November 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed her opposition. As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed.

C.C.P. §425.16(c)(1) provides, in part, “a prevailing defendant on a special motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees and costs.” California law makes the award of attorneys’ fees and costs to a prevailing anti-SLAPP defendant mandatory. (See Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1131 [“[u]nder Code of Civil Procedure §425.16, subdivision (c), any SLAPP defendant who brings a successful motion to strike is entitled to mandatory attorney’s fees.”].) Here, Defendants were the prevailing party in the Anti-SLAPP Motion. (See 6/12/24 Minute Order.) Accordingly, Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees is proper and they are entitled to recover attorneys’ fees and costs.

The California Supreme Court has determined the lodestar method is the proper mechanism to calculate attorneys’ fees under C.C.P. §425.16(c). (See Ketchum, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 1136.) To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by Defendant’s counsel. The “reasonable hourly rate” applicable under the lodestar method is the rate “prevailing in the community for similar work.” (PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) “The trial court makes its determination after consideration of a number of factors, including the nature of the litigation, its difficulty, the amount involved, the skill required in its handling, the skill employed, the attention given, the success or failure, and other circumstances in the case.” (Id. at pg. 1096.)

Defendants’ Counsel declares the following hourly rates in this case: (1) Catherine Jung (Junior Associate) $437 per hour; (2) Clint Robison (Partner) $1,057 per hour; and (3) Jessica Abreu (Junior Associate $437 per hour). (See Decl. of Robison ¶12, Exh. G at pg. 5 of 5; Motion, pg. 5.)[1] The Court determines based on its experience that Defendants’ Counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable in their community of practice.

An anti-SLAPP motion is complex in nature and requires the submission of declarations and evidence akin to a motion for summary judgment or a preliminary injunction. Defendants’ counsel declares the Anti-SLAPP Motion required extensive evidence and argument as to why the retaliation claim arose from petitioning activity including showing that the pre-litigation communications/representations were in serious good faith anticipation of litigation. (Decl. of Robison ¶4.) Defendant’s Counsel further declares that the motion also required considerable discussion as to why Plaintiff could not meet her prima facie evidentiary burden of showing a probability of prevailing on the merits of the retaliation cause of action. (Decl. of Robison ¶4.) Defendants’ counsel’s efforts resulted in the dismissal of part of a cause of action alleged against them. Accordingly, Defendants’ requested attorneys’ fees are ostensibly reasonable.

The verified time entries of the attorneys are entitled to a presumption of credibility, which extends to an attorney’s professional judgment as to whether time spent was reasonably necessary to the litigation. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396 [“We think the verified time statements of the attorney as officers of the court are entitled to credence in the absence of a clear indication the records are erroneous.”].) “California courts do not require detailed time records, and trial courts have discretion to award fees based on declarations of counsel describing the work they have done and the court’s own view of the number of hours reasonably spent.” (Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 691, 698-699.)

“[A] defendant should not be entitled to obtain as a matter of right his or her entire attorney fees incurred on successful and unsuccessful claims merely because the attorney work on those claims was overlapping. Instead, the court should first determine the lodestar amount for the hours expended on the successful claims, and, if the work on the successful and unsuccessful causes of action was overlapping, the court should then consider the defendant’s relative success on the motion in achieving his or her objective, and reduce the amount if appropriate.” (Mann v. Quality Old Time Service, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 328, 344-345.) “This analysis includes factors such as the extent to which the defendant’s litigation posture was advanced by the motion, whether the same factual allegations remain to be litigated, whether discovery and motion practice have been narrowed, and the extent to which future litigation expenses and strategy were impacted by the motion. The fees awarded to a defendant who was only partially successful on an anti-SLAPP motion should be commensurate with the extent to which the motion changed the nature and character of the lawsuit in a practical way. The court should also consider any other applicable relevant factors, such as the experience and abilities of the attorney and the novelty and difficulty of the issues, to adjust the lodestar amount as appropriate.” (Id. at pg. 345.)

Here, Defendants’ litigation posture was not advanced by the motion and there was no meaningful change to the legal landscape; Defendants’ motion merely struck a portion of the FEHA retaliation claim based on a “settlement communication.” (See 6/12/24 Minute Order, pgs. 8-11.) Plaintiff’s possible recovery against Defendants did not change, even pursuant to her cause of action for retaliation under FEHA: Plaintiff still seeks “loss of wages,” “prejudgment interest,” “emotional distress, humiliation, mental anguish and embarrassment, as well as manifestations of physical symptoms,” “attorneys’ fees and costs,” and “punitive damages.” (Complaint ¶¶45-48.) This Court also did not strike Plaintiff’s entitlement to any possible recovery. Plaintiff continues to allege a retaliation claim in her 1st cause of action under Labor Code §1197.5 (Complaint ¶¶26, 31) and her possible recovery remains the same pursuant to her other causes of action (Prayer for Relief ¶¶1-9, Complaint ¶¶32-34, 38-41, 51-54, 57).

Further, Defendants’ fee request is for a total of $114,063.52. This amount of fees is comparable to the exorbitant fees in Christian Research Institute v. Alnor. In Christian Research Institute, the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order to award the prevailing Defendant in an anti-SLAPP motion only $21,300 in attorneys’ fees and $1,494.83 in costs, which was considerably less than the requested fees of over $250,000.00 for over 600 hours of work. (Christian Research Institute v. Alnor (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319.) Here, like in Christian Research Institute, Defendants’ fee request is “grossly inflated” and their billing records are excessively redacted. Based on these facts this Court can “reasonably determine counsel’s fee request [is] unreasonably padded, vague, and worthy of little credence.” (Id. at pg. 1326.)

Therefore, the Court reduces Defendants’ requested billed fees by 2/3, resulting in a reduced award of attorneys’ fees on the Anti-SLAPP Motion of $32,407.30, calculated as follows:

With regards to the instant motion for attorneys’ fees, Defendants’ counsel requests attorneys’ fees for 10 hours, as well as 5 hours to review of the opposition, prepare a reply, and appear at the hearing for the instant motion. (Decl. of Robison ¶17.) The Court finds the requested 15 hours on the instant motion to be appropriate. However, Defendants’ counsel does not provide an invoice or a declaration stating which attorney billed for the instant motion. Therefore, the Court applies a junior associate’s rate and calculates the fees on the instant motion as follows: 15 x $437/hour = $6,555.00 in attorneys’ fees.

Accordingly, the Court calculates the total reduced attorneys’ fees to be $38,962.30.

Defendants request costs in the amount of $986.62. Plaintiff does not challenge Defendants’ request for costs, and such costs are substantiated in Defendants’ invoices, as they are not redacted, unlike the remainder of the invoices provided. (See Decl. of Robison, Exh. G.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ request for costs incurred on the Anti-SLAPP Motion is granted in the amount of $986.62.

Defendants’ motion for attorneys’ fees and costs is granted in the reduced total amount of $39,948.92, comprised of $32,407.30 in attorneys’ fees incurred on the Anti-SLAPP Motion, $6,555.00 in attorneys’ fees incurred on the instant motion, and $986.62 in costs.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The Court is concerned by the fact that Defendants’ counsel’s invoices redact the hourly rates of counsel. (See Decl. of Robison, Exh. G.) These redactions appear suspect; if the rates included on the invoices match the rates included in Defendants’ motion, there should be no reason to redact these rates.