Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 24STCV00417, Date: 2024-07-01 Tentative Ruling

Specially Appearing Defendant in pro per Carlos Gonzalez’s unopposed motion to quash service of summons is granted.

Specially Appearing Defendant Carlos Gonzalez (“Gonzalez”) (“Moving Defendant”), in pro per, makes a special appearance for this Court to quash service of the summons and complaint in this action on the grounds Plaintiff Ruben Isidoro Sanchez (“Sanchez”) (“Plaintiff”) has failed to properly serve Moving Defendant, and instead served Moving Defendant’s healthcare provider at the front door as she was attempting to enter Moving Defendant’s residence. (Notice of Motion, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §418.10.)

On January 8, 2024, Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint against Moving Defendant and Non-moving Defendant Nicholas Cabrera (“Cabrera”) (collectively, “Defendants”). On January 31, 2024, at 8:53 AM, Plaintiff served Moving Defendant with the summons and Complaint at 712 Calle Miramar, Redondo Beach, CA 90277 (“Property”) by substituted service on Jane Doe, indicating that she lives with the subject at the residence and accepted the paperwork. (2/5/24 Proof of Service.) Plaintiff filed a proof of service for the Complaint on February 5, 2024, indicating that he served Moving Defendant by substituted service.

On February 16, 2024, Moving Defendant filed the instant motion. As of the date of this hearing Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

“A defendant, on or before the day of his or her time to plead . . . may serve and file a notice of motion . . . [t]o quash service of summons on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the court over him or her.” (C.C.P. §418.10(a)(1).) By filing such motion, “a defendant makes a special appearance for the narrow purpose of contesting personal jurisdiction where the summons is defective.” (Stancil v. Superior Court (2021) 11 Cal.5th 381, 393.)

“California is a jurisdiction which in general requires strict statutory compliance with requirements for service of original process.” (In re Abrams (1980) 108 Cal.App.3d 685, 693-694.) “Until statutory requirements are satisfied, the Court lacks jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Ruttenberg v. Ruttenberg (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 801, 809.)

“In the absence of a voluntary submission to the authority of the court, compliance with the statutes governing service of process is essential to establish that court’s personal jurisdiction over a defendant.” (Floveyer International, Ltd. v. Superior Court (1997) 59 Cal.App.4th 789, 793; see also Calvert v. Al Binali (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 954, 961 [“To establish personal jurisdiction, it is essential to comply with the statutory procedures for service of process.”].) “When a defendant challenges that jurisdiction by bringing a motion to quash, the burden is on the plaintiff to prove the existence of jurisdiction by proving, inter alia, the facts requisite to an effective service.” (Lebel v. Mai (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 1154, 1160, internal quotations omitted.)

If a copy of the summons and complaint cannot with reasonable diligence be personally delivered to the person to be served, as specified in Section 416.60, 416.70, 416.80, or 416.90, a summons may be served by leaving a copy of the summons and complaint at the person’s dwelling house, usual place of abode, usual place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, in the presence of a competent member of the household or a person apparently in charge of his or her office, place of business, or usual mailing address other than a United States Postal Service post office box, at least 18 years of age, who shall be informed of the contents thereof, and by thereafter mailing a copy of the summons and of the complaint by first-class mail, postage prepaid to the person to be served at the place where a copy of the summons and complaint were left. Service of a summons in this manner is deemed complete on the 10th day after the mailing.

Here, Plaintiff failed to meet his burden to demonstrate he served the summons and complaint in the presence of a competent member of Moving Defendant’s household.

Furthermore, the individual, “Jane Doe,” who was substituted served does not meet the definition of a competent member of Moving Defendant’s household under C.C.P. §415.20(b). Moving Defendant submitted the declaration of Fatima Arango (“Arango”), who provides healthcare and support for Moving Defendant. (Decl. of Arango ¶3.) Arango declares that upon her arrival at the Property on January 31, 2024, an individual asked her if she lived at the Property, and she informed them that she did not. (Decl. of Arango ¶4.) Arango declares that despite informing the individual that she did not live at the Property, they handed Arango paperwork when she was at the front door ringing the Property’s doorbell. (Decl. of Arango ¶5.) Arango declares the individual that served her with the paperwork never gained access to the Property to attempt to personally serve Moving Defendant because he is disabled and could not come to the door because he was being cared for by his wife in the back room of the Property. (Decl. of Arango ¶6.) Arango does not meet the requirement of competent member of Moving Defendant’s household. Therefore, Plaintiff’s purported service is ineffectual as to Moving Defendant.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court