Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 24STCV03546, Date: 2025-05-12 Tentative Ruling

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Plaintiff Ramin Nouri (“Nouri”) (“Plaintiff”) moves for an order awarding him a total of $21,206.73 in attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses against Defendant Porsche Cars North America, Inc. (“PCNA”) (“Defendant”), consisting of (1) $18,375.00 in attorneys’ fees; (2) a 1.1 multiplier enhancement on attorneys’ fees (or $1,837.50); and (3) $994.23 in costs and expenses. (Notice of Motion, pgs. i-ii; Civ. Code §1794(d).)

This is a lemon law action brought under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“SBA”). On March 29, 2024, the parties formally agreed to resolve this action and Defendant stipulated, acknowledged and/or agreed that Plaintiff would be the “prevailing parties” so that Plaintiff could seek attorneys’ fees and costs by motion. The terms of the Defendant’s Offer were negotiated, and the finalized Settlement Agreement & Release (“SAR”) was fully executed by all parties on or before April 4, 2024. Pursuant to the SBA under Civil Code §1790 et. seq., and as a result of the acceptance of the Defendant’s Offer, Plaintiff is entitled to seek reasonable attorney’s fees, costs and expenses against Defendant. (Opp. Decl. of Hooper ¶15, Exh. G [“PCNA shall pay Releasor’s attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses that have been reasonably incurred to date by Releasor in the commencement and prosecution of this action in an amount determined by the Court . . . by way of a single noticed motion . . ..”].)[1]

On November 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed this motion for attorneys’ fees. On April 29, 2025, Defendant filed its opposition. As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed.

Under Song-Beverly, a buyer who prevails in their action is entitled to an award “as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney’s fees based on actual lime expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code §1794(d).)

Here, the SAR does not explicitly declare that Plaintiff is the prevailing party. However, the SAR determines that Plaintiff is entitled to attorneys’ fees and costs up to the date the SAR was executed on April 4, 2024. (Decl. of Hooper ¶15, Exh. G; see Decl. of Kohen ¶4.) For the purposes of this motion, Plaintiff is therefore the prevailing party.

To calculate a lodestar amount, the Court must first determine the reasonableness of the hourly rates sought by the Plaintiff’s counsel. The Supreme Court of California has concluded that a reasonable hourly lodestar rate is the prevailing rate for private attorneys “conducting non-contingent litigation of the same type.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1133, emphasis added.)

Plaintiff’s Counsel does not declare his hourly rate in this matter. (See Decl. of Kohen ¶¶14-18.) However, Exhibit 1 indicates Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate appears to be $545.00/hour. (See Decl. of Kohen ¶12, Exh. 1 at pg. 3.) This rate is appropriate given the attorney’s relative experience and qualifications. (See Decl. of Kohen ¶¶14-18.) Plaintiff has sufficiently demonstrated his counsel’s hourly rate is reasonable in his community of practice in his specialized area of law.

The party seeking fees and costs bears the burden to show “the fees incurred were allowable, were reasonably necessary to the conduct of the litigation, and were reasonable in amount.” (Nightingale v. Hyundai Motor America (1994) 31 Cal.App.4th 99, 104.)

Plaintiff’s fee recovery is based on the 35 hours spent by his attorney litigating this case, three anticipated hours incurred for reviewing the opposition and filing a reply, one anticipated hour attending the hearing on the instant motion, one anticipated hour to draft a memorandum of costs, one anticipated hour to attend a final status conference, and one anticipated hour for miscellaneous tasks to complete and closes this case. (See Decl. of Kohen ¶¶12, 33-36, Exh. 1.) Plaintiff cannot recoup anticipated attorneys’ fees that were not actually incurred; therefore, Plaintiff cannot recover the three anticipated hours incurred for reviewing the opposition and filing a reply, one anticipated hour to draft a memorandum of costs, one anticipated hour to attend a final status conference, and one anticipated hour for miscellaneous tasks to complete and closes this case (a total of 6 hours added to the total 35 hours requested).

Defendant objects to Plaintiff’s billed fees on the basis they are unreasonable or unnecessary. (Opposition, pgs. 5-10.) The Court will address these specific arguments in turn:

First, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s counsel billed an excessive amount of hours because a Rule 68 offer was served by Defendant on Plaintiff, and soon after Plaintiff agreed to the repurchase amount offered. However, rather than sign the Rule 68 offer, Plaintiff’s counsel requested an SAR instead. Further, the SAR only provided that “PCNA shall pay Releasor’s attorney’s fees, costs, and expenses that have been reasonably incurred to date by Releasor in the commencement and prosecution of this action . . ..” The SAR was fully executed on April 4, 2024. Plaintiff’s counsel billed nearly an hour analyzing the terms of the SAR and explaining it to Plaintiff, which is ample time to comprehend the clear terms, including that PCNA agreed to pay fees only up to the date the SAR was executed. (See Decl. of Kohen ¶12, Exh. 1 at pg. 2.) Defendant’s objection is well taken; per the SAR, Plaintiff is not entitled to recoup fees billed after April 4, 2024. Therefore, the 17.9 hours billed (or $9,397.50) by Plaintiff’s counsel after April 4, 2024, are not compensable under the SAR. Therefore, Plaintiff’s motion is reduced by $9,397.50.

Second, Defendant argues Plaintiff’s counsel’s billing entries are excessive, improper, or unnecessary. Defendant challenges billing entries on 11/14/23, 12/23/23, and 1/03/24 for client intake and vetting, and the retainer agreement, for a total of 1.4 hours ($735.00). Defendant argues the first two billing entries were incurred prior to the execution of the retainer agreement and therefore not billable and part of overhead. Defendant argues the last billing entry for 1.0 hours for reviewing the repair orders and sales contract, drafting the retainer agreement, and reviewing it with the client is improperly block billed. Defendant’s arguments are well taken. Accordingly, Plaintiff’s hours billed for 1.4 hours ($735.00) are reduced by 0.9 hours ($262.50) to 0.5 hours ($472.50).

Third, Defendant challenges a billing entry on 1/4/24 for 4.2 hours ($2,205.00) researching various recalls, technical service bulletins, and customer complaints on the basis that such research is unnecessary for a simple lemon law case. Defendant’s objection is not well taken; an attorney’s fees motion is to be based on actual time expended. The Court does not deem this time to adequately research documents to prosecute Plaintiff’s case unreasonable. Accordingly, Defendant’s request to reduce Plaintiff’s motion by $2,205.00 for 4.2 hours billed on January 4, 2024, is denied.

Fourth, Defendant challenges a billing entry on 12/2/24 for 1.5 hours ($892.50). No such billing entry exists on Plaintiff’s timesheet. There is a billing entry for 1.5 hours on 2/12/24. Regardless, Defendant’s objection on the basis that all lemon law firms use templates is unavailing and unsupported by case law. Accordingly, Defendant’s request to reduce Plaintiff’s motion by $525.00 for 1.5 hours billed on February 12, 2024, is denied.

Fifth, Defendant challenges billing entries on 1/25/24, 2/14/24, 2/19/24, 2/22/24, 2/24/24, 2/26/24, 3/8/24, 3/18/24, 3/21/24, 3/25/24, 3/26/24, and 4/2/24 on the basis of excessive time to review or write one-line emails, routine minute orders and forms, and block-billing with client communications. Plaintiff’s counsel billed 18 minutes for a short email exchange with opposing counsel on 2/22/24 and 12 minutes for another short email exchange on 2/24/24. (See Opposition, pg. 9.) Further, Plaintiff claims 3.3 hours for client communication between 2/14/24 and 4/2/24. Defendant’s objection is not well taken; an attorney’s fees motion is to be based on actual time expended. The Court does not find it unreasonable to have spent this time to adequately communicate with his client and prepare correspondence. Accordingly, Defendant’s request to reduce Plaintiff’s motion by $787.50 is denied.

Sixth, Defendant challenges billing entries on 11/19/24 and 11/21/24, as well as future motions on the basis PCNA did not agree to pay fees beyond April 4, 2024, so this time is not recoverable. This Court already ruled on these objections and will not grant Plaintiff’s request for fees dated after the execution of the SAR.

Accordingly, Plaintiff’s request for attorneys’ fees is granted in the reduced amount of $8,715.00.

Plaintiff requests a 1.1 multiplier. Given the routine work done in this case and the results obtained in this lemon law area, a multiplier is not appropriate. Any contingency risk factor is already accounted for in the hourly rates, which the Court has found to be reasonable.

The California legislature intended the word “expenses” in Song-Beverly to cover outlays not included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs,” and the legislative history of Song-Beverly further demonstrates that the legislature exercised its power to permit the recovery by prevailing buyers of a host of litigation expenditures. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.) “If the items appearing in a cost bill appear to be proper charges, the burden is on the party seeking to tax costs to show that they were not reasonable or necessary. On the other hand, if the items are properly objected to, they are put in issue and the burden of proof is on the party claiming them as costs.” (Nelson v. Anderson (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 111, 131.)

Pursuant to the SAR, the parties agreed to address costs on the instant motion. Plaintiff argues that should Defendant seek to reduce costs, then it should file a properly noticed motion to tax costs. (Motion, pg. 11.) While this is the typical procedure for challenging costs submitted on a memorandum of costs, no such memorandum was submitted by Plaintiff; costs were only sought in the instant motion. Therefore, this Court determines Defendant can properly challenge the costs sought in the instant motion in its reply.

Defendant challenges all costs incurred after April 4, 2024, and the Court agrees, pursuant to the language in the SAR. Defendant does not object to the $445.20 filing fee on 2/12/24 or the $30.00 service fee on 2/21/24. However, $61.65 fee motion filing fee was incurred after April 4, 2024, on 11/20/24 and is therefore not recoverable. The remaining costs are undated and unsubstantiated, and on that basis PCNA objects to the remaining costs. Defendant’s objections are well taken.

[1] The Court notes it is not helpful for Plaintiff’s counsel to declare that an exhibit on which he bases his motion is not attached to instant motion and will be produced under seal or in camera. (See Decl. of Kohen ¶4 [“([A] true and correct copy of the SAR will be produced to the court under seal or in Camera as Exhibit 3).”].) Plaintiff’s counsel provides no basis for which the document should be sealed, and such failure to attach the document can only result in further delay of the relief Plaintiff seeks in the form of attorneys’ fees. Thankfully, Defendant’s counsel attached a copy of the SAR to her declaration; the Court can rule on the instant motion at his hearing because Defendant produced the SAR on which Plaintiff relies for his motion.