Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 24STCV07725, Date: 2024-07-15 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24STCV07725 Hearing Date: July 15, 2024 Dept: 71
County of Los Angeles
DEPARTMENT
71
TENTATIVE RULING
OYEKUNLE JEGEDE, vs. 90018 COLLECTION LLC, et al. |
Case No.:
24STCV07725 Hearing
Date: July 15, 2024 |
Moving Defendant 90018
Collection LLC’s
demurrer to pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle Jegede’s complaint
is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Defendant 90018 Collection
LLC’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint is denied as moot.
Defendant 90018 Collection LLC (“90018 Collection”) (“Moving Defendant”)
demurs to the Complaint and each cause of action in pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle Jegede’s (“Jegede”)
(“Plaintiff”) complaint (“Complaint”) on the grounds Plaintiff’s Complaint and
each cause of action fails to state facts on which relief may be granted and is
uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).) Moving Defendant also filed a motion to
strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint.
(Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §436(b).)
Meet and Confer
Before filing a
demurrer, the demurring party must meet and confer in person, by telephone,
or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to
reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and
obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.)
The demurring party
shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either of the
following: (A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with
the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did
not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (B)
That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to
the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet
and confer in good faith. (C.C.P.
§430.41(a)(3).)
Moving Defendant’s
counsel submitted a meet and confer declaration stating that she met and
conferred with Plaintiff telephonically on May 21, 2024. (See Decl. of
Windler ¶2.) Moving Defendant’s
counsel declares she explained to Plaintiff the defects in the complaint and
the parties were not able to come to an agreement on the pleadings. (See Decl. of Windler ¶2.) Accordingly, the Court will consider Moving Defendant’s
demurrer.
Background
Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint on March 27, 2024, against
Defendant and Non-moving Defendants Winston Cenac, Trustee of the Island Boy
Trust (“Cenac”), Shelby Ring (“Ring”), the Law Offices of Rebecca Hufford-Cohen
(“Law Offices”), and On Time (“On Time”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging four
causes of action: (1) illegal eviction; (2) illegal theft; (3) discrimination;
and (4) fraud.
Plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2023, he was a tenant at 238
½ Market Street, Venice, CA 90291, and was subjected to an eviction
by Moving Defendant. (Complaint ¶1.)
Plaintiff alleges on November 28, 2021, property valued at over
$150,000.00 was removed without his consent, and this occurred two weeks after
the alleged eviction. (Complaint ¶1.) Plaintiff alleges he fulfilled all payments
by July 24, 2023, as outlined in a stipulation agreement with Cenac. (Complaint ¶2.) Plaintiff alleges Cenac filed an ex parte
that alleged non-payment and included a misleading hearing notice that led to
an erroneous judgment. (Complaint ¶2.)
Plaintiff alleges he uncovered the use of Moving Defendant’s
improper use of documentation for the eviction. (Complaint ¶3.) Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy
involving Cenac, Law Office, and On Time.
(Complaint ¶3.)
Plaintiff alleges On Time participated in the enforcement of the
eviction and the confiscation of Plaintiff’s property. (Complaint
¶3.)
Plaintiff alleges that following the eviction, Moving Defendant and Jason
Pennington, Ring, and On Time initiated major reconstruction without permits
from the Los Angeles Housing Authority and displaced Plaintiff and violated the
health rights of tenants. (Complaint
¶4.)
Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer and accompanying
motion to strike on May 21, 2024. Plaintiff filed his oppositions on July 5,
2024. Moving Defendant filed its replies
on July 8, 2024.
A. Demurrer
Summary of Demurrer
Moving Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds
that the entire Complaint and each cause of action alleged therein fails to
state facts on which relief may be granted and is uncertain. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 2-3; C.C.P.
§§430.10(e), (f).)
Legal Standard
“[A] demurrer tests the legal
sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc.
(2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A
demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the
pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially
noticeable. (See Donabedian v.
Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a
demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to
judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their
contents].) For purposes of ruling on a
demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the
reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District
(1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Failure to State a Claim
Illegal Eviction (1st COA)
California
recognizes the tort of wrongful eviction. (See Barkett v. Brucato (1953) 122
Cal.App.2d 264, 275.) “An essential
element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the
premises. [Citations.]” (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873,
900.)
The elements of a cause of action in tort for wrongful eviction
are (1) the tenant has property rights and privileges with regard to the use or
enjoyment that has been interfered with; (2) there has been a substantial
invasion of those rights or privileges; (3) the conduct
of the landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenant’s rights or
privileges; and (4) the invasion is intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional
and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless
or ultrahazardous conduct. (Tooke v. Allen
(1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 230, 237.)
Plaintiff fails to allege Moving Defendant is the landlord of 238
½ Market Street, Venice, CA 90291, factual allegations that Moving Defendant
substantially invaded his rights as a tenant, that Moving Defendant’s as the
landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenant’s rights or
privileges, and that Moving Defendant’s invasion was intentional and
unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules
governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.
Accordingly,
Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st cause of action is sustained with
20 days leave to amend.
Illegal
Theft (2nd COA)
Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property
of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s
ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s
conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3)
damages. (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61
Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 354 P.3d 334].)
To prove a cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff must show
the defendant acted intentionally to wrongfully dispose of the property of
another. (Duke v. Superior Court (2017)
18 Cal.App.5th 490, 508.)
“[C]onversion is a strict liability tort. It does not require bad
faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have
intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful
possession.” (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1158.)
Plaintiff fails to identify the property valued at over
$150,000.00 that was removed without his consent. (See Complaint ¶1.)
Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 2nd cause
of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Discrimination (3rd COA)
The elements of the cause of action for housing discrimination are:
(1) Plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) applied for and was
qualified for a housing accommodation; (3) was denied a housing accommodation;
and (4) circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive, such as similarly
situated individuals applied for and obtained housing. (Department of Fair Employment and Housing
v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 896, 902.)
Plaintiff fails to allege the protected class he belongs to for
which Moving Defendant based its impermissible decision to deny Plaintiff’s
application for a housing accommodation.
Plaintiff fails to allege he applied for and was qualified for a housing
accommodation. Plaintiff fails to allege
circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive. Further, Plaintiff fails to allege he filed a
complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) against
Moving Defendant prior to filing the instant action. (See Govt. Code §12980(h).)
Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to the 3rd cause of
action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
Fraud (4th COA)
“A complaint for fraud must allege the following elements: (1) a
knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or
induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting
damages.” (Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44
Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816 [combining misrepresentation and scienter as a single
element].)
Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity
in pleading. (Committee on Children’s
Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.) Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather
than with general and conclusory allegations. (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003)
30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) The specificity
requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing
how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made,
and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names
of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf
of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the
representation was made. (Lazar
v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645; West v. JPMorgan Chase
Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)
Plaintiff fails to allege a knowingly false representation by the
defendant, an intent to deceive or induce reliance, and justifiable reliance by
the plaintiff. Further, Plaintiff fails
to allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the
representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the
plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations,
their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what
they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.
Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to the 4th cause of
action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.
B. Motion to Strike
In light of the Court’s ruling on Moving Defendant’s demurrer, Moving
Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as moot.
Conclusion
Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is sustained with
20 days leave to amend as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action.
Moving Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as moot.
Moving Party to give notice.
|
Hon.
Daniel M. Crowley |
Judge
of the Superior Court |