Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 24STCV07725, Date: 2024-07-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV07725    Hearing Date: July 15, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

 

DEPARTMENT 71

 

TENTATIVE RULING

 

OYEKUNLE JEGEDE, 

 

         vs.

 

90018 COLLECTION LLC, et al.

 Case No.:  24STCV07725

 

 

 

 Hearing Date:  July 15, 2024

 

Moving Defendant 90018 Collection LLC’s demurrer to pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle Jegede’s complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant 90018 Collection LLC’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s complaint is denied as moot.

 

Defendant 90018 Collection LLC (“90018 Collection”) (“Moving Defendant”) demurs to the Complaint and each cause of action in pro per Plaintiff Oyekunle Jegede’s (“Jegede”) (“Plaintiff”) complaint (“Complaint”) on the grounds Plaintiff’s Complaint and each cause of action fails to state facts on which relief may be granted and is uncertain.  (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).)  Moving Defendant also filed a motion to strike portions of Plaintiff’s Complaint.  (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §436(b).)

 

Meet and Confer

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer.  (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.)

The demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith.  (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).)

Moving Defendant’s counsel submitted a meet and confer declaration stating that she met and conferred with Plaintiff telephonically on May 21, 2024.  (See Decl. of Windler ¶2.)  Moving Defendant’s counsel declares she explained to Plaintiff the defects in the complaint and the parties were not able to come to an agreement on the pleadings.  (See Decl. of Windler ¶2.)  Accordingly, the Court will consider Moving Defendant’s demurrer.

 

Background

Plaintiff filed the operative Complaint on March 27, 2024, against Defendant and Non-moving Defendants Winston Cenac, Trustee of the Island Boy Trust (“Cenac”), Shelby Ring (“Ring”), the Law Offices of Rebecca Hufford-Cohen (“Law Offices”), and On Time (“On Time”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging four causes of action: (1) illegal eviction; (2) illegal theft; (3) discrimination; and (4) fraud.

Plaintiff alleges that on November 9, 2023, he was a tenant at 238 ½ Market Street, Venice, CA 90291, and was subjected to an eviction by Moving Defendant.  (Complaint ¶1.)  Plaintiff alleges on November 28, 2021, property valued at over $150,000.00 was removed without his consent, and this occurred two weeks after the alleged eviction.  (Complaint ¶1.)  Plaintiff alleges he fulfilled all payments by July 24, 2023, as outlined in a stipulation agreement with Cenac.  (Complaint ¶2.)  Plaintiff alleges Cenac filed an ex parte that alleged non-payment and included a misleading hearing notice that led to an erroneous judgment.  (Complaint ¶2.) 

Plaintiff alleges he uncovered the use of Moving Defendant’s improper use of documentation for the eviction.  (Complaint ¶3.)  Plaintiff alleges a conspiracy involving Cenac, Law Office, and On Time.  (Complaint ¶3.)  Plaintiff alleges On Time participated in the enforcement of the eviction and the confiscation of Plaintiff’s property.  (Complaint ¶3.) 

Plaintiff alleges that following the eviction, Moving Defendant and Jason Pennington, Ring, and On Time initiated major reconstruction without permits from the Los Angeles Housing Authority and displaced Plaintiff and violated the health rights of tenants.  (Complaint ¶4.) 

Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer and accompanying motion to strike on May 21, 2024.  Plaintiff filed his oppositions on July 5, 2024.  Moving Defendant filed its replies on July 8, 2024.

         

A.   Demurrer

Summary of Demurrer

Moving Defendant demurs to Plaintiff’s Complaint on the grounds that the entire Complaint and each cause of action alleged therein fails to state facts on which relief may be granted and is uncertain.  (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 2-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).)

 

Legal Standard

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law.  (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

 

Failure to State a Claim

Illegal Eviction (1st COA)

          California recognizes the tort of wrongful eviction.  (See Barkett v. Brucato (1953) 122 Cal.App.2d 264, 275.)  “An essential element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated the premises. [Citations.]” (Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 900.)

The elements of a cause of action in tort for wrongful eviction are (1) the tenant has property rights and privileges with regard to the use or enjoyment that has been interfered with; (2) there has been a substantial invasion of those rights or privileges; (3) the conduct of the landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenant’s rights or privileges; and (4) the invasion is intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.  (Tooke v. Allen (1948) 85 Cal.App.2d 230, 237.)

Plaintiff fails to allege Moving Defendant is the landlord of 238 ½ Market Street, Venice, CA 90291, factual allegations that Moving Defendant substantially invaded his rights as a tenant, that Moving Defendant’s as the landlord is the legal cause of the invasion of the tenant’s rights or privileges, and that Moving Defendant’s invasion was intentional and unreasonable, or unintentional and otherwise actionable under the rules governing liability for negligent, reckless or ultrahazardous conduct.

          Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

 

          Illegal Theft (2nd COA)

Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.  (Lee v. Hanley (2015) 61 Cal.4th 1225, 1240 [191 Cal.Rptr.3d 536, 354 P.3d 334].)

To prove a cause of action for conversion, the plaintiff must show the defendant acted intentionally to wrongfully dispose of the property of another.  (Duke v. Superior Court (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 490, 508.)

“[C]onversion is a strict liability tort. It does not require bad faith, knowledge, or even negligence; it requires only that the defendant have intentionally done the act depriving the plaintiff of his or her rightful possession.” (Voris v. Lampert (2019) 7 Cal.5th 1141, 1158.)

Plaintiff fails to identify the property valued at over $150,000.00 that was removed without his consent.  (See Complaint ¶1.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 2nd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

 

Discrimination (3rd COA)

The elements of the cause of action for housing discrimination are: (1) Plaintiff was a member of a protected class; (2) applied for and was qualified for a housing accommodation; (3) was denied a housing accommodation; and (4) circumstantial evidence of discriminatory motive, such as similarly situated individuals applied for and obtained housing.  (Department of Fair Employment and Housing v. Superior Court (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 896, 902.)

Plaintiff fails to allege the protected class he belongs to for which Moving Defendant based its impermissible decision to deny Plaintiff’s application for a housing accommodation.  Plaintiff fails to allege he applied for and was qualified for a housing accommodation.  Plaintiff fails to allege circumstantial evidence of a discriminatory motive.  Further, Plaintiff fails to allege he filed a complaint with the Department of Fair Employment and Housing (“DFEH”) against Moving Defendant prior to filing the instant action.  (See Govt. Code §12980(h).)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to the 3rd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

 

Fraud (4th COA)

“A complaint for fraud must allege the following elements: (1) a knowingly false representation by the defendant; (2) an intent to deceive or induce reliance; (3) justifiable reliance by the plaintiff; and (4) resulting damages.” (Service by Medallion, Inc. v. Clorox Co. (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 1807, 1816 [combining misrepresentation and scienter as a single element].)

Fraud actions are subject to strict requirements of particularity in pleading.  (Committee on Children’s Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 216.)  Fraud must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations.  (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.)  The specificity requirement means a plaintiff must allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.  (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645; West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 780, 793.)

Plaintiff fails to allege a knowingly false representation by the defendant, an intent to deceive or induce reliance, and justifiable reliance by the plaintiff.  Further, Plaintiff fails to allege facts showing how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were made, and, in the case of a corporate defendant, the plaintiff must allege the names of the persons who made the representations, their authority to speak on behalf of the corporation, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when the representation was made.

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to the 4th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

 

B.    Motion to Strike

In light of the Court’s ruling on Moving Defendant’s demurrer, Moving Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

 

Conclusion

Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th causes of action.

Moving Defendant’s motion to strike is denied as moot.

Moving Party to give notice.

 

Dated:  July _____, 2024

                                                                            


Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court