Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 24STCV10112, Date: 2024-07-29 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV10112    Hearing Date: July 29, 2024    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendants Clifton Holliday’s, Carol Holliday’s, and Jasmine Holliday’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Shannon Rose Steckloff’s complaint is overruled.

Defendants Clifton Holliday (“Clifton”), Carol Holliday (“Carol”), and Jasmine Holliday (“Jasmine”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike portions of Plaintiff Shannon Rose Steckloff’s (“Steckloff”) (“Plaintiff”) complaint (“Complaint”) to support an award for punitive damages in the following portions of the Complaint: (1) ¶25 “was malicious in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in severe injury to others, and was conduct so base and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people”; (2) ¶25B “malicious”; (3) ¶25E “malicious”; (4) ¶26 “malicious” and “acted with malice in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in serious injury to others, and in a base and contemptible manner that would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people”; (5) ¶40 “was malicious in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in severe injury to others, and was conduct so base and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people”; (6) ¶40B “malicious”; (7) ¶40E “malicious”; (8) ¶41 “malicious” and “acted with malice in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in serious injury to others, and in a base and contemptible manner that would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people”; (9) ¶52 “was malicious in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in severe injury to others, and was conduct so base and contemptible that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people”; (10) ¶52B “malicious”; (11) ¶52E “malicious”; (12) ¶53 “malicious” and “acted with malice in conscious disregard for the probability that their conduct would result in serious injury to others, and in a base and contemptible manner that would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people”; and (13) Prayer ¶4 ““For punitive and exemplary damages according to proof”.  (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §436(a).)

Background

Plaintiff filed her operative Complaint on April 22, 2024, against Defendants alleging two causes of action: (1) strict liability; and (2) negligence arising from alleged injuries Plaintiff suffered from an attack by Defendants’ dog.

On June 3, 2024, Defendants filed the instant motion.  On July 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed her opposition.  On July 24, 2024, Defendants filed their reply.

Meet and Confer

Before filing a motion to strike, moving party’s counsel must meet and confer, in person, telephone, or by video conference with counsel for the party who filed the pleading in an attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing a motion to strike.  (C.C.P. §435.5.)  A declaration must be filed with the motion to strike regarding the results of the meet and confer process.  (C.C.P. §435.5(a)(3).)

Defendants’ counsel declares that on May 22, 2024, she spoke with Plaintiff’s counsel by telephone regarding the instant motion, and the parties were unable to come to an agreement.  (Decl. of Boiadjian ¶2.)  Therefore, Defendants’ motion to strike is proper.

Motion to Strike

Legal Standard

C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.”  (C.C.P. §436(a).)

Summary of Motion

Defendants move to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to punitive damages on the basis Plaintiff’s complaint alleges nothing more than conduct that might support claims of negligence or common law and statutory strict liability.  (Motion, pg. 6.)

Punitive Damages

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression.  (Civ. Code §3294(a).)  “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others.  (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.)  “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights.  (Id.)  “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury.  (Id.)  Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

“Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of ‘such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded to willful misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.’”  (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10, quoting Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286.)  “Despicable Conduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)

  “[C]onclusory characterization of defendant’s conduct as intentional, willful and fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of ‘oppression, fraud, or malice, express or implied,’ within the meaning of section 3294.”  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)

          Plaintiff’s Complaint alleges:

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that at all times herein mentioned, the dog owned by defendants CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY and DOES 1-10 was vicious.

Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereupon alleges that at all times herein mentioned, CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY, and DOES 1-10 were aware of the dog’s vicious nature and propensities. Defendants, and each of them, knew that the dog was inherently and naturally violent and vicious. Prior to the incident giving rise to this action, defendants, and each of them, were aware that the dog had previously escaped from their yard and attacked and bitten people and other dogs, in addition to having aggressively barked, growled and threatened the public.

Notwithstanding their knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities, defendants CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY and DOES 1-10 failed to leash, tether, chain, muzzle or otherwise take measures to ensure that the dog would not attack any person or member of the public.

Notwithstanding their knowledge of the dog’s vicious propensities, defendants CLIFTON HOLLIDAY, CAROL HOLLIDAY, JASMINE HOLLIDAY, and DOES 1-20, failed to provide a secure, enclosed, protected yard for the dog; and otherwise failed to take measures to ensure that the dog would not escape the yard and attack members of the public.

(Complaint ¶13-16.)

          Plaintiff’s allegations pertaining to Defendants’ knowledge that their dog had previously escaped from their yard and attacked and bitten people and other dogs, combined with the allegation that Defendants failed to leash, tether, chain, muzzle, or otherwise take measures to ensure that the dog would not attack any person or member of the public and the allegation that Defendants failed to provide a secured, enclosed, protected yard for the dog and otherwise failed to take measures to ensure that the dog would not escape the yard and attack members of the public are sufficient facts to allege malice.  (See Complaint ¶¶13, 15-16; Jarman v. HCR ManorCare, Inc. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 807, 818 [“[T]he defendant’s conscious disregard of the plaintiff’s rights or safety will be sufficient to support a finding of malice or oppression, as long as the conduct is also deemed to be despicable.”].)

          Here, Defendants’ alleged conduct rises to the level of despicable conduct because a reasonable person would find the alleged conscious disregard for the danger posed by Defendants’ dog and conscious decision to not contain the dog in an enclosure that would ensure the dog would not escape would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary people.  (See id.)

Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages from the Complaint is overruled. 

Conclusion

Defendants’ motion to strike is overruled.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  July _____, 2024