Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 24STCV14152, Date: 2025-05-02 Tentative Ruling

All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter.  If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SMCDEPT71@lacourt.org. Do not click on the email address, either copy and paste it or type it into your email. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.

            Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may still appear at the hearing and argue the matter, and the court could change its tentative based upon the argument.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If you submit, but still intend to appear, include the words "SUBMITS, BUT WILL APPEAR" in the Subject line.

            If you elect to argue your matter, you are urged to do so remotely, via Court-Connect. If the moving party fails to appear and/or submit to the Court’s tentative ruling, the Court will take the matter off calendar.

            Note that once the Court has issued a tentative, the Court has the inherent authority not to allow the withdrawal of a motion and to adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the court.

If you submitted a courtesy copy of your papers containing media (such as a DVD or thumb drive), unless you request the return of the media in your papers, the court will destroy it following the hearing of your matter.

Defendant CRST Expedited Inc.’s unopposed motion for a stay of this matter in its entirety is granted.

Defendant CRST Expedited Inc. (“CRST”) (“Defendant”) moves unopposed for an order staying this matter in its entirety. (Notice Motion, pg. 2.) Defendant moves on the grounds that the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction mandates a stay of this action, which involves a common plaintiff (the State of California as the real party in interest) and defendant as three earlier-filed actions that allege the same cause of action for penalties pursuant to California’s Private Attorneys General Act, Labor Code §§2699 et seq. (“PAGA”) on behalf of an overlapping group of employees for the same type of alleged wrong. (Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 245; see also, e.g., Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168; People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760.) Defendant further moves on the grounds that this Court should exercise its inherent discretion and stay this entire matter as a result of the earlier-filed class and PAGA actions. (See, e.g., Freiberg v. City of Mission Viejo (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1484, 1489, citing Walker v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 257, 266; Rice v. Superior Court (1982) 136 Cal.App.3d 81, 89.)

Defendant’s 1/8/25 request for judicial notice of (1) PAGA Complaint filed by Espiridion Sanchez on September 10, 2019, entitled Espiridion Sanchez v. Gardner Trucking, Inc., et al., Fresno County Superior Court, Case No. 19CECG03266 (“Sanchez PAGA Action”) (D-RJN, Exh. A); (2) First Amended PAGA Complaint in the Sanchez PAGA Action, which was filed by Plaintiff Espiridion Sanchez on October 25, 2019 (D-RJN, Exh. B); (3) PAGA Complaint filed by Mario Ramos on February 6, 2020, entitled Mario Ramos v. Gardner Trucking, Inc. et al., San Bernardino County Superior Court, Case No. CIVDS 2004038 (“Ramos PAGA Action”) (D-RJN, Exh. C); (4) Mario Ramos’ letter to the Labor Workforce Development Agency (“LWDA”) submitted on December 3, 2019 (D-RJN, Exh. D); (5) PAGA Complaint filed by William Matney-Tates on February 6, 2020, entitled William Matney-Tates v. Gardner Trucking, Inc. et al., San Joaquin County Superior Court, Case No. STK-CV-UOE-2021-11019 (“Matney-Tates PAGA Action”) (D-RJN, Exh. E); (6) Class Action Complaint filed by Kasper Leuzinger on June 28, 2021, entitled Kasper Leuzinger v. Gardner Trucking, Inc. et al. United States District Court – Northern District of California, Case No. 4:21-cv-04952 (“Leuzinger Class Action”) (D-RJN, Exh. F); (7) Order Amending Orders of Consolidation in the Leuzinger Class Action, which was entered on January 10, 2022, and as a result of the Court’s order, the Leuzinger Class Action was consolidated with William Matney-Tate v. Gardner Trucking, Inc. et al., United States District Court – Northern District of California, Case No. 4:21-cv-7474 and Michael Allen Jensen v. CRST Expedited, Inc., United States District Court – Northern District of California, Case No. 4:21-cv-7741 (collectively, “Consolidated Leuzinger Class Action”) (D-RJN, Exh. G); (8) Consolidated Class Action Complaint filed on March 23, 2022, in the Consolidated Leuzinger Class Action (D-RJN, Exh. H); (9) Order Granting Preliminary Approval of Settlement in the Consolidated Leuzinger Class Action and setting the final approval hearing for February 18, 2025 (D-RJN, Exh. I); (10) Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint filed on September 18, 2024, in the Consolidated Leuzinger Class Action (D-RJN, Exh. J); and (11) Class Action Complaint filed by Marcelino Castro on June 10, 2020, entitled Marcelino Castro v. Gardner Trucking, Inc. et al., Monterrey County Superior Court, Case No. 20CV001617 (“Castro Class Action”), which was removed by Defendant to federal court and is now pending in the United States District Court – Northern District of California, Case No. 4:20-cv-05473 (D-RJN, Exh. K), is granted.

On September 11, 2019, former employee Espiridion Sanchez (“Sanchez”) filed a representative PAGA action in Fresno County Superior Court against Gardner Trucking, et al. (D-RJN, Exh. A; Decl. of Voigt ¶2.) A first amended complaint was filed on October 25, 2019, alleging one cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA for violations under the Labor Code and IWC Wage Order. (D-RJN, Exh. B; Decl. of Voigt ¶2.) Sanchez’s claims for purported violations of the California Labor Code include CRST’s alleged failure to pay minimum wages, failure to pay overtime compensation, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to reimburse business expenses, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to pay all wages owed, and failure to provide sick pay. (D-RJN, Exh. B; Decl. of Voigt ¶2.) Sanchez is pursuing the PAGA claim broadly, defining the allegedly aggrieved group as Plaintiff and other current and former employees. (D-RJN, Exh. B ¶¶2, 23.) The Sanchez PAGA Action remains pending in the Fresno County Superior Court. (Decl. of Voigt ¶2.)

On February 5, 2020, former employee Mario Ramos (“Ramos”) filed a representative action under PAGA against Gardner Trucking entitled, Mario Ramos v. Gardner Trucking, Inc., San Bernardino County Superior Court Case No. CIVDS2004038. (D-RJN, Exh. C; Decl. of Voigt ¶3.) Ramos’ claim for PAGA penalties is predicated on purported violations of the California Labor Code including Defendant’s alleged failure to pay all wages (including overtime), failure to pay minimum wages, failure to timely pay wages, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, failure to provide lawful meal periods, and failure to authorize and permit lawful rest periods. (D-RJN, Exh. C.) Prior to filing the lawsuit, on December 3, 2019, Ramos sent a letter to the LWDA with a copy to Defendant alleging various violations of the California Labor Code. (D-RJN, Exh. D; Decl. of Voigt ¶3.) In his complaint, Ramos defines the aggrieved employees at issue in that case as “non-exempt, employees at their locations in the State of California.” (D-RJN, Exh. C ¶9.) The Ramos PAGA Action remains pending and is set for trial starting May 12, 2025. (Decl. of Voigt ¶3.)

On December 2, 2021, former employee William Matney-Tate (“Matney-Tate”) filed a representative action in San Joaquin County Superior Court against CRST alleging one cause of action for civil penalties under PAGA for violations under the Labor Code and IWC Wage Order. (D-RJN, Exh. E; Decl. of Voigt ¶4.) Matney-Tate’s claims for purported violations of the Labor Code include CRST’s alleged failure to pay wages including overtime, failure to provide meal and rest periods, failure to pay all wages earned and owed upon separation, failure to provide accurate itemized wage statements, and failure to reimburse expenses. (D-RJN, Exh. E.) Matney-Tate’s PAGA claim broadly defines the allegedly aggrieved group as “all current and former California Non-Exempt Employees of Defendants.” (D-RJN, Exh. E ¶43.) The Matney-Tate PAGA Action was stayed by stipulation of the parties given the overlap with the earlier-filed class and PAGA actions at issue, and the stay remains in place. (Decl. of Voigt ¶4.)

On June 5, 2024, Plaintiff filed this overlapping representative action in the Los Angeles County Superior Court against CRST Expedited, Inc. alleging one cause of action for civil penalties under the PAGA. (See Complaint; Decl. of Voigt ¶10.) Plaintiff’s PAGA claim broadly defines the allegedly aggrieved group as “all former and/or current non-exempt employees holding various positions and employed by Defendant within California during the relevant time period who were subject to at least one or more Labor Code violations set forth in the PAGA Notice dated March 13, 2024[.]” (Complaint ¶4.)

Defendant filed the instant motion on January 8, 2025. Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition on April 21, 2025.

The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction applies to PAGA actions. (Shaw v. Superior Court (2022) 78 Cal. App. 5th 245.) Defendant asserted this defense in its Answer, filed on July 29, 2024. (See Decl. of Voigt ¶10, Exh. 1 at Affirmative Defense No. 28.) “The established rule of ‘exclusive concurrent jurisdiction’ provides that where two (or more) courts possess concurrent subject matter jurisdiction over a cause, the court that first asserts jurisdiction assumes it to the exclusion of all others, thus rendering ‘concurrent’ jurisdiction ‘exclusive’ with the first court.” (Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 1168, 1175.) While similar in effect to the statutory plea in abatement, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction “has been interpreted and applied more expansively, and therefore may apply where the narrow grounds required for a statutory plea of abatement do not exist.” (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 786, 788.)

As long as “the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to bring before it all the necessary parties, the fact that the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule.” (Id.) In other words, “the remedies sought in the separate actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (Id.) Rather, the test is simply whether “the first and second actions arise from the ‘same transaction.’” (Id. at pg. 789.) Further, “[t]he rule of exclusive jurisdiction . . . is mandatory. Thus, if the conditions are met, the issuance of a stay order is a matter of right.” (People ex rel. Garamendi v. American Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 760, 772, citing Lawyers Title Insurance Corp. v. Superior Court (1984) 151 Cal.App.3d 455, 460.)

Here, the parties in this action substantially overlap with the parties in the Ramos PAGA Action, the Sanchez PAGA Action, and the Matney-Tate PAGA Action. Plaintiff is not prosecuting this action on her own behalf. Instead, she is doing so “as the proxy or agent of the state’s labor law enforcement agencies.” (Iskanian v. CLS Transp. Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, 380, 386 [a PAGA claim “is not a dispute between an employer and an employee;” rather, “[i]t is a dispute between an employer and the state.”].) The State of California remains the “real party in interest in [any] suit” brought under PAGA. (Id. at 382; see also id. at pg. 381.)

The entity defendant and alleged “employer” in this action and the earlier filed Ramos, Sanchez, and Matney-Tate PAGA Actions is CRST. While the Ramos and Sanchez PAGA Actions were filed against Gardner Trucking, Inc., that entity was converted and merged into CRST such that it no longer existed as a separate entity as of January 2, 2021. (Decl. of Voigt ¶2.) Rather, it operates as the Dedicated West division of CRST Expedited, Inc. dba CRST The Transportation Solution, Inc. Therefore, all four actions involve the State as a plaintiff, and CRST Expedited, Inc. as a defendant. The group of purportedly “aggrieved employees” and applicable statutory period in this later-filed case is also fully subsumed within the broader “aggrieved employee” definitions—and longer statute of limitations—that are currently at issue in the Ramos, Sanchez, and Matney-Tate PAGA Actions. While there is not complete overlap between the parties among all four cases, that is not required for exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and the associated mandatory stay to apply. The parties and claims are at the very least substantially the same, requiring a stay of this last-filed case.

In addition to the overlap in parties, there is substantial overlap with respect to the claims, theories, and the alleged Labor Code violations at issue. All four PAGA-only actions assert claims for failure to pay minimum wage and overtime, failure to provide compliant meal and rest periods, failure to maintain accurate records are issue compliant itemized wage statements, and penalties related to the timing of wage payment during and subsequent to employment. Moreover, all four actions arise from the “same transaction.” (Plant Insulation Co., 224 Cal.App.3d at pg. 789.) All four cases are representative actions on behalf of nonexempt employees for alleged Labor Code violations arising out of their employment with CRST, and specifically concern the issue of whether CRST paid all wages, including overtime, paid minimum wages, paid timely wages, provided accurate itemized wage statements to non-exempt employees, provided lawful meal periods, provided lawful rest breaks, paid all wages at the time of separation, and reimbursed reasonable and necessary expenses as required under the Labor Code. Moreover, variations in the alleged factual basis supporting the claim for relief under the Labor Code are immaterial to the application of the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction doctrine as the four PAGA actions need not be precisely the same so long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and to grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the law. (Plant Insulation Co., 224 Cal.App.3d at pg. 788.)

Here, Plaintiff’s causes of action based on CRST’s alleged failure to provide meal periods, failure to provide rest periods, failure to provide complete and accurate wage statements, failure to pay overtime wages, failure to pay minimum wages, failure to timely pay wages and failure to reimburse business-related expenses implicate the same primary right as the Ramos PAGA Action, the Sanchez PAGA Action, and the Matney-Tate PAGA Action, as all four cases allege the same and/or substantially overlapping violations of the Labor Code and Wage Orders. (Henry v. Clifford (1995) 32 Cal.App.4th 315, 320-321 [“[I]f two actions involve the same injury to the plaintiff and the same wrong by the defendant then the same primary right is at stake even if in the second suit the plaintiff pleads different theories of recovery, seeks different forms of relief and/or adds new facts supporting recovery.”].) Moreover, any such claim is a mere subset of the entirety of the claims that are being pursued and exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require complete overlap of all claims to apply.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court