Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 24STCV14644, Date: 2024-12-16 Tentative Ruling

Defendant V. Nueva, L.P.’s demurrer to Plaintiffs Amiyoko Shabazz’s, Ramona Leckbee’s, Henry Leckbee’s, and Sara Leckbee’s 2nd and 3rd causes of action in the Complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend and overruled as to the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th causes of action.

Defendant V. Nueva, L.P.’s motion to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint is denied as moot.

Defendant V. Nueva, L.P. (“V. Nueva”) (“Defendant”) demurs Plaintiffs Amiyoko Shabazz’s (“Shabazz”), Ramona Leckbee’s (“Ramona”), Henry Leckbee’s (“Henry”), and Sara Leckbee’s (“Sara”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, and 6th causes of action in their complaint (“Complaint”). (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).)

Defendant also moves to strike portions of Plaintiffs’ Complaint. (Notice of MTS, pgs. 2-4; C.C.P. §436(a).)

Before filing a demurrer, the demurring party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a).)

The demurring party shall file and serve with the demurrer a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the demurring party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the demurrer. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to demurrer failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).)

Defendant’s counsel declares that on October 2, 2024, she attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiffs’ counsel telephonically to discuss the instant demurrer and motion to strike and left a voicemail. (See Decl. of Henson ¶3.) Defendant’s counsel’s declaration is sufficient under C.C.P. §430.41(a). Therefore, the Court will consider Defendant’s demurrer.

Plaintiffs filed their operative Complaint on June 12, 2024, against Defendant alleging six causes of action: (1) Breach of Contract; (2) Breach of Implied Warranty of Habitability; (3) Nuisance; (4) Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress; (5) Negligence; and (6) Violation of Civil Code §1942.4.

Defendant filed the instant demurrer on October 4, 2024. Plaintiffs filed their opposition on November 14, 2024. Defendant filed its omnibus reply on November 21, 2024.

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant owned and/or managed 130 S. La Fayette Park Place, Los Angeles, CA 90057 (“Subject Property”) where they each resided in units #303 and #302. (See Complaint ¶¶1-5.) Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that at all relevant times Defendant owned, managed, and/or was the landlord of the Subject Property, Jennifer, whose last name is unknown, was a property manager at the Subject Property. (See Complaint ¶9.) Plaintiffs allege Jennifer was involved in all day-to-day operations of the Subject Property, including tenant relations, leasing, maintenance, and repair and security. (Complaint ¶9.) Plaintiffs allege Jennifer also supervised Defendant’s maintenance staff and hired outside contractors to make repairs at the Subject Property. (Complaint ¶9.)

Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that Defendant consented to, approved, affirmed, and ratified each and every action taken by Bullock.[1] (Complaint ¶10.)

Plaintiffs alleges that on November 15, 2017, Plaintiff Shabazz entered into a written lease agreement to lease a unit at the Subject Property and became a tenant of Defendant. (Complaint ¶11.) Plaintiff that on or about January 2021, Plaintiffs Ramona, Henry, and Sara entered into a written lease agreement to lease their unit at the Subject Property and became tenants of Defendant. (Complaint ¶12.) Plaintiffs allege that pursuant to the terms of the lease agreement, Plaintiffs agreed to pay monthly rents in exchange for habitable, safe, and clean living quarters. (Complaint ¶13, Exh. A.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendant has not maintained the Subject Property, therein causing and allowing slum and substandard living conditions. (Complaint ¶14.) Plaintiffs allege that during their tenancy, the following conditions have existed at the Subject Property, and have been allowed to exist by Defendant: (a) insect infestation; (b) visible mold and mildew; (c) leaking walls; (d) defective plumbing; (e) inoperable outlets; and (f) rodents and vermin (collectively, “Conditions”). (Complaint ¶14.)

Plaintiffs allege they suffered stress and anxiety because of the Conditions at the Subject Property, and continued to notify Defendant of their suffering, but Defendant did nothing to help Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶15.) Plaintiffs allege they repeatedly notified Defendant of the defective and dangerous conditions in their apartments and Defendant simply ignored their pleas or tried to avoid fixing them properly. (Complaint ¶16.)

Plaintiffs allege that they repeatedly informed Defendants that the Conditions at the Subject Property were causing them extreme anxiety and discomfort. (Complaint ¶17.)

Plaintiffs allege the Los Angeles County Health Department inspected the Subject Property and found multiple violations that were asked to be remedied. (Complaint ¶18.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant failed to remedy these conditions within 35 days. (Complaint ¶18.)

Plaintiffs allege that despite Defendant’s knowledge of the Conditions and Plaintiffs’ health issues, Defendant failed to properly remedy the Conditions, placing Plaintiffs’ health and safety at risk. (Complaint ¶19.)

Defendant demurs to each cause of action on the basis it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant and is uncertain as to Defendant. (Demurrer, pgs. 3-4.)[2]

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

The elements for a breach of the implied warranty are: (1) the existence of a materially defective condition affecting habitability; (2) the defective condition was unknown to the tenant at the time of occupancy; (3) the effect on habitability of the defective condition was not apparent upon a reasonable inspection; (4) notice was given to the landlord within a reasonable time after the tenant discovered or should have discovered the breach of warranty; and (5) the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the defect while the defendant remained in possession. (Quevedo v. Braga (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 7-8, disapproved of by Knight v. Hallsthammar (1981) 29 Cal.3d 46.)

Plaintiffs allege the Conditions enumerated in the Complaint are unsafe and render various apartments uninhabitable. (Complaint ¶29.) Plaintiffs allege they legitimately expected that the dwellings they rented from Defendants were and would remain fit for habitation during the duration of their leaseholds. (Complaint ¶30.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant had and has actual knowledge of the Conditions, and in spite of this knowledge, Defendant has done nothing and has allowed Plaintiffs’ health and safety to be placed at risk by residing in these apartments. (Complaint ¶31.) Plaintiffs allege that despite the Conditions, Defendant continued to collect full rent from Plaintiffs in violation of the implied warranty of habitability. (Complaint ¶31.)

Plaintiffs allege that as a proximate result of Defendant’s actions and omissions alleged herein, Plaintiffs were privileged to withhold rent from Defendant, and Plaintiffs have therefore been damaged thereby in amounts according to proof at trial. (Complaint ¶33.) Plaintiffs allege that they have suffered other economic damages, including, but not limited to, being forced to expend monies to make repairs to their units and damage to their personal property. (Complaint ¶33.)

Plaintiffs allege that as a further proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, Plaintiffs have been injured in their bodies, in their health, strength, and activities, and sustained injuries to their mental health and shock and injury to their nervous systems, all of which have caused and continue to cause Plaintiffs great mental, physical, and nervous pain and suffering. (Complaint ¶34.)

Plaintiffs allege that as a further proximate result of Defendant’s conduct, plaintiffs have incurred and will in the future incur, medical and other related expenses in connection herewith, the exact amount of which costs, fees and expenses are unknown to Plaintiffs at this time, but which will be shown according to proof at the time of trial. (Complaint ¶35.)

Plaintiffs fail to allege that the defective condition was unknown to the tenant at the time of occupancy; that the effect on habitability of the defective condition was not apparent upon a reasonable inspection; that notice was given to Defendant within a reasonable time after Plaintiffs discovered or should have discovered the breach of warranty; and Defendant was given a reasonable time to correct the defect while the defendant remained in possession. (Quevedo, 72 Cal.App.3d Supp. at pgs. 7-8.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 2nd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

A cause of action for public nuisance must allege the following elements: (1) defendant, by acting, or failing to act, created a condition that was: (a) harmful to health; or (b) obstructed the free use of the property so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property; (2) the condition affected a substantial number of people at the same time; (3) an ordinary person would be reasonably annoyed or disturbed by the condition; (4) the seriousness of the harm outweighs the social utility of the conduct; (5) plaintiff did not consent to the conduct; (6) plaintiff suffered harm that was different from the type of harm suffered by the general public; and (7) defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing plaintiff’s harm. (Birke v. Oakwood Worldwide (2009) 169 Cal.App.4th 1540, 1548.)

Plaintiffs allege they leased the Subject Property from Defendant. (Complaint ¶38.) Plaintiffs allege the conditions as described herein constitute a nuisance in that the Conditions were injurious to the health and safety of the Plaintiffs and the public at large, and were further indecent and offensive to the senses of Plaintiffs and the public at large, and interfered substantially with Plaintiffs’ comfortable enjoyment of the premises. (Complaint ¶39.)

Plaintiffs allege this nuisance had a deleterious effect on the public while at the same time specifically injuring Plaintiffs, who were exposed to the defective conditions not directly affecting the public at large. (Complaint ¶40.)

Plaintiffs allege that despite being required by law to abate the nuisance, Defendant willfully failed to correct conditions rendering the premises a nuisance, and Defendant knew, or reasonably should have known, that Plaintiffs would be injured as a result of this failure to abate the nuisance. (Complaint ¶41.)

Plaintiffs allege that due to the Defendant’s failure to abate the nuisance, Plaintiffs suffered personal injuries. (Complaint ¶42.) Plaintiffs allege that as a direct and proximate legal result of Defendant’s failure to abate the nuisance as set forth above Plaintiffs were hurt in their health, strength and activity, sustaining shock and injuries to their bodies, persons and nervous systems, all of which said injuries have caused and continue to cause Plaintiffs great pain and mental anguish, fear, anxiety, torment and emotional distress. (Complaint ¶43.)

Plaintiffs allege that as a further, direct, and legal result of Defendant’s failure to abate the nuisance and dangerous condition of the subject property as alleged herein, Plaintiffs were required to and did employ physicians for medical examination, treatment and care for their injuries and thus incurred medical and related expenses. (Complaint ¶44.) Plaintiffs allege they did incur and will continue to incur in the future further medical, therapeutic and related expenses, in an amount according to proof. (Complaint ¶44.)

Plaintiffs allege that as a direct and legal result of Defendant’s failure to abate the nuisance and the dangerous condition of the Subject Property as alleged herein, Plaintiffs suffered damage to their personal property, all to their damage, in an amount according to proof. (Complaint ¶45.)

“Given ‘the broad definition of nuisance,’ the independent viability of a nuisance cause of action ‘depends on the facts of each case.’ [Citation.] ‘Where negligence and nuisance causes of action rely on the same facts about lack of due care, the nuisance claim is a negligence claim.’ [Citations.] (Avedon v. State of California (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1336, 1345, internal citations omitted.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ nuisance claim and negligence claims are reliant on the same duties, the same “nuisances” (i.e. the Conditions) and the same actions—or inactions—of Defendant. Plaintiffs base their nuisance and negligence claims on the same set of facts underpinning their entire Complaint. (Complaint ¶¶8-19.) When a cause of action is claiming the same thing but using a different label, it may be rejected as duplicative. (El Escorial Owners’ Association v. DLC Plastering, Inc., (2007) 154 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349.) Therefore, Plaintiffs’ cause of action for nuisance is impermissibly duplicative.

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 3rd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

“A cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress exists when there is ‘(1) extreme and outrageous conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct.’ A defendant’s conduct is ‘outrageous’ when it is so ‘extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated in a civilized community.’ And the defendant’s conduct must be ‘intended to inflict injury or engaged in with the realization that injury will result.’” (Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1050-1051.)

“‘Behavior may be considered outrageous if a defendant (1) abuses a relation or position that gives him power to damage the plaintiff’s interests; (2) knows the plaintiff is susceptible to injuries through mental distress; or (3) acts intentionally or unreasonably with the recognition that the acts are likely to result in illness through mental distress.’” (Molko v. Holy Spirit Association (1988) 46 Cal.3d 1092, 1122, internal citation omitted.)

Plaintiffs allege on information and belief that Defendant knew Plaintiffs would be particularly susceptible to emotional distress and mental suffering resulting from the actions and omissions alleged herein. (Complaint ¶48.) Plaintiffs allege the conduct of defendants as herein alleged was egregious, extreme and outrageous and done with reckless disregard of the likelihood of inflicting severe emotional distress. (Complaint ¶49.) Plaintiffs allege specifically, Defendant has completely failed in their duty as a landlord to maintain the Subject Property and has allowed slum living conditions to persist which spread infection, sickness and disease. (Complaint ¶49.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendant’s conduct was reckless or intentional and malicious, and done for the purpose of causing Plaintiffs to suffer humiliation, mental anguish, and emotional distress. (Complaint ¶50.) Plaintiffs allege the as a direct and proximate result of Defendants’ outrageous conduct, Plaintiffs suffered and continue to suffer severe mental and emotional distress. (Complaint ¶51.)

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiffs allege that the Subject Property had an insect infestation, defective plumbing, a leaking roof, and rodents and vermin. (Complaint ¶14). Plaintiffs allege that they notified Defendant of these conditions and that rather than fix the Conditions, Defendant ignored them. (See Complaint ¶15). Plaintiffs sufficiently plead that the Defendant intentionally and willfully placed their health and safety at risk and further had a special relationship with Plaintiffs as their landlord which they abused. (See Molko, 46 Cal.3d at pg. 1122.)

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 4th cause of action is overruled.

The elements for violation of Civil Code §1942.4 are: (1) a landlord demanded rent, collected rent, issued a notice of rent increase or issued a three-day notice to pay rent; (2) the dwelling substantially lacked any of the affirmative standards listed in §1941.1 or violates Health and Safety Code §17920.10, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in §17920.3; (3) a public officer or employee responsible for the enforcement of any housing law has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair substandard conditions; (4) the conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice to abate and delay is without good cause; and (5) conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant. (Civ. Code §1942.4(a)(1)-(4); see Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281,1298.)

Plaintiffs allege that at all pertinent times, Plaintiffs and Defendant were in a landlord-tenant relationship. (Complaint ¶62.) Plaintiffs allege that throughout the time of the tenancy of Plaintiffs the Subject Property lacked the affirmative standard characteristics listed in Civil Code §1941.1. (Complaint ¶63.) Plaintiffs allege that at various times during Plaintiffs’ tenancies, a public officer responsible for the enforcement of housing laws noted the substandard conditions in the Subject Property and ordered Defendant by written notice after inspection of the premises of the Defendant’s obligations to abate the nuisances and/or repair the substandard conditions at the Subject Property. (Complaint ¶64.)

Plaintiffs allege that the conditions cited had existed and were not abated 35 Pays beyond the date of the issuance of the notices, and defendants had no good cause for delay in complying with the government orders. (Complaint ¶65.) Plaintiffs allege the conditions cited were not caused by acts or omissions of Plaintiffs in violation of Civil Code Section 1929 or 1941.2. (Complaint ¶65.)

Plaintiffs allege that in spite of the citations, defendants have continued to demand and accept rent from Plaintiffs in violation of Civil Code §1942.4, and illegally served 3-Day Notices to Pay Rent or Quit in violation of Civil Code Section 1942.4. (Complaint ¶66.)

Plaintiffs allege that by reason of Defendant’s unlawful conduct, Plaintiffs have sustained general and special damages in amounts to be proven at trial. (Complaint ¶67.) Plaintiffs are also entitled to recover special statutory damages of not less than $100 nor more than $5,000 for each of Defendant’s violations of Civil Code §1942.4. (Complaint ¶67.)

Plaintiffs sufficiently allege a cause of action for Violation of Civil Code §1942.4. Plaintiffs sufficiently allege (1) Defendant demanded rent, collected rent, issued a notice of rent increase or issued a three-day notice to pay rent (Complaint ¶66); (2) the dwelling substantially lacked any of the affirmative standards listed in §1941.1 or violates Health and Safety Code §17920.10, or is deemed and declared substandard as set forth in §17920.3 (Complaint ¶63); (3) a public officer or employee responsible for the enforcement of any housing law has notified the landlord or the landlord’s agent in writing of his or her obligations to abate the nuisance or repair substandard conditions (Complaint ¶64); (4) the conditions have existed and have not been abated 35 days beyond the date of service of the notice to abate and delay is without good cause (Complaint ¶65); and (5) conditions were not caused by an act or omission of the tenant (Complaint ¶65). (Civ. Code §1942.4(a)(1)-(4)

Accordingly, Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 6th cause of action is overruled.

A demurrer for uncertainty will be sustained only where the complaint is so bad that defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., he or she cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against him or her. (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

If the complaint contains enough facts to apprise defendant of the issues it is being asked to meet, failure to label each cause of action is not ground for demurrer: “Although inconvenient, annoying and inconsiderate, the lack of labels . . . does not substantially impair [defendant’s] ability to understand the complaint.” (Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139 n.2.)

Where a demurrer is made upon this ground, it must distinctly specify exactly how or why the pleading is uncertain, and where such uncertainty appears (by reference to page and line numbers of the complaint). (See Fenton v. Groveland Community Services District (1982) 135 Cal.App.3d 797, 809.)

Defendant fails to specify where the uncertainty appears by reference to page line and numbers in the complaint. (See id.)

Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 2nd and 3rd causes of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend and overruled as to the 1st, 4th, 5th, and 6th causes of action.

In light of the Court’s ruling on the demurrer, Defendant’s Motion to Strike is denied as moot.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The Court notes this is the first and only time there is an allegation made against “Bullock” in this Complaint.

[2] The Court notes Defendant’s motion does not present an actual argument that Plaintiff’s 1st or 5th causes of action fail to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Defendant. Therefore, the Court does not address these argument. Defendant only presents argument that the 1st and 5th causes of action are uncertain. (See Demurrer, pgs. 2-4.)