Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 24STCV18879, Date: 2024-12-23 Tentative Ruling

Defendants West Coast Aerospace’s and Robert Vizcarra Paredes’ motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Gregorio Ruiz’s complaint is granted with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendants West Coast Aerospace (“WCA”) and Robert Vizcarra Paredes (“Paredes”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike portions of Plaintiff Gregorio Ruiz’s (“Ruiz”) (“Plaintiff”) Complaint pertaining to punitive damages, specifically: (1) ¶38; (2) ¶49; (3) ¶61; (4) ¶70; (5) ¶81; (6) ¶86; (7) ¶94; (8) ¶102; (9) ¶112; and (10) Prayer ¶4 (“For punitive damages, pursuant to Civil Code §§3294 in amounts sufficient to punish Defendants for the wrongful conduct alleged herein and to deter such conduct in the future.”). (Notice of MTS, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§435-437, 431.10; Civ. Code §3294.)

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the motion. (C.C.P. §435.5(a).)

The moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to motion, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the motion to strike. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to motion failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (C.C.P. §435.41(a)(3).)

Defendants’ counsel declares that on October 16, 2024, he attempted to met and conferred telephonically with Plaintiff’s counsel, and the parties were unable to reach an agreement, necessitating the instant motion. (Decl. of Hirota ¶3.) Defendants’ counsel’s declaration is sufficient under C.C.P. §435.41(a). Therefore, the Court will consider Defendants’ motion to strike.

Plaintiff filed his operative Complaint on July 30, 2024 against Defendants alleging fourteen causes of action: (1) discrimination in violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.; (2) harassment in violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.; (3) retaliation in violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.; (4) retaliation in violation of Gov. Code §§12945.2 et seq.; (5) retaliation in violation of Labor Code §1102.5; (6) failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation in violation of Gov. Code §12940(k); (7) failure to provide reasonable accommodations in violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.; (8) failure to engage in a good faither interactive process in violation of Gov. Code §§12940 et seq.; (9) wrongful termination in violation of public policy; (10) failure to provide meal periods (Labor Code §§226.7, 512); (11) failure to pay wages due (Labor Code §201); (12) failure to provide itemized wage and hour statements (Labor Code §226); (13) waiting time penalties (Labor Code §203); and (14) unfair business practices (Bus. & Prof. Code §§17200 et seq.).

Defendants filed the instant motion to strike on October 21, 2024. Plaintiff filed his opposition on December 9, 2024, and a second opposition on December 10, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on December 16, 2024.

C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any pleading or part thereof “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (C.C.P. §436.)

Defendants move to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to recovery of punitive damages. (Motion, pgs. 6-13.)

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code §3294(a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. Cal., Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Id.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Id.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

“Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of ‘such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded to willful misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.’” (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10, quoting Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286.) “Despicable Conduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)

Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege malice in his causes of action to support his request for punitive damages. While heavy with conclusory language, Plaintiff’s allegations fail to allege specific facts demonstrating an intent to cause injury to Plaintiff or despicable conduct with the willful and conscious disregard of the rights safety of others. Further, Plaintiff does not sufficiently allege fraud based on the allegations of “false assurances” that Defendants allegedly provided to Plaintiff. Such allegations are not alleged with the requisite specificity.

Accordingly, Moving Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages from the Complaint is granted with 20 days leave to amend.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court