Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 24STCV24233, Date: 2025-01-06 Tentative Ruling

All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter.  If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SMCDEPT71@lacourt.org. Do not click on the email address, either copy and paste it or type it into your email. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.

            Please be advised that if you submit on the tentative and elect not to appear at the hearing, the opposing party may still appear at the hearing and argue the matter, and the court could change its tentative based upon the argument.  Unless you receive a submission from all other parties in the matter, you should assume that others might appear at the hearing to argue. If you submit, but still intend to appear, include the words "SUBMITS, BUT WILL APPEAR" in the Subject line.

            If you elect to argue your matter, you are urged to do so remotely, via Court-Connect. If the moving party fails to appear and/or submit to the Court’s tentative ruling, the Court will take the matter off calendar.

            Note that once the Court has issued a tentative, the Court has the inherent authority not to allow the withdrawal of a motion and to adopt the tentative ruling as the order of the court.

If you submitted a courtesy copy of your papers containing media (such as a DVD or thumb drive), unless you request the return of the media in your papers, the court will destroy it following the hearing of your matter.

Defendants Turning Point Alcohol and Drug Education Program, Inc.’s and Antonio Owens’ motion to strike portions of Plaintiff Alicia Harris’ complaint is granted with 20 days leave to amend as to Defendant Turning Point Alcohol and Drug Education Program, Inc. and denied as to Defendant Antonio Owens.

Defendants Turning Point Alcohol and Drug Education Program, Inc. (“Turning Point”) and Antonio Owens (“Owens”) (collectively, “Defendants”) move to strike portions of Plaintiff Alicia Harris’ (“Harris”) (“Plaintiff”) Complaint pertaining to punitive damages, specifically: (1) ¶62 (“Said actions justify the imposition of punitive damages in that Defendants committed the acts alleged herein maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injuring Plaintiff, from improper and evil motives amounting to malice, and in conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to recovery punitive damages form Defendants, and each of them, in an amount according to proof.”); (2) ¶93 (“Said actions justify the imposition of punitive damages in that Defendants committed the acts alleged herein maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injury Plaintiff, from improper and evil motives amounting to malice, and in conscious disregard to Plaintiff’s rights. Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to recovery punitive damages, and each of them, in an amount according to proof.”); and (3) ¶124 (“Defendants’ conduct in forcing Plaintiff to resign was wrongful and justifies the imposition of punitive damages since it was against public policy. In doing so, Defendants acted maliciously, fraudulently, and oppressively, with the wrongful intention of injuring Plaintiff. Based upon the foregoing, Plaintiff is entitled to recovery punitive damages from Defendants and each of them, in an amount according to proof.”). (Notice of MTS, pg. 2; C.C.P. §§435, 436.)

Before filing a motion to strike, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the motion. (C.C.P. §435.5(a).)

The moving party shall file and serve with the motion to strike a declaration stating either of the following: (A) The means by which the moving party met and conferred with the party who filed the pleading subject to motion, and that the parties did not reach an agreement resolving the objections raised in the motion to strike. (B) That the party who filed the pleading subject to motion failed to respond to the meet and confer request of the demurring party or otherwise failed to meet and confer in good faith. (C.C.P. §435.41(a)(3).)

Defendants’ counsel declares that on November 20, 2024, counsel for the parties met and conferred telephonically, and the parties were unable to reach an agreement, necessitating the instant motion. (See Decl. of Cox ¶3.) Defendants’ counsel’s declaration is sufficient under C.C.P. §435.41(a). Therefore, the Court will consider Defendants’ motion to strike.

Plaintiff filed her operative Complaint on September 18, 2024 against Defendants alleging six causes of action: (1) hostile work environment (sexual harassment); (2) failure to prevent and remedy harassment; (3) constructive termination in violation of FEHA; (4) violation of Labor Code §§226.2 and 226.7 (failure to provide meal breaks); (5) violation of Labor Code §226(A) (failure to provide accurate wage statements); and (6) violation of Labor Code §§200-204 (waiting time penalties).

Defendants filed the instant motion to strike on November 19, 2024. Plaintiff filed her opposition on December 20, 2024. Defendants filed their reply on December 27, 2024.

C.C.P. §436 provides that the Court may, upon a motion made pursuant to C.C.P. §435, or at any time within its discretion and upon terms it deems proper, “strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading” or any pleading or part thereof “not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.” (C.C.P. §436.)

Defendants move to strike portions of the Complaint pertaining to recovery of punitive damages. (Motion, pgs. 6-13.)

Punitive damages may be recovered upon a proper showing of malice, fraud, or oppression. (Civ. Code §3294(a).) “Malice” is defined as conduct intended to cause injury to a person or despicable conduct carried on with a willful and conscious disregard for the rights or safety of others. (Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Oppression” means despicable conduct subjecting a person to cruel and unjust hardship, in conscious disregard of the person’s rights. (Id.) “Fraud” is an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known by defendant, with intent to deprive a person of property, rights or otherwise cause injury. (Id.) Conclusory allegations, devoid of any factual assertions, are insufficient to support a conclusion that parties acted with oppression, fraud, or malice. (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042.)

“Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of ‘such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded to willful misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.’” (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 10, quoting Nolin v. National Convenience Stores, Inc. (1979) 95 Cal.App.3d 279, 286.) “Despicable Conduct” is conduct that is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)

“With respect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression, fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.” (Civ. Code § 3297.) Generally, “principal liability for punitive damages [does] not depend on employees’ managerial level, but on the extent to which they exercise substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy.” (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 576-577.) Furthermore, “supervisors who have no discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine the corporate policy would not be considered managing agents even though they may have the ability to hire or fire other employees.” (Id.) Instead, “to establish that an individual is a managing agent, a plaintiff seeking punitive damages must show that ‘the employee exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation’s business.’” (CRST, Inc. v. Superior Court (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 1255, 1273.)

Here, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege malice and oppression in her causes of action to support her request for punitive damages against Defendant Turning Point. Plaintiff fails to allege that Owens was an agent of Defendant Turning Point; Plaintiff only alleges Owens was a manager at Turning Point, and that she was forced to work alongside Owens, who was her manager. (Complaint ¶¶7, 10.) Plaintiff fails to allege Owens “exercised substantial discretionary authority over significant aspects of a corporation’s business.” (CRST, Inc., 11 Cal.App.5th at pg. 1273.) Therefore, Plaintiff fails to sufficiently allege that Defendant Turning Point was vicariously liable for Owens’ alleged actions.

Regarding Defendant Owens, Plaintiff sufficiently alleges malice and oppression. Plaintiff alleges Owens made comments regarding her body, stating that Plaintiff is “shaped like his girlfriend, “is pretty,” and “reminds him of his girlfriend.” (See Complaint ¶14.) Plaintiff alleges that after it became apparent to her that Owens was attempting to start a relationship with her, she proceeded to ignore Owens and report his behavior to her direct supervisor, Leshun Phillips-Patton. (Complaint ¶¶14-15, 18.) Plaintiff alleges that after she complained to her supervisor, Owens proceeded to “walk around Ms. Harris’ desk slamming things around her.” (Complaint ¶16.) Plaintiff alleges that on one occasion, Owens “yelled and screamed” at her, proclaiming “You haven’t talked to me in months” and then called Plaintiff a “stupid ass bitch.” (Complaint ¶¶19-20.) Plaintiff alleges Owens threatened her to “meet [him] outside,” then “proceeded to walk toward Ms. Harris in a threatening manner causing Ms. Harris to fear that Mr. Owens was going to hit her.” (Complaint ¶¶21-22.) Plaintiff alleges Owens’ behavior was acting in such a violent manner that it prompted another employee to plead with Owens to “stop and to get out of Ms. Harris’ face.” (Complaint ¶22.) Plaintiff sufficiently alleges Owens acted with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others and subjected Plaintiff to cruel and unjust hardship.

Accordingly, Moving Defendants’ motion to strike Plaintiff’s request for punitive damages from the Complaint is granted with 20 days leave to amend as to Defendant Turning Point and denied as to Defendant Owens.

Defendants’ motion to strike is granted with 20 days leave to amend as to Defendant Turning Point and denied as to Defendant Owens.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court