Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: 24STCV26265, Date: 2025-04-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24STCV26265    Hearing Date: April 18, 2025    Dept: 71

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

DEPARTMENT 71

TENTATIVE RULING

Defendant Greenfield Care Center of South Gate, LLC’s motion to compel arbitration of Plaintiff Irma Tamayo Ramirez’s claims in this action is granted. This case is stayed pending arbitration.

The Court sets a non-appearance case review for April 20, 2026, at 8:30 a.m.  The parties are directed to submit a joint statement five calendar days in advance, apprising the Court of the status of the arbitration.

Defendant Greenfield Care Center of South Gate, LLC (“Greenfield”) (“Defendant”) moves for an order compelling arbitration of all claims asserted by Plaintiff Irma Tamayo Ramirez (“Ramirez”) (“Plaintiff”) and staying the instant action during the pendency of arbitration.  (Notice of Motion, pg. 2; 9 U.S.C. §4; C.C.P. §§1281.2, 1281.4.) 

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant’s 2/11/25 request for judicial notice of The JAMS Employment Rules and Procedures, available at https://www.jamsadr.com/rules-employmentarbitration/english, (D-RJN, Exh. 1), is granted.

Background

On October 9, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant action against Defendant, asserting five causes of action: (1) disability discrimination; (2) failure to provide a reasonable accommodation; (3) failure to engage in good faith interactive process; (4) retaliation; and (5) wrongful termination in violation of public policy.  (See Complaint.)  Defendant filed its Answer on November 18, 2024.

Defendant filed the instant motion on February 11, 2025.[1]  Plaintiff filed her opposition on April 1, 2025.  On April 7, 2025, Defendant filed its reply.

Motion to Compel Arbitration

A.  Arbitration Agreement

1.     The Arbitration Agreement is enforceable.

Federal law provides for enforcement of this Arbitration Agreement. The Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. §1, et seq. (“FAA”), establishes a strong federal policy in favor of arbitration of disputes where a written arbitration agreement exists. Section 2 of the FAA provides, in pertinent part that “[a] written provision . . . to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract . . .  shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.”  (9 U.S.C. §2.)  The purpose of the FAA is to “reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitration agreements.” (Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp. (1991) 500 U.S. 20, 24.)  The FAA places arbitration agreements “on an equal footing with other contracts and [requires courts] to enforce them according to their terms.”  (AT&T Mobility, LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U.S. 333, 339; see also Rent-A-Center West, Inc. v. Jackson (2010) 561 U.S. 63, 67 [“The FAA reflects the fundamental principle that arbitration is a matter of contract.”].)  The FAA will preempt not only a state law that “discriminat[es] on its face against arbitration,” but also a state law that “covertly accomplishes the same objective by disfavoring contracts that (oh so coincidentally) have the defining features of arbitration agreements.”  (Kindred Nursing Centers Limited Partnership v. Clark (2017) 137 S.Ct. 1421, 1426.)

The United States Supreme Court has specifically held that the FAA applies to employment contracts: “[A]s a matter of law the answer is clear.  In the Federal Arbitration Act, Congress has instructed federal courts to enforce arbitration agreements according to their terms.”  (Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis (2018) 138 S.Ct. 1612, 1619 [holding that employees must submit to arbitration agreements including those with collective action waivers].) 

The FAA restricts a court’s inquiry related to compelling arbitration to two threshold questions: (1) whether there was an agreement to arbitrate between the parties; and (2) whether the agreement covers the dispute.  (Howsam v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (2002) 537 U.S. 79, 84.)  Here, both criteria are satisfied. First, Plaintiff agreed to arbitration when she entered into the Mutual Agreement for Employment At-Will and Mediation/Arbitration (“Arbitration Agreement”) that contained the relevant arbitration clause.  (Decl. of Casillas ¶8, Exh. A.)  Second, the Arbitration Agreement expressly covers “any claim, dispute, and/or controversy . . . between Employee and Employer . . . arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with Employee’s seeking employment with, employment by, other association with, or termination of employment with Employer . . ..”  (Decl. of Casillas ¶8, Exh. A at pg. 1 of 5.) 

California law also favors arbitration for dispute resolution. The California Arbitration Act (“CAA”), codified at C.C.P. §1281 et seq., provides, “A written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.”  (C.C.P. §1281; see also Grafton Partners L.P. v. Superior Court (2005) 36 Cal.4th 944, 955 [“[U]nlike predispute jury waivers, predispute arbitration agreements are specifically authorized by statute.”].) 

“California law, like federal law, favors enforcement of valid arbitration agreements.”  (Armendariz v. Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 97, 99.)  The public policy in favor of arbitration is so strong that California courts have held that an employee is “bound by the provisions of the [arbitration] agreement regardless of whether [he] read it or [was] aware of the arbitration clause when [he] signed the document.”  (Brookwood v. Bank of America (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 1667, citing Macaulay v. Norlander (1992) 12 Cal.App.4th 1.)  The only prerequisite for a court to order arbitration is a determination that the parties have entered into an agreement to arbitrate the dispute.  (United Transportation Union v. Southern California Rapid Transit District (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 804, 808.)  Thus, arbitration must be ordered “unless the agreement clearly does not apply to the dispute in question.”  (Vianna v. Doctors’ Management Co. (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 1186, 1189.)

Defendant proved the existence of an arbitration agreement with Plaintiff.  Defendant submitted evidence that on March 16, 2019, Plaintiff signed the Arbitration Agreement and a letter from Defendant offering Plaintiff employment, wherein Plaintiff agreed to arbitrate disputes.  (Decl. of Casillas ¶9, Exh. B.) 

Plaintiff argues there was no meeting of the minds in executing the Arbitration Agreement and therefore the agreement is not valid.  Plaintiff declares she can speak some conversational English and can read and write English on approximately a fifth-grade level, did not understand the arbitration agreement in its English form, was never provided a Spanish language version to review, and the agreement was not translated for her by anyone who worked for Defendant at the time she signed the document.  (See Opposition, pg. 5; Decl. of Ramirez ¶¶7-10.)  Plaintiff argues that had Defendant explained to her what arbitration entailed or how it would affect her legal rights, she would have never agreed to execute any arbitration agreements.  (See Opposition, pgs. 5-6; Decl. of Ramirez ¶17.) 

Plaintiff’s argument is unavailing.  One’s failure to read or understand an arbitration agreement is no bar to enforcement.  (See Caballero v. Premier Care Simi Valley LLC (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 512, 518-519 [“Generally, a party may not avoid enforcement of an arbitration provision because the party has limited proficiency in the English language. If a party does not speak or understand English sufficiently to comprehend a contract in English, it is incumbent upon the party to have it read or explained to him or her.”]; Harris v. Tap Worldwide LLC (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 373, 383 [“The fact that [plaintiff] either chose not to read or take time to understand these [arbitration] provisions is legally irrelevant.”]; Stewart v. Preston Pipeline Inc. (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1589 [“Generally, one who assents to a writing is presumed to know its contents and cannot escape being bound by its terms merely by contending that he did not read them.”], internal citations omitted.)

Based on the foregoing, Defendant proved the existence of a valid Arbitration Agreement that is enforceable by Defendant.

2.     Covered Claims

The Arbitration Agreement states,

Employer and Employee both agree that any claim, dispute, and/or controversy (including, but not limited to, any claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (29 U.S.C. Section 621 et seq.), the National Labor Relations Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, the Family and Medical Leave Act, the Equal Pay Act, the Employee Retirement Income Security Act, the California Constitution, the California Government Code, the California Labor Code, the California Civil Code, the California Business & Professions Code, or any other federal, state or local law, regulation or ordinance) between Employee and Employer and its owners, directors, officers, shareholders, employees, agents, and parties affiliated with its employee benefit and health plans, arising from, related to, or having any relationship or connection whatsoever with Employee’s seeking employment with, employment by, other association with, or termination of employment with Employer, whether based on tort, contract, statute, equity, or otherwise (with the sole exception of (a) claims within the jurisdictional limit of California’s Small Claims Court, (b) claims brought before the National Labor Relations Board, (c) claims brought under the California Workers’ Compensation Act, (d) claims with the California Employment Development Department, (e) claims pertaining to any of Employer’s employee welfare, insurance, benefit, and pension plans that provide their own claims and appeals procedure for challenging any denial of benefits, and (f) claims that applicable laws do not permit to be resolved by final and binding arbitration).  

(Decl. of Casillas ¶8, Exh. A at pg. 1 of 5, §2.)  Plaintiff’s claims arise from her employment relationship with Defendant and are therefore governed by the Arbitration Agreement.  Based on the foregoing, Defendant met its burden of establishing the Arbitration Agreement covers the causes of action asserted in Plaintiff’s Complaint.

B. Unconscionability

“[P]rocedural and substantive unconscionability must both be present in order for a court to exercise its discretion to refuse to enforce a contract or clause under the doctrine of unconscionability.”  (Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 102.)  Courts invoke a sliding scale which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves, i.e., the more substantively oppressive the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to conclude that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.  (Id., at pg. 114.)  Plaintiff bears the burden of proving that the provision at issue is both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. 

1.     Procedural Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues the Arbitration Agreement is procedurally unconscionable because (1) the Arbitration Agreement is a contract of adhesion; and (2) Defendant failed to provide Plaintiff the applicable arbitration rules.  (Opposition, pgs. 9-11.)

“Procedural unconscionability focuses on the elements of oppression and surprise. [Citations] ‘Oppression arises from an inequality of bargaining power which results in no real negotiation and an absence of meaningful choice . . . Surprise involves the extent to which the terms of the bargain are hidden in a ‘prolix printed form’ drafted by a party in a superior bargaining position.’ [Citations.]”  (Roman v. Superior Court (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)

Procedural unconscionability “focuses on the unequal bargaining positions and hidden terms common in the context of adhesion contracts.”  (24 Hour Fitness, Inc. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 1199, 1212-1213.)  Although standard employment agreements offered on a “take it or leave it” basis are generally considered contracts of adhesion, this alone is not enough to equate to unconscionability.  (See Graham v. Scissor-Tail, Inc. (1981) 28 Cal.3d 807, 817-819 [“To describe a contract as adhesive in character is not to indicate its legal effect. It is, rather, ‘the beginning and not the end of the analysis insofar as enforceability of its terms are concerned.’”].)  Adhesion contracts are “fully enforceable . . . unless certain other factors are present which under established legal rules—legislative or judicial—operate to render it otherwise.”  (Id. at pgs. 819-820; Harper v. Ultimo (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 1402, 1409 [adhesion alone does not render arbitration agreements unconscionable]; see also Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at 114; Lagatree v. Luce, Forward, Hamilton & Scripps, LLP (1999) 74 Cal.App.4th 1105 [discussing many authorities upholding arbitration agreements contained in adhesion contracts].)

Plaintiff’s argument in opposition that she had no meaningful opportunity to negotiate the Arbitration Agreement is unavailing.  The adhesive nature of arbitration agreements in the employment context alone does not render an agreement unenforceable.  (Lagatree, 74 Cal.App.4th at pg. 1127 [“[C]ases uniformly agree that a compulsory predispute arbitration agreement is not rendered unenforceable just because it is required as a condition of employment or offered on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis.”]; Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at pg. 113 [holding that the requirement that the employee sign an arbitration agreement may contain some elements of procedural unconscionability, but that, in itself, does not invalidate the arbitration agreement]; Ajamian v. CantorCO2e, LP (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 771, 796 [“Where there is no other indication of oppression or surprise, the degree of procedural unconscionability of an adhesion agreement is low[.]”].) 

Here, the Arbitration Agreement is a stand-alone document that provides Plaintiff the unqualified right to revoke her signature on the agreement 30 days after execution.  (Decl. of Casillas ¶8, Exh. A at pg. 1 of 5, §20.) 

Second, Plaintiff’s argument that she was not provided with the JAMS rules, and that the contract is therefore unenforceable is also unavailing.  In Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC, the Court of Appeal determined that the Defendant’s failure to attach a copy of the AAA rules did not render the arbitration agreement at issue procedurally unconscionable.  (Lane v. Francis Capital Management LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 691.)  The Lane Court stated there could be no surprise, as the arbitration rules referenced in the agreement were easily accessible to the parties on the Internet.  (Id.)  Here, as in Lane, the JAMS rules are accessible to the parties on the Internet.  (D-RJN, Exh. 1.)[2]

Therefore, Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate any procedural unconscionability.  (Hicks v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 77, 91.)

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Arbitration Agreement is, at most, minimally procedurally unconscionable.  However, as discussed below, the Court finds the arbitration agreement is not substantively unconscionable. 

2.     Substantive Unconscionability

Plaintiff argues the Arbitration Agreement is substantively unconscionable because it (1) does not provide for adequate discovery; (2) forbids Plaintiff from bringing representative actions; and (3) does not permit severance and therefore severing any portion of the agreement cannot save the arbitration clause.  (Opposition, pgs. 11-15; Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at pg. 104.)

“Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create ‘overly harsh’ or ‘‘one-sided’ results’ [Citations] that is, whether contractual provisions reallocate risks in an objectively unreasonable or unexpected manner.  [Citation] Substantive unconscionability ‘may take various forms,’ but typically is found in the employment context when the arbitration agreement is ‘one-sided’ in favor of the employer without sufficient justification, for example, when ‘the employee’s claims against the employer, but not the employer’s claims against the employee, are subject to arbitration.’ [Citations].”  (Roman, 172 Cal.App.4th at pgs. 1469-1470.)  In determining whether an arbitration agreement is unconscionable, the Court considers whether the agreement: (1) provides for a neutral arbitrator; (2) provides for reasonable discovery; (3) requires a written award; (4) provides for the same remedies that otherwise would be available in court; and (5) does not require employees to bear costs unique to arbitration.  (See Armendariz, 24 Cal.4th at pgs. 102-103.)

First, Plaintiff’s argument that the discovery permitted under the Arbitration Agreement is inadequate is unavailing.  Here, JAMS Rule 17 applies, and outlines the parties’ discovery rights and obligations, which includes but is not limited to, the exchange of relevant information (i.e., all relevant non-privileged documents, identification of witnesses, and depositions of opposing parties) and continued duty to supplement; and the deposition of at least one expert and non-expert with the option to take additional depositions pursuant to parties’ mutual agreement or arbitrator approval.  (D-RJN, Exh. 1, Rule 17.)  Further, the Arbitration Agreement specifically provides that the Arbitrator may allow additional depositions.  (Decl. of Casillas ¶8, Exh. A at ¶11.)  This discovery is adequate, reasonable, and satisfies Armendariz.  (Armendariz, 24 Cal. 4th at pg. 106.)  Armendariz also states that lack of discovery is not grounds for holding a FEHA claim inarbitrable.  (Id.)

Second, Plaintiff’s argument that the Arbitration Agreement forbids her from bringing a representative action is inapposite to the instant motion because Plaintiff does not bring any dispute as a class, collective, or representative action.  Nonetheless, the Arbitration Agreement is consistent with applicable law permitting arbitration of an individual PAGA claim and severance of the non-individual PAGA claims. (See Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 596 U.S. 639, 662 [“We hold that the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non- individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate,” and therefore “Viking [River Cruises] is entitled to compel arbitration of [plaintiff’s] individual [PAGA] claim.”]; see also Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104, 1118-1119 [“Viking River requires enforcement of agreements to arbitrate a PAGA plaintiff’s individual claims if the agreement is covered by the FAA”].)

Finally, Plaintiff’s argument that the Arbitration Agreement does not contain a severability clause is inapposite because there is no need for this Court to sever any portion of the agreement that would render it unconscionable.

Based on the evidence before the Court, the terms of the Arbitration Agreement do not create overly harsh or one-sided results, satisfying the requirements for a substantively conscionable agreement.

Based on the foregoing, the Court finds the Arbitration Agreement is not substantively unconscionable. 

C.    Stay of Current Action

Pursuant to C.C.P. §1281.4, if an application has been made to a court involving order to arbitrate a controversy and such application is undetermined, the court where the application is pending shall, upon motion of a party to the action, stay the action until the application for an order to arbitrate is determined.  (C.C.P. §1281.4.)

Accordingly, this case is stayed pending arbitration.

D.   Conclusion

Defendant’s motion to compel arbitration is granted. 

The case is stayed pending arbitration. The Court sets a non-appearance case review for April 20, 2026, at 8:30 a.m.  The parties are directed to submit a joint statement five calendar days in advance, apprising the Court of the status of the arbitration.

Moving Party to give notice.

Dated:  April _____, 2025