Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 24STCV30386, Date: 2025-04-01 Tentative Ruling

Defendant FCA US LLC’s demurrer to Plaintiff Larissa Matsson’s complaint is sustained as to the 6th cause of action with 20 days leave to amend.

Defendant FCA US LLC (“FCA”) (“Moving Defendant”) demurs to Plaintiff Larissa Matsson’s (“Matsson”) (“Plaintiff”) complaint (“Complaint”) on the grounds that pursuant to C.C.P. §430.10(e), Plaintiff cannot state her sixth cause of action for fraudulent inducement – concealment against FCA as a matter of law because the claim fails state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against FCA. (Notice of Demurrer, pg. 1.)[1]

Before filing a demurrer, the moving party must meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading to attempt to reach an agreement that would resolve the objections to the pleading and obviate the need for filing the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41, emphasis added.)

Moving Defendant’s counsel declares that on January 14, 2025, she attempted to meet and confer telephonically and was unable to reach counsel. (See Decl. of Cranford ¶7.) Moving Defendant’s counsel’s declaration is sufficient under C.C.P. §430.41. Accordingly, the Court will consider Moving Defendant’s demurrer.

Plaintiff filed her operative Complaint on November 18, 2024, against Moving Defendant and Non-Moving Defendant Glendale Chrysler Jeep Dodge Ram (“Glendale Jeep”) (collectively, “Defendants”) alleging six causes of action: (1) violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act (“Song-Beverly”) Civil Code §1793.2(D) [against FCA]; (2) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(B) [against FCA]; (3) violation of Civil Code §1793.2(A)(3) [against FCA]; (4) breach of implied warranty of merchantability (Civ. Code §§1791.1, 1794, 1795.5) [against FCA]; (5) negligent repair [against Glendale Jeep]; and (6) fraudulent inducement- concealment [against FCA].

Plaintiff’s causes of action arise from her entry into a warranty contract with Moving Defendant on or about January 6, 2019, regarding a 2018 Jeep Wrangler (“Subject Vehicle”). (See Complaint ¶10.)

Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer on January 22, 2025. Plaintiff filed her opposition on March 18, 2025. As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed.

Moving Defendant demurs to the 6th cause of action for fraudulent inducement-concealment on the basis the claim fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against Moving Defendant. (Demurrer, pgs. 5-9; C.C.P. §430.10(e).)

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

The required elements for fraudulent concealment are: “(1) concealment or suppression of a material fact; (2) by a defendant with a duty to disclose the fact to the plaintiff; (3) the defendant intended to defraud the plaintiff by intentionally concealing or suppressing the fact; (4) the plaintiff was unaware of the fact and would not have acted as he or she did if he or she had known of the concealed or suppressed fact; and (5) plaintiff sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the fact.” (See Bank of America Corp. v. Superior Court (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 862, 870; Civ. Code §1710(3); CACI 1901.) The rule of specificity of pleading is only intended for affirmative fraud cases not fraud by concealment. (See Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement Systems & Planning Association, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384.)

Plaintiff fails to allege what representations Moving Defendant made to this particular Plaintiff regarding the 3.6L engine (“Engine Defect”) that these Plaintiff relied on in purchasing the Subject Vehicle. Plaintiff does not plead that Moving Defendant made any specific representations directly to Plaintiff. Plaintiff does not allege any direct contact with Moving Defendant before purchasing the Subject Vehicle where representations regarding the Engine Defect at issue should or could have been revealed. Merely alleging that Moving Defendant omitted facts about an alleged Transmission Defect in TSBs is not sufficient to establish: (1) knowledge of a particular defect in a particular vehicle, or (2) intent to conceal this particular knowledge from this particular Plaintiff. (See Tenzer v. Superscope, Inc. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 18, 30 [“something more than nonperformance is required to prove the defendant’s intent not to perform his promise”]; American Honda Motor Co., Inc. v. Superior Court (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1378 [“A TSB is not and cannot fairly be construed by a trial court as an admission of a design or other defect, because TSBs are routinely issued to dealers to help diagnose and repair typical complaints.”].)

Plaintiff has also failed to show Moving Defendant had a duty to disclose to Plaintiff. (LiMandri v. Judkins (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 326, 336 [“There are ‘four circumstances in which nondisclosure or concealment may constitute actionable fraud: (1) when the defendant is in a fiduciary relationship with the Plaintiff; (2) when the defendant had exclusive knowledge of material facts not known to the Plaintiff; (3) when the defendant actively conceals a material fact from the Plaintiff; and (4) when the defendant makes partial representations but also suppresses some material facts.’”].) Plaintiff fails to allege that Moving Defendant had exclusive knowledge of the purported transmission defect at the time of sale to trigger a duty to disclose. Plaintiff’s allegations that Moving Defendant had knowledge of these facts is conclusory because Plaintiff merely states that Moving Defendant had knowledge from pre- and post-production testing data, consumer complaints, and warranty data and repair and part replacement data received from dealers throughout the Complaint. (Complaint ¶¶22, 25, 26, 29, 66.) “[M]ere conclusionary allegations” do not suffice. (Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1, 44.) For a duty to disclose to exist, “[the] transaction must necessarily arise from direct dealings between the plaintiff and the defendant; it cannot arise between the defendant and the public at large.” (Rattagan, 17 Cal.5th at pg. 41.) Plaintiff does not allege that Moving Defendant made the purportedly misleading partial statements directly to Plaintiff. (See generally Complaint.) Finally, Plaintiff alleges only that Plaintiff spoke with sales representatives, never with Moving Defendant. (See Complaint ¶24.) This too is insufficient because, to bind the statements to Moving Defendant, Plaintiff “must allege the names of the persons who made the allegedly fraudulent representations, their authority to speak, to whom they spoke, what they said or wrote, and when it was said or written.” (Lazar v. Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 645, emphasis added.) Plaintiff has not done so here.

Further, Plaintiff does not state facts establishing that she was damaged in tort by the purported fraud. Plaintiff must plead facts establishing Plaintiff “sustained damage as a result of the concealment or suppression of the material fact.” (Rattagan, 17 Cal.5th at pg. 40.) “[M]ere conclusionary allegations” do not suffice. (Id. at pg. 44.) Plaintiff cannot rely on damages which are recoverable under other theories nor can Plaintiff rely on potential damages that were not actually incurred. Here, Plaintiff alleges that she was harmed by purchasing a defective vehicle Plaintiff would not have otherwise purchased. (See Complaint ¶70.) However, Plaintiff also seeks recovery of the vehicle’s purchase price under the express warranty contract via the Song-Beverly Act. (See Complaint ¶¶31-34, 39-41, Prayer for Relief ¶b.) It is patent that “[t]he law of contractual warranty governs damage to the product itself.” (Robinson Helicopter Co., Inc. v. Dana Corp. (2004) 34 Cal.4th 979, 989.) “[A]ny overlap between damages recoverable in tort and damages recoverable in contract would be limited by the rule against double recovery.” (Lazar, 12 Cal.4th at pg. 649.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 6th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiff’s 6th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court

[1] The Court notes Moving Defendant does not demur to the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, or 4th causes of action alleged against it.