Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 25STCL02918, Date: 2025-06-09 Tentative Ruling

This Court’s sua sponte motion for judgment on the pleadings as to pro per Plaintiff Milton White’s complaint is granted without leave to amend.

This Court sua sponte moves for judgment on the pleadings of pro per Plaintiff Milton White’s (“White”) (“Plaintiff”) complaint (“Complaint”). (5/1/25 Order Noticing Motion, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §438(b)(2).) Specifically, the Court moves for judgment on the pleadings on the 1st cause of action for declaratory relief on the basis Plaintiff has an adequate remedy on other causes of action in a separate Unlawful Detainer case. (5/1/25 Order Noticing Motion.) The Court moves for judgment on the pleadings on the causes of action for “injunctive relief” and “TRO” on the basis these are remedies, not causes of action. (5/1/25 Order Noticing Motion.)

Plaintiff’s 4/4/25 request for judicial notice of the (1) 4/22/24 Minute Order issued by Dept R in the UD Case No. 25PDUD91127; (2) 4/22/24 Notice of Ruling in the same UD Case; (3) the Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed on April 17, 2025 in Case No. 25PDUD01127 (LASC – Pasadena); and (4) the Case Summaries/Dockets for both Case No. 25STLC02918 and Case No. 25PDUD01127 is denied because Plaintiff failed to attach the documents to his request for judicial notice pursuant to CRC, Rule 3.1306(c). (CRC, Rule 3.1306(c) [“A party requesting judicial notice of material under Evidence Code sections 452 or 453 must provide the court and each party with a copy of the material.”].)

Plaintiff’s 4/4/25 request for judicial notice of the 5/1/25 Minute Order from Dept. 82 continuing the motion to Dept. 71 in this case is denied because this Court does not need to take judicial notice of filings on the instant docket.

Plaintiff’s 4/4/25 request for judicial notice of the 2025 Los Angeles County Wildfire Emergency Tenant Protection Resolution (P-RJN, Exh. A) is granted.

Plaintiff filed his operative Complaint on April 14, 2025, against Defendant Peter A. Coeler dba P.A.C. Properties (“Coeler”) (“Defendant”) alleging three causes of action: (1) declaratory relief; (2) injunctive relief; and (3) TRO.

On May 1, 2025, Judge Stephen I. Goorvitch noticed the Court’s own motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to C.C.P. §438(b)(2), setting the hearing on the instant motion in Department 71. (5/1/25 5/1/25 Order Noticing Motion.) The Court authorized Plaintiff to file and serve an opposition to this motion on or before May 27, 2025, and if Plaintiff files an opposition, Defendant may file and serve a reply brief on or before June 2, 2025. (5/1/25 5/1/25 Order Noticing Motion.)

Defendant filed his opposition on May 27, 2025. As of the date of this hearing no reply has been filed.

The court may upon its own motion grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings. (C.C.P. §438(b)(2); Foster v. Sexton (2021) 61 Cal.App.5th 998, 1019 [“Based on Code of Civil Procedure section 438, we conclude the trial court had the authority to bring its own motion for judgment on the pleadings. As a result, the court did not err when it considered whether the allegations in Foster’s petition for writ of replevin were sufficient to state a cause of action.”].)

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself.” (Stoops v. Abbassi (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th 644, 650; see also Korchemny v. Piterman (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1032, 1055 [“common law ground for a motion for judgment on the pleadings is identical to the statutory ground”].)

The grounds for a motion for judgment on the pleadings must appear on the face of the challenged pleading or be based on facts the court may judicially notice. (C.C.P. §438(d); Tung v. Chicago Title Co. (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 734, 758-759.)

A cause of action for declaratory relief must include the following elements: (1) a person interested under a written instrument or a contract; or (2) a declaration of his or her rights or duties; (a) with respect to another; or (b) in respect to, in, over or upon property; and (3) an actual controversy. (C.C.P. §1060; Ludgate Insurance Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 605-606; Bennett v. Hibernia Bank (1956) 47 Cal.2d 540, 549; see also City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 80 [“an actual, present controversy must be pleaded specifically” and “the facts of the respective claims concerning the [underlying] subject must be given.”].)

Plaintiff alleges that he seeks a judicial declaration that he is entitled to eviction protections under the February 25, 2025, Los Angeles County Resolution after serving hardship notices for March and April 2025 in accordance with the Resolution, and that the 3-Day Notice served by Defendant is unlawful because there is no actual remedy at law from the court per the Resolution. (Complaint ¶13.) Plaintiff alleges that an actual, present controversy exists between Plaintiff and Defendants concerning Plaintiff’s legal right to remain housed and Defendant’s claimed right to initiate eviction proceedings during the protection period under the LA County Resolution. (Complaint ¶13.)

Plaintiff sought a temporary restraining order to prevent Defendant from proceeding with his unlawful detainer case in Case No. 25PDUD01127 based upon an allegedly defective three-day notice. (5/1/25 Order Noticing Motion; 4/22/25 Motion to Dismiss filed in 25PDUD01127.) Plaintiff must seek relief in Case No. 25PDUD01127 rather than pursue the instant cause of action for declaratory judgment. Plaintiff seeks the declaratory judgment in the instant case that he cannot be evicted because “he is a qualifying tenant under the County Resolution and may not be evicted for non-payment of rent due to wildfire-related hardship through July 31, 2025.” (Complaint, Prayer ¶1.) Plaintiff also seeks “[a] declaration that the 3-Day Notice to Pay or Quit served on April 11, 2025, is invalid, unlawful, and retaliatory under California Civil Code § 1942.5.” (Complaint, Prayer ¶2.) These are Plaintiff’s defenses to the unlawful detainer case. Accordingly, the unlawful detainer court—not this court—must resolve those defenses.

A tenant cannot circumvent the unlawful detainer court by litigating his eviction defenses in a different court through a declaratory relief action. That is not the purpose of the declaratory relief statute. A declaratory relief action is inappropriate when a party has an adequate remedy on other causes of action at trial. (See Hood v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 319, 324; California Insurance Guarantee Association v. Superior Court (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 1617, 1624.) “The declaratory relief statute should not be used for the purpose of anticipating and determining an issue which can be determined in the main action.” (General of America Insurance Co. v. Lilly (1968) 258 Cal.App.2d 465, 470.)

Accordingly, This Court’s motion for judgment on the pleadings of the 1st cause of action is granted without leave to amend.

Strictly speaking “a ‘cause of action’ is comprised of a ‘primary right’ of the plaintiff, a corresponding ‘primary duty’ of the defendant, and a wrongful act by the defendant constituting a breach of that duty.” (Crowley v. Katleman (1994) 8 Cal.4th 666, 681.) The gravamen, or essential nature of a cause of action is determined by the primary right alleged to have been violated, not by the remedy sought. (R & A Vending Services, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 1188, 1194.) The nature of the relief sought does not determine the nature of the cause of action because the violation of one primary right may entitle the injured party to many different forms of relief. (Crowley, 8 Cal.4th at p. 682.) “Injunctive relief is a remedy and not, in itself, a cause of action . . ..” (Shell Oil Co. v. Richter (1942) 52 Cal.App.2d 164, 168.)

Plaintiff has not alleged a wrongful act stating a cause of action in this matter, which is required before asserting the remedy of injunctive relief or a temporary restraining order.

Accordingly, This Court’s motion for judgment on the pleadings of the 2nd and 3rd causes of action is granted without leave to amend.

The Court’s sua sponte motion for judgment on the pleadings of Plaintiff’s Complaint is granted without leave to amend.

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court