Judge Daniel M. Crowley, Case Number: 25STCV00413, Date: 2025-06-13 Tentative Ruling

All parties are urged to meet and confer with all parties concerning this tentative ruling to see if they can reach an agreed-upon resolution of their matter.  If you are able to reach an agreement, please notify the courtroom staff in advance of the hearing if you wish to submit on the tentative ruling rather than argue the motion by notifying the court by e-mailing the court at: SMCDEPT71@lacourt.org. Do not click on the email address, either copy and paste it or type it into your email. Include the word "SUBMITS" in all caps and the Case Number in the Subject line. In the body of the email, please provide the date and time of the hearing, your name, your contact information, the party you represent, and whether that party is a plaintiff, defendant, cross-complainant, cross-defendant, claimant, intervenor, or non-party, etc.

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Moving Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company’s unopposed demurrer to Plaintiffs Wise Edward Allen’s and Sonja White’s complaint is sustained with 20 days leave to amend as to the 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action, and sustained without leave to amend as to the 2nd cause of action.

The Court sua sponte strikes Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint received by the Court on June 4, 2025, as untimely filed, pursuant to C.C.P. §436(b).

Defendant Fidelity National Title Insurance Company, a Florida Corporation [erroneously sued as Fidelity National Title, a Nebraska Corporation] (“FNTIC”) (“Moving Defendant”) demurs unopposed to Plaintiffs Wise Edward Allen, as Trustee of the Pearlie Mae Jones Living Trust Dated November 10, 2009’s (“Allen”) and Sonja White, as Trustee of the Middleton Living Trust Date November 10, 2009’s (“White”) (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action in their complaint (“Complaint”) based on failure to state a claim and uncertainty. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-3; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).)

Plaintiffs filed their operative Complaint on January 7, 2025, alleging eight causes of action against Defendants Kevin Jackson (“Jackson”), Moving Defendant, Renova West LLC (“Renova”), and John Salinger (“Salinger”) (collectively, “Defendants”): (1) quiet title [against all Defendants]; (2) negligence [against Moving Defendant and Salinger]; (3) fraudulent transfer [against Jackson, Salinger, Moving Defendant, and Renova]; (4) conspiracy to commit fraud [against Jackson, Moving Defendant, and Salinger]; (5) permanent trespass [against Jackson, Moving Defendant, and Salinger]; (6) conversion [against Jackson, Moving Defendant, and Salinger]; (7) violation of the Business & Professions Code [against Renova, Salinger, and Moving Defendant]; and (8) slander of title [against Jackson, Renova, Salinger, and Moving Defendant].

Moving Defendant filed the instant demurrer on April 25, 2025. Moving Defendant filed a notice of non-opposition on June 3, 2025. Plaintiffs attempted to file an untimely first amended complaint (“FAC”), which was received by the Court on June 4, 2025, and was not filed. Moving Defendant filed its reply on June 5, 2025.

Plaintiffs’ attempt to file the FAC with the Court was not timely. C.C.P. §472(a) provides, in part:

A party may amend its pleading once without leave of the court at any time before the answer, demurrer, or motion to strike is filed, or after a demurrer or motion to strike is filed but before the demurrer or motion to strike is heard if the amended pleading is filed and served no later than the date for filing an opposition to the demurrer or motion to strike.

Here, Plaintiffs’ opposition or FAC was due to be filed and served on June 2, 2025. Plaintiffs untimely attempted to file the FAC on June 4, 2025. Therefore, the Court sua sponte strikes Plaintiffs’ proposed FAC as not filed in conformity with the laws of this state, pursuant to C.C.P. §436(b). (C.C.P. §436(b) [“The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper: . . . (b) Strike out all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court.”].)

Moving Defendant demurs to the eight causes of action alleges in Plaintiffs’ Complaint based on failure to state a claim and uncertainty. (Notice of Demurrer, pgs. 1-2; C.C.P. §§430.10(e), (f).)

Before filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a), emphasis added.) A declaration must be filed with a demurrer regarding the results of the meet and confer process. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(3).)

Moving Defendant’s counsel declares that she sent a detailed letter to Plaintiffs’ counsel on March 18, 2025, did not receive a response, and emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel again on April 22, 2025, which again received no response. (Decl. of Thai ¶¶2-4.) Moving Defendant’s counsel declaration is in violation of C.C.P. §430.41(a) because she did not attempt to meet and confer in person, by telephone, or by video conference. However, the failure to sufficiently meet and confer is not grounds to overrule or sustain a demurrer. (C.C.P. §430.41(a)(4); Dumas v. Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th 348, 355; Olson v. Hornbrook Community Services District (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 502, 515.) Accordingly, the Court will consider the instant demurrer.

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Insurance Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 [in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents].) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hospital District (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)

(a) A description of the property that is the subject of the action. In the case of tangible personal property, the description shall include its usual location. In the case of real property, the description shall include both its legal description and its street address or common designation, if any.

(b) The title of the plaintiff as to which a determination under this chapter is sought and the basis of the title. If the title is based upon adverse possession, the complaint shall allege the specific facts constituting the adverse possession.

(d) The date as of which the determination is sought. If the determination is sought as of a date other than the date the complaint is filed, the complaint shall include a statement of the reasons why a determination as of that date is sought.

(e) A prayer for the determination of the title of the plaintiff against the adverse claims.

(C.C.P. §761.020.) However, “there is no entitlement to a judgment quieting title insofar as there is no antagonistic property interest.” (Friends of the Trails v. Blasius (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 810, 831.)

squatter fraudulently claiming an adverse interest of 100% of Plaintiffs’ title as tenants in common to the 8th Avenue Property) and multiple deeds recorded by Gloria Middleton (“Middleton”). (See Complaint ¶¶43-44.) Plaintiffs allege that with the contributory negligence of Defendants Salinger and Moving Defendant, Jackson transferred 100% of the 8th Avenue Property to Renova. (Complaint ¶44.) Plaintiffs allege Moving Defendant, the insurer of Renova, was also negligent when it further clouded the title by transferring 100% of the 8th Avenue Property back to only one of the Plaintiffs, the Pearlie Mae Jones Living Trust dated November 10, 2009. (Complaint ¶44.)

Plaintiffs fail to allege that Moving Defendant has made any adverse claim to Plaintiffs’ title for which a determination is sought. (See C.C.P. §761.020(c).)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to the 1st cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

The elements for negligence are: “(1) a legal duty of care toward the plaintiff; (2) a breach of that duty; (3) legal causation; and (4) damages.” (Century Surety Co. v. Crosby Insurance, Inc. (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 116, 127.)

A title insurance policy and preliminary title report are not a representation of title. “[T]he title insurer ‘does not represent expressly or impliedly that the title is as set forth in the policy; it merely agrees that, and the insured only expects that, the insurer will pay for any losses resulting from, or [the insurer] will cause the removal of, a cloud on the insured’s title within the policy provisions.’” (Dollinger DeAnza Associates v. Chicago Title Insurance Co. (2011) 199 Cal.App.4th 1132, 1145.)

Further, because the policy is only a contract for indemnity, there is no action for negligence based on a policy of title insurance. (Golden Security Thrift & Loan Association v. First American Title Insurance Co. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 250, 256-257.)

Plaintiffs allege that Moving Defendant had a duty to confirm Plaintiffs’ title prior to insuring it for the sale to Renova as Plaintiffs were the actual parties to be affected by the transaction. (Complaint ¶50.) Plaintiffs allege that, instead, Moving Defendant relied on obviously fake trust documents that they should have realized were fraudulent. (Complaint ¶50, Exh. 26.) Plaintiffs allege that once an attorney had reviewed the trust document making Jackson successor trustee, he immediately knew it was fraudulent which is why Moving Defendant reversed the grant deed back to Pearlie Mae’s trust. (Complaint ¶50, Exh. 16.) Plaintiffs allege that Moving Defendant then re-granted title back to one trust even though they had received it from two, forcing Plaintiffs to correct this with a quit claim deed. (Complaint ¶50, Exh. 30.)

Plaintiffs allege that they seek special, general, and punitive damages for the emotional stress of losing the personal possessions of their family members, for the property damage, and to punish the parties for their reckless and intentional actions. (Complaint ¶52.)

The title insurance policy issued by Moving Defendant is, as a matter of law, a contract, and the only individual with the ability to enforce the policy against Moving Defendant is Renova, the insured. (Walters v. Marler (1978) 83 Cal.App.3d 1, 33-34.) A third party cannot sue an insurer based on its claims handling done on behalf of its insured. (Coleman v. Gulf Insurance Group (1986) 41 Cal.3d 782, 795, [“an injured claimant may proceed directly against the insurer only to the extent that the insured party has assigned the claimant his cause of action for a breach of the duty to settle.”].) Likewise, an insurer owes no duty of care to third party claimants and a third party cannot assert any cause of action against an insurer based on its refusal to settle a claim. (Murphy v. Allstate Insurance Co. (1976) 17 Cal.3d 937, 941.) “Absent coverage, there is no tort liability for improperly investigating a first-party insurance claim, whether the insurer’s conduct is characterized as breach of an implied covenant or negligence. (Benavides v. State Farm General Insurance Co. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1250.)

To the extent Plaintiffs claim any beneficiary status under the policy, as a matter of law, there can be no claim by a third-party, incidental beneficiary to a title insurance policy. (Kenny v. Safeco Title Insurance Co. (1980) 113 Cal.App.3d 557, 561-562.) Therefore, Plaintiffs have no grounds for recovery against Moving Defendant and cannot enforce the policy. (Id.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to the 2nd cause of action is sustained without leave to amend.

The elements of fraudulent conveyance of real property are: “a transfer of assets made by a debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor’s claim arose before or after the transfer, if the debtor made the transfer (1) with an actual intent to hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor, or (2) without receiving reasonably equivalent value in return, and either (a) was engaged in or about to engage in a business or transaction for which the debtor’s assets were unreasonably small, or (b) intended to, or reasonably believed, or reasonably should have believed, that he or she would incur debts beyond his or her ability to pay as they became due; and (3) injury to the creditor. [Citations.]” (Civ. Code §3439.04(a).)

Plaintiffs allege Jackson did commit a theft of real property from Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶55.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant knew he was not the trustee of these trusts, forged trust documents, and thereafter took the 8th Avenue property without Plaintiffs’ knowledge or consent. (Complaint ¶55.) Plaintiffs allege Defendant Salinger, also using his LLC, Renova, conspired in this fraudulent transfer. (Complaint ¶55.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendant’s theft, and the subsequent razing of the property to remove not only the personal property that belonged to Plaintiffs, but also to demolish the structure of the property itself, are the source of Plaintiffs’ damages. (Complaint ¶56.)

Plaintiffs fail to state facts against Moving Defendant. (See Complaint ¶¶53-57.) Plaintiffs merely allege that they “seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Fidelity Title are jointly and severally liable for all action of the other.” (Complaint ¶57.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 3rd cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

The elements of a civil conspiracy are: “(1) formation and operation of the conspiracy and (2) damage resulting to plaintiff (3) from an act done in furtherance of the common design.” (Thompson v. California Fair Plan Association (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 760, 767.) “Conspiracy is not a cause of action, but a legal doctrine that imposes liability on persons who, although not actually committing a tort themselves, share with the immediate tortfeasors a common plan or design in its perpetration.” (Kesmodel v. Rand (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1141.)

Plaintiffs allege that there have been formations of a group of two or more persons here, being Jackson and Salinger also utilizing Salinger’s LLC Renova, who agreed to and cooperated with the scheme that allowed Defendant Jackson to claim title to the 8th Avenue Property so as to sell it. (Complaint ¶60.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants did conspire in a common plan and design to commit a tortious act to steal real property from Plaintiffs. (Complaint ¶60.) Plaintiffs allege that each of these two joint tortfeasors is liable for the damages and loss of the value of all the interior furnishings, family heirlooms, car and cash that was stolen from 8th Avenue, the loss of value of 8th Avenue, and the cost of returning it to the state it was in before these joint tortfeasors took possession and demolished it. (Complaint ¶60.) Plaintiffs allege that they seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Moving Defendant are jointly and severally liable for all actions of the other. (Complaint ¶60.)

Plaintiffs fail to state facts against Moving Defendant. (See Complaint ¶60.) Plaintiffs merely allege that they “seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Fidelity Title are jointly and severally liable for all actions of the other.” (Complaint ¶60.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 4th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

Trespass is the physical intrusion upon property of another without the permission of the person lawfully entitled to possession. (Martin Marietta Corp. v. Insurance Co. of North America (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 1113, 1131-1132.) The elements of trespass are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or control of the property; (2) the defendant’s intentional, reckless, or negligent entry onto the property; (3) lack of permission for the entry or acts in excess of permission; (4) harm; and (5) the defendant’s conduct was a substantial factor in causing the harm. (Ralphs Grocery Store v. Victory Consultants Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 245, 261-262.)

Plaintiffs allege that Defendants dismantled and destroyed an existing home which remains a half-finished construction site. (Complaint ¶63, Exh. 28.) Plaintiffs allege that in doing so they also removed a lifetime of family heirlooms and mementos that had value to Plaintiffs as well as an inherent value which cannot be replaced. (Complaint ¶63.)

Plaintiffs allege that they are entitled to recover all of their costs for dismantling these “improvements” and returning the 8th Avenue property to a condition that resembles the home that Defendants destroyed including the damages and loss of the value of all the interior furnishings, family heirlooms, car and cash that was stolen from 8th Avenue, the loss of value of 8th Avenue, and the cost of returning it to the state it was in before these defendants took possession and demolished it. (Complaint ¶64.) Plaintiffs allege that they seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Moving Defendant are jointly and severally liable for all actions of the other. (Complaint ¶64.)

Plaintiffs fail to state facts against Moving Defendant. (See Complaint ¶64.) Plaintiffs merely allege that they “seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Fidelity Title are jointly and severally liable for all actions of the other.” (Complaint ¶64.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 5th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

“Conversion is the wrongful exercise of dominion over the property of another. The elements of a conversion claim are: (1) the plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of the property; (2) the defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights; and (3) damages.” (Greif v. Sanin (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 412, 449.)

Plaintiffs allege that they seek the fair market value of all the property wrongfully taken at the time of the conversion as well as the costs of recovery including attorney fees. (Complaint ¶68.) Plaintiffs allege these include all the interior furnishings, family heirlooms, car and cash that was stolen from 8th Avenue. (Complaint ¶68.)

Plaintiffs allege that they are the trustees of the trusts but are also family members of the deceased elderly women, seek emotional distress damages for the loss of their family heirlooms including the family bible which contained all their family history, the valuable China that had been in the family for multiple generations, family photos, cash that was in the safe and elsewhere in the home, the Cadillac that was in the driveway, and the antique that were in the living room. (Complaint ¶69.) Plaintiffs allege that they seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Moving Defendant are jointly and severally liable for all actions of the other. (Complaint ¶69.)

Plaintiffs fail to state facts against Moving Defendant. (See Complaint ¶¶68-69.) Plaintiffs merely allege that they “seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Fidelity Title are jointly and severally liable for all actions of the other.” (Complaint ¶69.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 6th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

To sue for a violation of the Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), a plaintiff must have personally suffered an “injury in fact and . . . lost money or property as a result of the unfair competition.” (Troyk v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1305, 1346; see also Bus. & Prof. Code §17204.) “While the scope of conduct covered by the UCL is broad, its remedies are limited.” (Korea Supply Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2003) 29 Cal.4th 1134, 1144.)

Under the UCL, “[p]revailing plaintiffs are generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution.” (Cel-Tech Communications, Inc. v. Los Angeles Cellular Telephone Co. (1999) 20 Cal.4th 163, 179.)

Plaintiffs allege that they seek compensatory damages for their financial loss directly related to the misconduct of Defendants and punitive damages for the reckless nature of these acts. (Complaint ¶73.) Plaintiffs allege that they also seek a return to the status quo. (Complaint ¶73.) Plaintiffs allege that they seek a judgement from this Court that Defendants Salinger and Moving Defendant are jointly and severally liable for all actions of the other. (Complaint ¶73.)

Plaintiffs fail to allege requests for restitutionary or injunctive relief, and only “seek compensatory damages . . . and punitive damages.” (Complaint ¶73, Prayer ¶7.) Plaintiffs fail to allege any act by Moving Defendant that caused Plaintiffs any injury.

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 7th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

To establish slander of title, a plaintiff must show: “(1) a publication, (2) which is without privilege or justification, (3) which is false, and (4) which causes direct and immediate pecuniary loss.” (Klem v. Access Insurance Co. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 595, 612-613; see also Manhattan Loft, LLC v. Mercury Liquors, Inc. (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1040, 1051.) Further, malice is an essential element of a slander of title cause of action. (See Fearon v. Fodera (1915) 169 Cal. 370, 381; Edwards v. Burris (1882) 60 Cal. 157, 161; Alhambra Consolidated Mines, Inc. v. Alhambra Shumway Mines, Inc. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d 590, 597.)

Plaintiffs allege Defendants individually and in concert, slandered Plaintiffs’ title by recording a grant deed of the 8th Avenue property to Renova from Jackson as successor trustee to Pearlie Mae Jones Living Trust dated November 10, 2009, and the Middleton Living Trust dated November 10, 2009, which is Los Angeles County Recorder Document number 20230871594 recorded on December 13, 2023. (Complaint ¶77, Exh. 18.)

Plaintiffs fail to allege Moving Defendant’s malice. (See Complaint ¶¶74-78.) Further, Plaintiff fails to state facts against Moving Defendant for slander of title.

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer to Plaintiffs’ 8th cause of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend.

“A demurrer for uncertainty is strictly construed, even where a complaint is in some respects uncertain, because ambiguities can be clarified under modern discovery procedures. [Citations.]” (Khoury v. Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.)

Here, Plaintiffs’ allegations are not so uncertain that Defendant cannot reasonably respond—i.e., it cannot reasonably determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts or claims are directed against it. (Id.)

Accordingly, Moving Defendant’s demurrer on the basis of uncertainty is overruled.

Moving Defendant’s unopposed demurrer to Plaintiff’s 1st, 3rd, 4th, 5th, 6th, 7th, and 8th causes of action is sustained with 20 days leave to amend, and overruled without leave to amend as to the 2nd cause of action.

The Court sua sponte strikes Plaintiffs’ first amended complaint received by the Court on June 4, 2025, as untimely filed, pursuant to C.C.P. §436(b).

Hon. Daniel M. Crowley

Judge of the Superior Court