Judge: Daniel M. Crowley, Case: BC721551, Date: 2023-03-08 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: BC721551 Hearing Date: March 8, 2023 Dept: 28
Defendant Laniece Jenkins’s Motion
to Vacate Entry of Default and Default Judgment
Having considered the moving and opposing
papers, the Court rules as follows.
BACKGROUND
On
September 13, 2018, Plaintiff Safeway Insurance Company (“Plaintiff”) filed
this action against Defendants Julius Lavont Randall (“Randall”) and Laniece
Jenkins (“Jenkins”) for subrogation. Plaintiff later amended the complaint to
include Defendant Chaz Malik Maxwell (“Maxwell”).
On
October 16, 2019, the clerk entered default against Defendants. On November 5,
2021, the Court dismissed Maxwell, without prejudice, pursuant to Plaintiff’s
request. On November 5, 2021, the Court entered default against Randall and
Jenkins.
On
January 18, 2023, Jenkins filed a Motion to Vacate Default to be heard on March
8, 2023. On February 16, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition.
There
is no current trial date.
PARTY’S REQUESTS
Jenkins
requests the Court set aside entry of default and default judgment on the basis
that Jenkins never received notice of the complaint.
Plaintiff
requests the Court deny the motion.
LEGAL
STANDARD
CCP
§ 415.10 provides that “[a] summons may be served by personal delivery of the
summons and of the complaint to the person to be served. Service of summons in
this manner is deemed complete at the time of such delivery.” A party may also
serve the complaint and summons via other statutorily authorized means, but
service of both the complaint and summons is necessary.
“We
conclude California's Jurisdiction and Service of Process Act of 1969 preempted
the subjects of jurisdiction and service of process and clearly rejected the
rule that a defendant's general appearance after entry of a default judgment
against him based upon a void service of summons retroactively makes valid that
void service.” (In re Marriage of Smith (1982) 135 Cal. App. 3d 543,
545.)
CCP
§ 473.5 provides that if service of a summon has not resulting in actual notice
to a party, said party may file a notice of motion to set aside default within
a reasonable time. A reasonable time is considered to be either the two years
after entry of default judgment or 180 days of receiving notice of default,
whichever comes first.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiff’s
proof of service provides that Jenkins was served via personal service at 1167
Andrew Lane, Corona, CA 92881. The person served allegedly confirmed her
identity as Jenkins. She is described as “a black female approx. 18-25 years of
age, 5’6”-5’8” tall, weighing 140-160 lbs with brown hair.”
Jenkins
submitted a motion arguing that she was not living at that address at that
time; rather she has lived at 8774 Denker Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90047, her
entire life. She states she does not know anyone who lives at that address. She
was only put on notice as to the garnishment of her wages on December 27, 2022.
Plaintiff’s declaration states it is the declaration of “Cedrik Doughton”,
rather than Laniece Jenkins, twice within the declaration—the Court assumes
that this is a mistake, as Laniece Jenkins is also identified in the
declaration and also signed the declaration.
Plaintiff’s
opposition relies upon the proof of service, citing Evidence Code § 647 that
the return of a process server appropriately registered establishes a
presumption of service.
In
reviewing Jenkins’ declaration, the Court finds that Jenkins has not actually
provided evidence of lack of service. Jenkins’ declaration does not state she
was not served—the moving papers do. Similarly, Jenkins’ declaration does not
state she does not know anyone at that address—the moving papers do. The fact
she did not live at that location is not indicative of the fact she was not
properly served. When being personally served, a party can be served at any
location, not just their home address. Jenkins does not state the person
described does not match her description. There is insufficient evidence within
the declaration to find that Jenkins was never served. The Court denies the
motion.
CONCLUSION
Defendant
Laniece Jenkins’s Motion to Vacate Entry of Default and Default Judgment is
DENIED.
Moving
party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.
Moving Party is ordered to file the proof of service of this
ruling with the Court within five days.
The parties are directed to the header of this
tentative ruling for further instructions.