Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 18STCV01201, Date: 2022-10-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 18STCV01201    Hearing Date: October 17, 2022    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

In October 2018, AMAG, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) commenced this action against Marc Anthony Cubas, et al. (“Defendants”), asserting causes of action for creditor’s suit, fraudulent conversion, and declaratory relief. The lawsuit stems from an underlying judgment wherein Vlaze was found liable to AMAG for unpaid loans. Marc Cubas was Vlaze’s CEO, and he allegedly made several fraudulent transfers of real and personal property to other Defendants to avoid debt collection. By this action, AMAG seeks to unwind these transfers and to apply these assets to the unpaid balance of the money judgment. The operative complaint is the First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) filed August 4, 2020, alleging fraudulent conversion and declaratory relief.

On October 28, 2021, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to all Defendants except Omar Zambrano and the Zambrano Law Corporation. On February 2, 2022, default was entered against Vlaze pursuant to a November 11, 2021 court order striking its answer. Judgment was entered on February 4, 2022. Defendants filed a Memorandum of Costs (“MOC”) on May 2, 2022, totaling $10,394.48. On May 17, 2022, Plaintiff filed a motion to strike Defendants’ MOC, which was granted in part on June 29, 2022. Among other things, the Court held that Defendants were entitled to recover $5,843.75 in filing and motion fees.

On July 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for reconsideration of the Court’s June 29 order, arguing that Defendant Vlaze is not entitled to recover its filing and motion fees because it is a defunct corporation.

LEGAL STANDARD

“When an application for an order has been made to a judge, or to a court, and refused in whole or in part, or granted, or granted conditionally, or on terms, any party affected by the order may, within 10 days after service upon the party of written notice of entry of the order and based upon new or different facts, circumstances, or law, make application to the same judge or court that made the order, to reconsider the matter and modify, amend, or revoke the prior order. The party making the application shall state by affidavit what application was made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008(a).)

Additionally, “the trial court retains the inherent authority to change its decision at any time prior to the entry of judgment.” (Darling v. Kritt (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 1148, 1156.) “[S]ection 1008 does not govern the court's ability, on its own motion, to reevaluate its own interim rulings.” (Ibid.) “[T]he only requirement of the court is that it exercise ‘due consideration’ before modifying, amending, or revoking its prior orders.” (Id. at p. 1157.)

DISCUSSION

            Defendants do not dispute that Vlaze is a suspended corporation or that a suspended corporation cannot properly file papers in court or recover the costs of such filings. (See Mtn. 4:10-17.) Instead, Defendants’ opposition focuses solely on Section 1008’s requirement for new facts or law to support a motion for reconsideration. However, “section 1008 does not govern the court's ability, on its own motion, to reevaluate its own interim rulings.” (Darling, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 1156.) It is immaterial whether the court realizes an error on its own or acts at the suggestion of a party. (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108.) The Court is entitled to revisit its June 29 order even if Plaintiff has not brought a proper reconsideration motion. Because Vlaze is a suspended corporation not entitled to recover filing fees, the order to tax costs should be amended to reflect this.

CONCLUSION

            On the Court’s own motion, the June 29, 2022 Order re Motion to Tax Costs is amended to further tax costs pertaining to Vlaze’s filing fee of $435.00.