Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 20STCV05697, Date: 2024-03-18 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV05697    Hearing Date: April 12, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On February 13, 2020, Plaintiff Cecile Lopez Macabagdal initiated this action against Defendants Norman Roy Levine and Hancock Plaza Homeowners Association, Inc. arising from alleged habitability issues. Defendant Levine was allegedly Plaintiff’s landlord. However, Levine died in January 2021. On July 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed a First Amended Complaint adding Herschel Manalo, the trustee of Levine’s estate, as a Defendant. Plaintiff filed the operative Third Amended Complaint on April 24, 2023.

            On March 11, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant two motions to compel further responses to special interrogatories and requests for production. Defendant filed his oppositions on March 29, 2024. Plaintiff filed her replies on April 8, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

Upon receiving responses to its discovery requests, the propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses if the responses are incomplete or evasive, or objections are without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(a), 2031.310(a), 2033.290(a).)

MEET AND CONFER

A motion to compel further must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to resolve the matter informally. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(b)(1), 2031.310(b), 2033.290(b).) The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See Akhavan Decl.)

DISCUSSION

I. Special Interrogatories

            The motion concerns SROG No. 3, which asks whether the subject property is owned by the trust for which Defendant is a trustee. Defendant objected to the interrogatory as vague, irrelevant, argumentative, calling for a legal opinion, intruding on attorney-client privilege, and intruding on privacy. Plaintiff argues that Defendant waived all objections by serving late responses and that the objections are meritless.

a. Relief from Waiver

            The failure to timely respond to discovery results in waiver of objections. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.290(a), 2031.300(a).) However, the Court may relieve a party from this wavier if (1) the party serves substantially compliant responses, and (2) the failure to timely respond was caused by mistake, inadvertence, or excusable neglect. (Ibid.) There is no dispute that Defendant’s responses were untimely. However, the Court finds that Defendant’s response to SROG No. 3 is substantially compliant and that Defendant’s failure to timely respond was caused by inadvertence. (See Uss Decl. ¶¶ 9-11.) Therefore, objections are not waived.

            b. Merits of the Objections   

            A party “is entitled to demand answers to its interrogatories, as a matter of right . . . [and] the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.) Here, Defendant stands only on its privacy objection, arguing that SROG No. 3 improperly seeks protected financial information in violation of Civil Code section 3295.

“The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) If the court finds a privacy interest, the court must balance the privacy concerns against the need for the information. (Ibid.) The party seeking discovery need not demonstrate a compelling need for the information unless there is “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” (Id. at p. 556.)

            Here, Defendant has not articulated an objective expectation of privacy associated with revealing whether the trust owns the subject property. Nor has Defendant explained how merely answering “yes” or “no” to that question constitutes a serious intrusion of privacy. Tedesco v. White (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 1090, the single case cited in support of a trust’s interest in privacy, involved an overbroad subpoena seeking “all documents, writings or communications, in whatever form, relating or referring to Tedesco or any of his accounts or assets—including, but not limited to, those that are held by the restated trust.” (Id. at p. 1100.) By contrast, SROG No. 3 seeks information on a single asset, the subject property, and the information sought is merely whether the trust owns the property. Ownership of the subject property is directly relevant, and Plaintiff’s need for the information outweighs the minimal privacy interest.

Civil Code section 3295 precludes discovery of a defendant’s financial information until the plaintiff establishes entitlement to punitive damages. However, Section 3295 does not preclude discovery where the information sought is fundamental to the case and is not used solely for assessing punitive damages. (Rawnsley v. Superior Court (1986) 183 Cal.App.3d 86, 91.) Here, SROG No. 3 seeks relevant information regarding ownership of the subject property. This information is fundamental to the case beyond punitive damages. Therefore, Section 3295 does not preclude discovery.  

In sum, a further response is required for SROG No. 3.
II. Requests for Production

The party seeking production of documents bears the initial burden of showing good cause through a fact-specific showing of relevance. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections. (Ibid.)

RFP No. 2 seeks “ALL DOCUMENTS RELATING TO the PERSON(s) who owned, leased or operated the SUBJECT PROPERTY from 2018 to present.” Defendant objected to the request as vague, irrelevant, overbroad, and burdensome. Ownership and management of the subject property are relevant. Plaintiff’s motion and separate statement sufficiently set forth good cause for such information. Defendant maintains that the request is overbroad as phrased because it seeks all documents pertaining to any person who owned, leased, or operated the subject property, meaning Plaintiff could conceivably obtain any information on the person regardless of whether that information is related to the property. The request is limited to information regarding the ownership, leasing, or operation of the subject property, including the identity of the owner, lessor, or operator.  

In sum, a further response is required for RFP No. 2, subject to the above limitations.

CONCLUSION

            Plaintiff’s motions to compel further are GRANTED. Defendant Manalo shall provide further responses to SROG No. 3 and RFP No. 2 within 15 days of this order. Sanctions are denied as the parties acted with substantial justification.