Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 20STCV21243, Date: 2022-08-22 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20STCV21243 Hearing Date: August 22, 2022 Dept: 32
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DANIEL BEDINGFIELD, Plaintiff, v. JEREMY BRAUD, Defendant.
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Case No.: 20STCV21243 Hearing Date: August 22, 2022 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: defendant’s motion to quash subpoenas |
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BACKGROUND
This is a landlord-tenant dispute
arising from alleged habitability issues. On June 4, 2020, Plaintiff Daniel Bedingfield
filed the complaint against Defendant Jeremy Braud, alleging (1) negligence,
(2) breach of the implied warranty of habitability, (3) constructive eviction,
and (4) failure to refund deposit.
The
instant motions to quash concern two subpoenas Plaintiff served to nonparties
(i) Webb & Ord and (ii) Artkraft Build, Inc. Defendant sought legal advice
from Webb & Ord regarding his acquisition of the subject property. (Braud
Decl. ¶ 5.) The subpoena to Webb & Ord requested case files, mediation
briefs, and settlement negotiations relating to claims made by Defendant stemming
from his purchase of the property. (Staub Decl., Ex. A.) Artkraft is a
now-suspended corporation operated by the same individual who controlled the
company that sold Defendant the subject property. (Parker Decl. ¶¶ 2-5.) The
subpoena to Artkraft requested permits, applications, inspection reports, and complaints
for the property from 2018 to present.
LEGAL STANDARD
“If a subpoena requires … the production
of books, documents, electronically stored information, or other things …, the
court, upon motion reasonably made by [a party] . . . may make an order
quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or directing compliance with it upon
those terms or conditions as the court shall declare, including protective
orders.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1987.1, subd. (a), (b).) Good cause must be shown
to require a non-party to produce documents. (See Calcor Space Facility,
Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 224.)
DISCUSSION
Here, the subpoenas plainly request
privileged documents that are also irrelevant to the subject matter at issue in
this litigation. Defendant’s underlying purchase of the property and associated
mediation has no bearing on Plaintiff’s separate claims based on habitability.
Plaintiff does not dispute this contention and has since withdrawn the
subpoenas. However, no substantial justification is provided for issuing the
subpoenas in the first place. Thus, sanctions are warranted. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 2023.010 [defining discovery abuse as, inter alia, (i) attempting
to obtain material outside the permissible scope of discovery without
substantial justification, or (ii) employing discovery in a manner that causes
unwarranted annoyance].)
Plaintiff argues that the motion
should be denied because it is untimely. (Opp. 3:14-23.) Citing Code of Civil
Procedure section 1985.3, Plaintiff argues that the deadline to bring the
motion was 5 days prior to the production date for the subpoena. (Ibid.)
The subpoenas here had production dates of May 12, 2022 and July 5, 2022, while
the motions were filed July 5 and 21, 2022. However, Section 1985.3 expressly
provides that “[t]he failure to provide notice to the deposition officer shall
not invalidate the motion to quash or modify the subpoena duces tecum . . . .” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff next argues that the
motion should be denied because Defendant failed to meet and confer. (Opp.
3:26-4:11.) However, Plaintiff cites no authority requiring a meet and confer
prior to filing a motion to quash or requesting sanctions. There is no mention
of meet and confer in Civil Code section 1987.1, the provision authorizing
motions to quash, unlike the provisions regarding motions to compel further
responses. (See, e.g., Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300(b).)
Defendant does not dispute that he has
withdrawn his request for sanctions regarding the Artkraft subpoena. (See Alarcon
Decl., Ex. C, p. 2.) However, Defendant maintains his request for sanctions as
it pertains to the Webb & Ord subpoena. As discussed above, Plaintiff has
provided no substantial justification for issuing the plainly improper
subpoena. Defense counsel claims to have spent 9.9 hours at $500 per hour for
the motion. (Staub Decl. ¶ 25.) This is unreasonably high given the simplicity
of the motion. The reasonable amount is 3 hours at $500 per hour plus a $60
filing fee. This totals to $1,560.
CONCLUSION
Defendant’s motions to quash are denied
as moot. The Court awards monetary sanctions against Plaintiff and his counsel
in the amount of $1,560, to be paid within 30 days.