Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 20STCV48993, Date: 2022-09-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV48993    Hearing Date: September 14, 2022    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On December 22, 2020, Plaintiffs Maria R. Pulido-Lucero (“Maria”) and Jimmy V. Lucero, Jr. (“Jimmy”) initiated this action against Defendants Hector Pulido (“Hector”) and Wells Fargo. The operative Second Amended Complaint, filed July 21, 2021, alleges: (1) fraud; (2) specific performance; (3) declaratory relief; (4) unjust enrichment; (5) constructive trust; (6) resulting trust; and (7) equitable lien.

            Plaintiffs’ complaint arises from a dispute over a certain parcel of real property in Whittier, California. Plaintiffs allege that Maria’s brother, Defendant Hector, reneged on a promise to convey title to the property to Plaintiffs. Plaintiffs allege that Maria had been paying the mortgage on the property to allow their mother, Claudia, to remain on the property.

            On March 1, 2022, Hector, his brother Ricardo, and their mother Claudia, initiated a cross-complaint against Maria and Jimmy. The operative First Amended Cross-Complaint asserts: (1) fraud; (2) trespassing; (3) conversion; and (4) defamation. The FACC alleges that Maria made false demands for unsubstantiated sums of money, remained on the property without permission, stole money from a bank account, and made false statements about Hector and Ricardo to a family friend. The fraud claim has since been stricken.

            On July 1, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for summary adjudication of their second cause of action for specific performance.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the plaintiff moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to establish each element of the cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

            Defendants’ objections are overruled.

DISCUSSION

“To obtain specific performance after a breach of contract, a plaintiff must generally show: ‘(1) the inadequacy of his legal remedy; (2) an underlying contract that is both reasonable and supported by adequate consideration; (3) the existence of a mutuality of remedies; (4) contractual terms which are sufficiently definite to enable the court to know what it is to enforce; and (5) a substantial similarity of the requested performance to that promised in the contract.’” (Real Estate Analytics, LLC v. Vallas (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 463, 472, internal citations omitted.) “It is to be presumed that the breach of an agreement to transfer real property cannot be adequately relieved by pecuniary compensation.” (Civ. Code, § 3387.)

Maria avers that “[i]n February 2008, HECTOR agreed to transfer title to the Subject Property to me in exchange for my taking over the mortgage payments.” (Maria Decl. ¶ 15.) In his deposition, Hector acknowledged that he and Maria formed a plan in 2008 whereby Maria would take over the mortgage payments and Hector would deed the property to her. (Plntf.’s Ex. F, p. 21.) It is undisputed that Maria made mortgage and tax payments for over twelve years since 2008. (UF 19.) Plaintiffs argue that they are entitled to specific performance because Maria fulfilled her end of the bargain by paying the mortgage on the house for twelve years, while Hector still refuses to transfer title as agreed. (Mtn. 18:21-27.)

However, Defendants dispute that Maria’s obligations under the agreement consisted of simply making the mortgage payments. (Opp. 6:3-13.) In particular, Hector testified in deposition that Maria did not fulfill her end of the deal because she did not make complete payments for the first four years, thereby causing the balance of the mortgage to increase by $6,000. (Def.’s Ex. E.) Additionally, Hector testified that the plan required Maria to refinance the property such that Hector’s name would be completely taken off the mortgage, something that Maria did not do. (Def.’s Ex. I.) This creates a triable issue regarding whether Maria fulfilled her obligations under the contract. If Maria did not perform under the contract, she would not be entitled to specific performance. (See Darbun Enterprises, Inc. v. San Fernando Community Hospital (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 399, 409 [a plaintiff seeking specific performance must prove the elements of breach of contract].)

It is undisputed that the alleged contract was oral. Plaintiffs do not present any evidence of a written contract outlining the precise terms of the parties’ purported agreement. Thus, if Plaintiff avers that the agreement consisted of certain terms (Maria Decl. ¶ 15), while Defendant avers that the agreement consisted of other terms (Def.’s Ex. E, I), there is a factual dispute that must be resolved by a jury.

CONCLUSION

            Plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication is DENIED.