Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 21STCV07398, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV07398 Hearing Date: February 21, 2024 Dept: 32
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kristina
turpin, Plaintiff, v. LEARNING WITH A
DIFFERENCE, INC. Defendant.
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Case No.: 21STCV07398 Hearing Date: February 21, 2024 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: (1) plaintiff’s motions to compel further
responses; and (2) defendant’s motion for protective order |
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BACKGROUND
On February 24, 2021, Kristina
Turpin (“Plaintiff”) filed this employment discrimination action against
Learning with a Difference, Inc. (“Defendant”).
On December 27, 2023 and January 4, 2024,
Plaintiff filed three motions to compel further responses to its Special
Interrogatories (Sets Two and Three) and its Requests for Production (Set Two).
On January 5, 2024, Defendant filed a motion for protective order pertaining to
the same requests. The parties filed their respective oppositions to each
motion on February 6, 2024. The parties filed their replies on February 13,
2024.
LEGAL STANDARD
Upon receiving responses to its discovery
requests, the propounding party may move for an order compelling further
responses if the responses are incomplete or evasive, or objections are without
merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(a), 2031.310(a),
2033.290(a).)
“The court shall limit the scope of
discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that
discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this
determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other
affected person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).) “The issuance and
formulation of protective orders are to a large extent discretionary.” (Nativi
v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 316.) “[T]he
burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for
whatever order is sought.” (Id. at p. 318.)
DISCUSSION
I.
SROG Set Three
Plaintiff seeks further responses to
SROG Nos. 13-19. The SROGs are organized in the following manner. SROG No. 13
asks for the identity of each teacher who had school responsibilities beyond a
fulltime teaching load in the 2020-21 school year. SROG Nos. 14-16 ask for more
specific information on the teachers identified in No. 13—what work they
performed, whether they were additionally compensated, and the classes they
taught. SROG No. 17 asks for the identity of each teacher who had work hours
beyond fulltime teaching hours in the 2020-21 school year. SROG Nos. 18 and 19
ask for specific information on those teachers—the nature of the work performed
during the additional hours and whether they were additionally compensated. Defendant
objected to the requests as irrelevant, invading privacy, overbroad, harassing,
and vague.
a. Relevance
“Evidence that an employer treated ‘similarly
situated’ employees outside the plaintiff's protected class ‘more favorably’ is
probative of the employer's discriminatory or retaliatory intent.” (Gupta v.
Trustees of California State University (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 510, 519.) Plaintiff
argues that the information is relevant because Plaintiff was historically paid
a stipend for additional afterschool work until Defendant altered her job
description for the 2020-21 school year and increased her workload while
refusing to pay the stipend. Plaintiff seeks to prove that Defendant’s
proffered rationale for doing this is false and that Defendant treated
Plaintiff differently compared to other teachers who continued to receive a
stipend.
The Court agrees that evidence that
Defendant treated Plaintiff differently than similarly situated employees would
tend to show that Defendant harbored discriminatory animus. (See Code Civ.
Proc., § 2017.010; D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35
Cal.App.5th 210, 229 [“‘Relevant’ evidence is evidence ‘having any tendency in
reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action’”].) However, Plaintiff seeks information for
2020-2021 even though she was terminated on August 31, 2020. The request is
limited to information up to August 31, 2020.
b. Privacy
The facts requested do not constitute a
serious invasion of privacy, and Plaintiff’s need for the information outweighs
any privacy concerns, which can also be addressed by a protective order. (See Williams
v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552; Hill v. National Collegiate
Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 38.)
c. Burden
Defendant avers that it employed 50
teachers during the 2020-21 school year, and there are no documents that
identify each teacher by school year, classes taught, compensation, and
additional hours. (Johnson Decl. ¶¶ 9-10.) Defendant claims that it would have
to speak to every implicated teacher in order to ascertain the information
sought by the interrogatories, and 13 of those teachers no longer work for
Defendant. (Id., ¶¶ 11, 13.)
The fact that there is no document
containing all of the information sought does not render Defendant incapable of
ascertaining the information to answer the interrogatories. Defendant must make
“a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to
other natural persons or organizations.” (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220(c).)
Defendant has not demonstrated that speaking with its teachers is unduly
burdensome in comparison to the relevance of the information. However,
Defendant is not required to seek out ex-employees. In sum, Defendant must
provide further responses to SROG Nos. 13-19.
II.
SROG Set Two
a. SROG No. 5
SROG No. 5 asks Defendant to
identify by name, job title, and subject taught, each employee from the 2018-19
school year who had an appendix or exhibit attached to their contract and the
reason for the attachment. Defendant objected to the request as irrelevant,
compound, invading privacy, and harassing.
Here, the information sought is directly
relevant because Plaintiff alleges that Defendant attached an appendix to her
contract which altered her job duties and fabricated performance issues as
retaliation. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant targeted disabled employees
with similar attachments to their contracts. Defendant denies that the appendix
was retaliatory and claims that employees regularly have attachments added to
their contracts. Plaintiff is entitled to test the veracity of Defendant’s
claim and determine whether she was treated like other employees. (See Gupta,
supra, 40 Cal.App.5th at p. 519.) The information sought does not
constitute a serious invasion of privacy, and Plaintiff’s need for the
information outweighs the privacy concerns.
Defendant argues that the request is
burdensome because it employed around 50 teachers in the 2018-19 school year
and did not have the space to maintain all of their contracts. (Taylor Decl. ¶¶
8-9.) Defendant avers that it would have to obtain the records from an offsite
custodian. (Id., ¶ 10.) Defendant does not possess any document that
specifically identifies teachers by name, job title, and subject taught. (Id.,
¶ 13.) Defendant does not demonstrate that obtaining the records from an
offsite custodian is unduly burdensome given the relevance of the information.
As with above, the fact that the information sought has not been compiled onto
a particular document does not absolve Defendant from ascertaining the
information to answer the request. Therefore, a further response is required
for SROG No. 5.
b. SROG No. 11
SROG No. 11 asks when and how
Defendant became aware of the disability of Margot Fitzsimmons, Plaintiff’s
replacement, to the extent Defendant is aware of such disability. Defendant
asserted the same objections as above.
Ms. Fitzsimmons was hired to replace
Plaintiff after Plaintiff was allegedly wrongfully terminated. The information
sought is directly relevant because it would reveal whether Defendant replaced
Plaintiff with someone who was not disabled, which is probative of
discriminatory motive. The request does not seriously intrude upon privacy
because it only asks if, when, and how Defendant became aware of Ms.
Fitzsimmons’ disability, without inquiring into any details about the disability
itself. Therefore, a further response is required for SROG No. 11.
c. SROG No. 12
SROG No. 12 asks for each date from
school year 2020 to present that Margot Fitzsimmons was provided an employment
agreement signed by head of school, Claudia Koochek. Defendant asserted the
same objections as above.
The information sought is irrelevant
to the extent it concerns a time period after Plaintiff’s employment with
Defendant, up to the present. Plaintiff argues that the information is relevant
to showing whether Defendant sought to replace Plaintiff during the interactive
process. That only explains the relevance of the first contract offered to Ms.
Fitzsimmons. Subsequent events do not constitute proper comparator evidence because
Plaintiff no longer worked for Defendant by then. A further response is required
for SROG No. 12, but the request is limited to the date of the first contract
offered to Margot Fitzsimmons.
III.
RFP Set Two
a. RFP No. 85
RFP No. 85 seeks the addenda of
teacher contracts from the 2019-2020 school year that set forth a list of job
duties. A further response is required for the same reasons discussed above
regarding SROG Set Two, No. 5.
b. RFP No. 92
RFP No. 92 requests all
communications with Margot Fitzsimmons regarding the Theater Arts Teacher
position. Plaintiff argues that the information is relevant to showing whether
Defendant sought to replace Plaintiff during the interactive process. The Court
agrees. However, Plaintiff is only entitled to communications up to the hiring
of Ms. Fitzsimmons. A further response is required for RFP No. 92.
c. RFP No. 93
RFP No. 93 seeks the written
agreement, including addenda, signed by Margot Fitzsimmons for the 2020-21
school year. A further response is not required because the information is from
beyond the time of Plaintiff’s own employment.
d. RFP No. 94
RFP No. 94 seeks school schedules
for the school year 2020-21. During meet and confer, Plaintiff narrowed the
request to bell schedules, after school care staffing schedules, and late bus
schedules. Plaintiff argues that the information is directly relevant to
ascertaining whether Plaintiff could have adequately performed her duties with
reasonable accommodations. The information is relevant, but only up to August
31, 2020. A further response is required for RFP No. 94.
IV.
Protective Order
The majority of discovery requests
implicated in Defendant’s motion for protective order have been addressed
above. Defendant’s motion addresses the following additional requests from RFP
Set Three: Nos. 97, 99, and 104. However, Defendant already responded to these
requests by making a statement of compliance or explaining an inability to
comply. There is no need for a protective order absolving Defendant from
responding to these requests if Defendant has already responded. Defendant must
respond to the remaining requests, subject to the limitations described above.
CONCLUSION
Plaintiff’s motions to compel
further responses are GRANTED in part as set forth above. Defendant’s motion
for protective order is DENIED. Document production shall be subject to a
protective order. Sanctions are denied as the parties acted with substantial
justification.