Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 21STCV10900, Date: 2022-11-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV10900    Hearing Date: November 21, 2022    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On March 22, 2021, Plaintiff Randall Stewart initiated this action against Defendants Los Angeles Police Department, City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles, and Bryan Dameworth. The operative First Amended Complaint alleges (1) battery, (2) assault, (3) battery by peace officer, (4) negligent hiring, (5) negligence, (6) negligent use of deadly force, and (7) intentional infliction of emotional distress. Plaintiff alleges that he was attending a protest on May 30, 2020 in Los Angeles when Officer Dameworth fired a rubber bullet, striking him. (FAC ¶¶ 10-12.) The incident allegedly left Plaintiff with severe injuries, continued pain and suffering, and permanent disabilities. (Id., ¶ 30.)

            On October 11, 2022, Defendant City of Los Angeles filed the instant motions to compel further responses to Special Interrogatories and Requests for Production.   

LEGAL STANDARD

On receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.300, subd. (a).)  

On receipt of a response to a request for inspection, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further responses to the demand if the demanding party deems that (1) a statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete, (2) a representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive, or (3) an objection in the response is without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.310, subd. (a).) “The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.” (Id., subd. (b)(1).)

MEET AND CONFER

Motions to compel further responses must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to resolve the issue informally. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(b)(1), 2031.310(b)(2), 2033.290(b)(1).) The Court finds that Defendant has satisfied the meet and confer requirement. (See Ellyin Decl. ¶¶ 11-16.)

DISCUSSION

I. Requests for Production

            a. RFP Nos. 5-6

            These RFPs seek Plaintiff’s medical records for the five years preceding the incident. There is good cause for the information because Plaintiff alleges that the incident caused him physical and emotional injuries. Defendant is entitled to seek evidence verifying whether Plaintiff’s conditions are preexisting or attributable to other causes. (See Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842 [“A plaintiff waives his or her rights to preclude the discovery of private information when that information is directly relevant to the plaintiff’s claim”].)

            Plaintiff objected and then responded with the following: “Plaintiff refers you to his medical records previously produced via Parris ICloud as Exhibit A. Additional responsive documents may be in the possession of Kaiser Permanente, located at 13640 Roscoe Blvd., Panorama City, CA 91402-3904.” This is not a proper statement of compliance and does not reveal whether all responsive documents will be produced. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2031.220.)

However, after this motion was filed, Plaintiff amended his response to state that he is complying in full and that all responsive documents have been produced in iCloud Exhibit A. (Park Decl., Ex. 4.) Plaintiff also removed the language about Kaiser potentially holding responsive documents. (Ibid.) Therefore, Plaintiff’s response is now code-compliant, rendering a further response unnecessary. If all responsive records are already included in a prior production, then no further production needs to be compelled. (See Park Decl. ¶ 6.)  

            The motion is DENIED as to RFP Nos. 5-6 as moot.

            b. RFP No. 14

            This RFP seeks all documents relating to Plaintiff’s arrests, convictions, or criminal charges. Plaintiff objected, then limited the request to 10 years preceding the incident, and stated that he “has no responsive documents in his possession, custody, or control, as such documents do not exist.”

Defendant contends that evidence of pre-incident aggression is relevant because Plaintiff attributes brain injury, PTSD, emotional outbursts, anger issues, and mood swings to Officer Dameworth’s conduct. (Def.’s Sep. Stmnt. 10:17-25.) Defendant further argues that Plaintiff’s prior arrests are relevant as potential alternative stressors contributing to the alleged emotional distress. (Id., 10:26-11:4.) The Court agrees that the records are relevant, but the request is limited to Plaintiff’s adult criminal records. Juvenile records are sealed and can only be released by order of the juvenile court.

The motion is GRANTED in part as to RFP No. 14, limited to arrests, convictions, and charges during Plaintiff’s adulthood. Production shall be subject to the existing protective order.   If Plaintiff does not have such documents, he needs to do a code compliant response.   

II. Special Interrogatories

            a. SROG Nos. 6-7

            These SROGs ask Plaintiff to state the amount of his claim for medical expenses and to explain the calculation. Plaintiff objected and then responded with the following: “Responding Party’s experts have not had an opportunity to evaluate the full cost of Plaintiff’s past medical expenses. As a result, Plaintiff is unable to provide a full and complete response at this time. The damages claimed will be based on the reasonable cost of reasonably necessary medical care that Responding Party has received.”

            Expert testimony is required to determine which expenses are reasonably necessary. Plaintiff avers that he lacks the information at this time and that discovery is ongoing. This is a valid response.

            The motion is DENIED as to SROG Nos. 6-7.

            b. SROG Nos. 9-10

            These SROGs ask for details regarding each offense for which Plaintiff has been arrested or convicted. Plaintiff limited the scope of the request to 10 years and then responded with “None.” As discussed above, the information is relevant. Unlike the RFP, this interrogatory does not demand sealed juvenile records. The fact that Plaintiff was arrested or convicted is discoverable even if it occurred more than 10 years ago.  

            The motion is GRANTED as to SROG Nos. 9 and 10.

            c. SROG No. 17

            This SROG asks Plaintiff to identify pertinent witnesses and provide their information. Plaintiff identified individuals who attended the protest with him on the day of the incident and provided their information. However, Plaintiff also identified his doctors without providing the doctors’ information.

            Plaintiff contends that he does not need to provide the doctors’ information because he has already produced his medical records from after the incident, and those records contain the doctors’ information. Plaintiff cites to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.220(c) for the proposition that a responding party need not provide information that is equally available to the propounding party.

Section 2030.220(c) states: “If the responding party does not have personal knowledge sufficient to respond fully to an interrogatory, that party shall so state, but shall make a reasonable and good faith effort to obtain the information by inquiry to other natural persons or organizations, except where the information is equally available to the propounding party.” This section only applies when the responding party does not have personal knowledge of responsive information. Normally, a responding party must make a diligent inquiry if he lacks personal knowledge. However, Section 2030.220(c) excuses this diligent inquiry if the information is equally available to the propounding party.

Section 2030.220(c) does not apply here because Plaintiff does not claim a lack of personal knowledge. Section 2030.220(a) requires the response to be “as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.” If Plaintiff has personal knowledge, he must simply answer the interrogatory. The response is incomplete because Plaintiff did not provide the information of his doctors.

The motion is GRANTED as to SROG No. 17.

d. SROG No. 21

This SROG asks Plaintiff to describe in detail the clothing worn by whoever was with him and witnessed the incident. Plaintiff responded that he does not recall. This is a complete answer. Defendant contends that because “[m]ultiple videos of the summer 2020 protests exist,” Plaintiff must make “a reasonable or good faith effort to obtain the information responsive to this interrogatory.” (Def.’s Sep. Stmnt. 17:12-23.)

However, the fact that videos of the protests exist does not mean that Plaintiff and his acquaintances are in the videos. Plaintiff is not required to review all available footage of the protests to find himself and his acquaintances.

The motion is DENIED as to SROG No. 21.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant City of Los Angeles’s motions to compel further responses are GRANTED in part as set forth above. Plaintiff is to produce further responses within 10 days. Sanctions are denied as the parties acted with substantial justification. Production is subject to the existing protective order.