Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 21STCV18305, Date: 2023-01-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV18305    Hearing Date: January 13, 2023    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On May 14, 2021, Plaintiff Kyle Rice filed this action against Defendant Douglas Meyer (Meyer) and Does 1 through 100, asserting causes of action for negligence, strict liability for product defect, and negligence based on product liability.

The action stems from severe and permanent injuries that Plaintiff sustained after Meyer intentionally pointed a laser at Plaintiff which struck Plaintiff’s eye. Meyer has been arrested for the crime and is one of the defendants in this action, but Plaintiff has also named Amazon.com Services LLC (Amazon) as a Doe defendant. Meyer allegedly purchased the laser pointer using the Amazon website. Plaintiff seeks to hold Amazon liable for strict liability based on the following alleged defects with the laser pointer: (1) failure to warn; (2) manufacturing defect; and (3) design defect. Plaintiff additionally seeks to hold Amazon liable under a theory of negligence.

            On November 18, 2022, Amazon filed the instant demurrer to the complaint.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Williamson Decl. ¶ 3.)

DISCUSSION

I. Strict Liability

            “The elements of a strict products liability cause of action are a defect in the manufacture or design of the product or a failure to warn, causation, and injury.” (Nelson v. Superior Court (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 689, 695.) “[E]ntities in the stream of commerce for purposes of strict liability are not limited to those readily identifiable as designer, manufacturer, or vendor of the defective product. Instead, strict liability is applicable to such entities which are a link in the chain of getting goods from the manufacturer to the ultimate user or consumer.” (Fortman v. Hemco (1989) 211 Cal.App.3d 241, 251.) Plaintiff alleges that “the subject laser did not contain adequate safety warnings, in that markings on the subject laser failed to clarify whether the subject laser was a Class IIIA laser or Class IIIB laser.” (Compl. ¶ 11.) Plaintiff alleges that the laser pointer used by Meyer was a Class IIIB laser, which is capable of burning materials and is unsafe for eye exposure. (Id., ¶ 10.)  

            a. Failure to Warn

            Amazon argues that the failure to warn claim fails because “there is no duty to warn of known risks or obvious dangers.” (Chavez v. Glock, Inc. (2012) 207 Cal.App.4th 1283, 1304.) Amazon relies on a case where the court dismissed a failure to warn claim filed by a victim who was struck by a pellet gun because the dangers of firing a pellet gun were obvious. (Holmes v. J. C. Penney Co. (1982) 133 Cal.App.3d 216, 220.) The court held that under those circumstances, a warning on the CO2 cartridges sold by JC Penny would have been futile. (Ibid.) Holmes is not comparable to this case, which involves a laser pointer, a generally innocuous product. Whether the laser pointer in this case presented an obvious danger is a factual issue that cannot be resolved at the pleading stage.

            Amazon next argues that the complaint does not actually allege a product defect because the laser pointer operated as designed by emitting a laser. Amazon contends that misuse of the laser by Meyer is not a product defect. However, the defect alleged in this claim is failure to warn. Even if the laser operated exactly as it was supposed to, the defect is that it contained no warning of the potential burn hazard of the laser emission.

            Lastly, Amazon argues that Plaintiff does not allege that a Class IIIB warning would have made a difference. Specifically, Amazon contends that Plaintiff must allege that Meyer would have abided by the hypothetical warning and refrained from aiming the laser at Plaintiff. For demurrer purposes, it can be reasonably inferred that an adequate warning would have deterred Meyer from aiming the laser at another individual. The complaint is read liberally, and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the complaint. It cannot be determined at the pleading stage whether Meyer would have acted differently had the laser contained a warning.

            b. Design/Manufacturing Defect

            Amazon argues that the complaint does not actually allege a product defect because the laser pointer operated as designed by emitting a laser. However, the complaint alleges that “the laser was defectively designed, manufactured, assembled and/or supplied since it created an unreasonable hazard such that the subject laser poses a burn hazard for exposed materials, including but not limited to eyes.” (Compl. ¶ 32.) Failing to emit a laser is not the only possible defect. Even if the pointer emits a laser, the emission could be overly powerful and pose a burn hazard. A reasonable consumer may not expect such a hazard from a simple laser pointer, and the risks of such a laser may outweigh its utility, thus constituting a design defect. (See Chavez, supra, 207 Cal.App.4th at p. 1303.) The laser may also have been defectively manufactured so as to emit a laser more powerful and hazardous than intended. (See Garcia v. Becker Bros. Steel Co. (2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 474, 482.) These are all facts which cannot be resolved at the pleading stage. The complaint alleges enough to place Amazon on notice. (See Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.)

            Amazon next argues that it cannot be held liable for the unforeseeable criminal acts of a third party. Amazon relies on Collins v. Navistar, Inc. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 1486, 1504-06, which itself relied on various cases to demonstrate when certain injuries are foreseeable. For example, where a tire failure left a motorist stranded and as a result of being stranded, the motorist was murdered by a criminal, the tire manufacturer was not liable for the death. (Stahlecker v. Ford Motor Co. (2003) 266 Neb. 601.) And a fertilizer manufacturer was held not liable for the use of its product in the Oklahoma City bombing. (Gaines-Tabb v. ICI Explosives USA (W.D.Okla. 1996) 995 F.Supp. 1304.) In each of these cases, the criminal acts of third parties constituted unforeseeable intervening causes, or “bizarre misuse.” (Collins, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 1506.)

            However, the mere fact that Meyer also committed a criminal act by misusing the product at issue here does not automatically render this case analogous to those other cases. In contrast to those cases, it is entirely foreseeable that a laser pointer would be aimed at another individual, either intentionally or inadvertently. A laser pointer is a simple device that is commonly used in settings where it could easily be aimed at another person, such as in classrooms or offices. It is not a bizarre misuse to point a laser pointer at an individual. The very purpose of a laser pointer is to emit a laser that can be aimed where the user desires. The wrongfulness or illegality of Meyer’s conduct does not affect its foreseeability. Contrary to Amazon’s contention, the complaint does allege that Amazon contributed to Plaintiff’s harm—by distributing a defectively powerful laser pointer that it knew constituted a burn hazard. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 31.)  

            In sum, the strict liability claims have been adequately pled.

II. Negligence

“The elements of a cause of action for negligence are: the defendant had a duty to use due care, that he [or she] breached that duty, and that the breach was the proximate or legal cause of the resulting injury.” (Vasquez v. Residential Investments, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 269, 278.)

Amazon argues that Plaintiff has not pled any facts demonstrating how Amazon caused Plaintiff’s harm because it was Meyer who aimed the laser at Plaintiff. While the law does not impose an affirmative duty to protect another, this principle generally refers to situations where the defendant is an innocent bystander who is not responsible for creating the peril. (See Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 214.) However, as discussed above, Amazon allegedly contributed to Plaintiff’s harm by distributing a defectively powerful laser pointer that it knew constituted a burn hazard. (See, e.g., Compl. ¶ 31.) It is foreseeable that distributing a defective laser would result in a buyer pointing the laser at another individual, causing injury. Under the facts alleged, Amazon is not some unrelated bystander who played no hand in creating Plaintiff’s harm. Amazon arguably owed a duty to Plaintiff due to the foreseeability of the injury. Therefore, the negligence claim is properly pled.

CONCLUSION

            Amazon’s demurrer is OVERRULED.