Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 21STCV30558, Date: 2023-03-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV30558    Hearing Date: March 15, 2023    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On August 18, 2021, Plaintiff Mark Baldwin initiated this employment action against Defendant Western Asset Management Company, LLC. Plaintiff alleges that he was improperly terminated after requesting medical leave and accommodation for his disability. The complaint asserts causes of action for (1) discrimination, (2) retaliation, (3) failure to prevent, (4) failure to accommodate, (5) failure to engage in the interactive process, (6) wrongful termination, (7) declaratory relief, and (8) injunctive relief.  

            Plaintiff began working for Defendant in 1998 as a Client Services and Marketing employee. In 2017, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Data Governance Analyst, where his supervisor was initially Ashley Hancock. Beginning December 2018, Plaintiff’s direct supervisor was Darcy Pauken, who reported to Hancock. Plaintiff began a leave of absence in May 2019 for stress and anxiety. Plaintiff’s doctors notified Defendant that Plaintiff’s work environment or location was causing psychological distress and recommended a change in position, location, or supervisor. After Plaintiff exhausted his FMLA and CRFA leave, Defendant determined that Plaintiff did not have a qualifying disability requiring further accommodation and requested Plaintiff return to work by the end of August 2019. When Plaintiff did not report to work accordingly, Defendant terminated him for abandonment.

            On July 27, 2022, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or adjudication, arguing that Plaintiff did not suffer from a qualifying disability because his inability to work stemmed solely from issues with a single supervisor, Ashley Hancock. Defendant maintains that it legitimately terminated Plaintiff for abandoning his employment. On November 4, 2022, the Court denied Defendant’s motion, finding triable issues as to whether Plaintiff suffered a qualifying disability. Among other things, Plaintiff relied on the assessment of Dr. Charles Unger, who provided a note to Defendant recommending leave for Plaintiff due to work-related stress. The Court found Dr. Unger’s assessment and others too ambiguous to preclude a triable issue over whether Plaintiff’s disability stemmed solely from his supervisor or from work in general.

After the Court’s ruling, Defendant deposed Dr. Unger, who testified that in his opinion, Plaintiff’s condition resulted from working with his boss more than the job itself. On December 28, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion for summary judgment or adjudication, once again arguing that Plaintiff does not suffer from a qualifying disability. Defendant’s motion is made on the grounds that Dr. Unger’s deposition testimony, along with a letter written by Dr. Unger obtained through subpoena, constitute new facts not previously considered.    

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Both parties’ objections are overruled.

DISCUSSION

I. New Facts or Law Justifying a Second Motion for Summary Judgment

As Defendant acknowledges, a party may not move for summary judgment based on previously addressed issues unless there are new facts or law to justify reconsideration of the argument. (Mtn. 13:20-24; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(f)(2).) The new facts that Defendant relies on in this motion are Dr. Unger’s testimony and letter. (Mtn. 13:24-14:3.) Dr. Unger’s opinion relates to the issue of whether Plaintiff’s disability stems purely from issues with his supervisor. Defendant presents no new facts or law on any other issue. Therefore, to the extent Defendant reiterates its arguments on those other issues in this motion, the Court’s prior ruling controls.

II. Qualifying Disability

“An employee's inability to work under a particular supervisor because of anxiety and stress related to the supervisor's standard oversight of the employee's job performance does not constitute a disability under FEHA.” (Higgins-Williams, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at p. 84, citing Hobson v. Raychem Corp. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 614, 628.) The plaintiff in Higgins-Williams did not suffer from a qualifying disability because her doctor expressly found that she suffered “stress when dealing with her Human Resources and her manager.” (Higgins-Williams, supra, 237 Cal.App.4th at pp. 84-85.)

In this case, the Court initially found that “the doctors’ notes never explicitly identify Plaintiff’s supervisor as the cause of Plaintiff’s stress and anxiety. Rather, they discuss Plaintiff’s stressful work environment or position, or being at work in general.” (November 4, 2022 Order re MSJ (MSJ Ruling) 4:16-18.) However, once Dr. Unger was deposed, he clarified that “it was my opinion working under his prior boss caused him a great deal of stress, and it doesn’t sound like a good idea to go back to work for that same individual since he did improve when he was not working under that individual.” (Def.’s Ex. P at 27:22-28:2.) Dr. Unger further opined, “it was the boss more than the work he was doing.” (Id. at 28:7-9.) Dr. Unger also wrote a letter to Defendant wherein he stated that Plaintiff was suffering “under his current position and boss.” (Def.’s Ex. Q.) The letter recommends, “I don't think he should ever return to work at his old position under his old boss . . . .” (Ibid.)

On the other hand, there is evidence that Plaintiff’s condition began in 2016, before working with Hancock. Notes from Dr. Megan Grossman diagnosed Plaintiff’s primary condition as anxiety and identified the “[d]ate of onset of this condition” as 2016. (Def.’s Ex. C.) Defendant confirms that this note was provided to it by Plaintiff’s physician and is maintained in its personnel records. (Twitchell Decl. ¶ 5.) Thus, Defendant was potentially put on notice that Plaintiff’s condition began before he worked with Hancock. In reply, Defendant relies on Arteaga v. Brink's, Inc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 327 for the proposition that “[e]ven if Plaintiff had anxiety in 2016, his medical diagnosis is insufficient to establish a disability in 2019.” (Reply 6:16-18.) However, the plaintiff in Arteaga “was diagnosed with carpal tunnel syndrome after leaving” employment, and “[t]he evidence establishe[d] he was not disabled before or during his employment.” (Arteaga, supra, 163 Cal.App.4th at p. 349.) By contrast, in this case, Defendant’s own records suggest that Plaintiff suffered from anxiety before working with Hancock, and Plaintiff provided notice of this while he was still employed. (Twitchell Decl. ¶ 5, Ex. C.)

Additionally, Plaintiff relies on the assessment of psychologist Dr. Anthony Reading, who reviewed Plaintiff’s history with psychiatric symptoms and prior treatments. Dr. Reading avers that at the time Plaintiff’s symptoms began, Plaintiff “was dealing with the effects of his divorce, his mother’s health issues and a demanding, problematic girlfriend.” (Reading Decl. ¶ 37.) Dr. Reading notes that work became more stressful for Plaintiff due to “underlying and ongoing anxiety symptoms.” (Ibid.) Dr. Reading’s analysis suggests that Plaintiff’s condition began prior to working with Hancock and was caused by other issues, though it may have been exacerbated by a stressful work environment.

Dr. Unger’s testimony only clarifies his own opinion, not that of the other doctors who also diagnosed Plaintiff. Dr. Grossman’s diagnosis, which Defendant has in its files, may still be interpreted to attribute Plaintiff’s condition to work in general and also suggests that Plaintiff’s condition began before Plaintiff reported to Hancock. (See Def.’s Ex. C.) This is a factual issue requiring resolution by a jury.  

Therefore, there are disputed issues of fact regarding whether Plaintiff suffers from a qualifying disability. Dr. Unger’s opinion contributes to this dispute and may bolster Defendant’s case, but it does not preclude a triable issue.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or adjudication is DENIED.