Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 21STCV31040, Date: 2023-03-06 Tentative Ruling



Case Number: 21STCV31040    Hearing Date: March 6, 2023    Dept: 32

 

OCTAVIO SUAREZ,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.,

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  21STCV31040

  Hearing Date:  March 6, 2023

 

     [TENTATIVE] order RE:

defendants’ demurrer to second amended complaint

 

 

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff Octavio Suarez initiated this action on August 23, 2021, filing a complaint for damages for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amended Complaint, filed May 12, 2022, alleged malicious prosecution in violation of Section 1983 against Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Detective Josue Torres, and Sergeant Jose Rojas.

            Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the murder of Miguel Herrera. Plaintiff alleges that he was misidentified by a witness to the incident. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully arrested and prosecuted. The information against Plaintiff was eventually dismissed, and he filed this action for malicious prosecution.

            On November 30, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend. The Court held that Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution was barred as a matter of law because good cause was found at the preliminary hearing in the criminal case. However, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend to assert false arrest.

            On December 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint, asserting (1) false arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) false arrest in violation of California Penal Code section 836. Per the Court’s order, Plaintiff asserts these claims only against Defendants Josue Torres and Jose Rojas, the officers responsible for his arrest.

            On January 30, 2023, Defendants Torres and Rojas filed the instant demurrer to the second cause of action in the SAC, arguing that Plaintiff’s assertion of a state law claim violates the Government Claims Act. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) A complaint will survive demurrer if it sufficiently apprises the defendant of the issues, and specificity is not required where discovery will clarify the ambiguities. (See Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the complaint. (Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 713.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (Beach Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)

DISCUSSION

            Under the Government Claims Act, “no suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .” (Gov. Code, § 945.4.) A plaintiff must commence an action within six months after notice of the rejection of their claim. (Id., § 945.6.) “[F]ailure to allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure to state a cause of action.” (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 211, 218.)

            Plaintiff alleges that he presented a claim to the County on January 21, 2021, which was rejected on April 8, 2021. (SAC ¶ 33.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Penal Code claim, filed December 29, 2022, violates the six-month statute of limitations. However, allegations in an amended complaint may relate back to a timely original complaint if they “(1) rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer to the same instrumentality, as the original one.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 409.) “An amended complaint relates back to an earlier complaint if it is based on the same general set of facts, even if the plaintiff alleges a different legal theory or new cause of action.” (Pointe San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves & Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 277.) “[T]he critical inquiry is whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original pleading.” (Ibid.) “Additionally, in applying the relation-back analysis, courts should consider the strong policy in this state that cases should be decided on their merits.” (Ibid.)

Here, Plaintiff filed the original complaint on August 23, 2021, within the six-month deadline. The original complaint, while labeled as one for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested without a warrant or probable cause. (See Compl. ¶ 9-11, 14-15.) Penal Code section 836 requires probable cause for a warrantless arrest. Therefore, the SAC does not assert new claims. Instead, it clarifies and narrows Plaintiff’s claims to false arrest and thereby relates back to the original complaint. Plaintiff’s attempt to seek recovery through a second legal theory does not run afoul of the statute of limitations because it is based on the exact same facts as the original complaint. There is no separate incident or arrest underlying the Penal Code claim. It is based on the same arrest underlying the original complaint. In other words, Plaintiff already asserted a timely claim based on his arrest by filing the original complaint. Plaintiff has not violated the statute of limitations by clarifying and narrowing his claims or asserting new legal theories to redress the same injury.

Defendants rely on caselaw holding that the filing of a state law claim does not toll the statute of limitations for a federal claim, and vice versa. (See, e.g., McMahon v. Albany Unified Sch. Dist. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292; Javor v. Taggart (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795, 804; Ervin v. Los Angeles County (9th Cir. 1988) 848 F.2d 1018, 1019-1020; Stone v. City and County of San Francisco (N.D. Cal. 1990) 735 F.Supp. 340, 345.) However, Plaintiff filed a timely complaint without the benefit of tolling. Additionally, cases discussing equitable tolling recognize that equitable tolling applies “to situations involving litigants who, possessing several legal remedies for the same harm, reasonably and in good faith pursued one.” (Loehr v. Ventura County Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1086.) On the other hand, “equitable tolling is inapplicable to a situation in which a plaintiff who allegedly suffered several different wrongs pursues only one remedy as to one of those wrongs.” (Ervin, supra, 848 F.2d at p. 1019.)

As discussed above, Plaintiff has different legal theories addressing the same harm. The original complaint already placed Defendants on notice that Plaintiff was accusing them of wrongfully arresting him without probable cause. The government claim accomplished the same by alleging that Defendants “unlawfully and wrongfully arrested and detained” Plaintiff. (See SAC, Ex. 1.) The SAC is based on the exact same arrest, i.e., the same harm or injury. Therefore, if equitable tolling applied to this case, it would allow Plaintiff to file the Penal Code claim.  

Although Plaintiff initially labeled his claim as one for malicious prosecution in violation of federal law, that does not necessarily limit his theories of recovery. It is the substance of a claim, not its formatting, that matters. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) The government claim and original complaint both substantively sought redress for Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest, even if they also erroneously sought recovery for malicious prosecution.    

            In sum, it is not apparent on the face of the complaint or from judicially noticeable materials that Plaintiff failed to comply with the Government Claims Act. Therefore, his complaint cannot be stricken on this basis.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer to the SAC is OVERRULED.