Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 21STCV31040, Date: 2023-03-06 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV31040 Hearing Date: March 6, 2023 Dept: 32
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OCTAVIO SUAREZ, Plaintiff, v. COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,
et al., Defendants.
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Case No.: 21STCV31040 Hearing Date: March 6, 2023 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: defendants’ demurrer to second amended
complaint |
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BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Octavio Suarez initiated
this action on August 23, 2021, filing a complaint for damages for violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amended Complaint, filed May 12, 2022, alleged
malicious prosecution in violation of Section 1983 against Defendants County of
Los Angeles, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Detective Josue Torres, and Sergeant
Jose Rojas.
Plaintiff was arrested and charged
with the murder of Miguel Herrera. Plaintiff alleges that he was misidentified
by a witness to the incident. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully arrested
and prosecuted. The information against Plaintiff was eventually dismissed, and
he filed this action for malicious prosecution.
On November 30, 2022, the Court granted
Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend. The Court
held that Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution was barred as a matter of
law because good cause was found at the preliminary hearing in the criminal
case. However, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend to assert false arrest.
On December 29, 2022, Plaintiff
filed the operative Second Amended Complaint, asserting (1) false arrest in
violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) false arrest in violation of California Penal
Code section 836. Per the Court’s order, Plaintiff asserts these claims only
against Defendants Josue Torres and Jose Rojas, the officers responsible for
his arrest.
On January 30, 2023, Defendants
Torres and Rojas filed the instant demurrer to the second cause of action in
the SAC, arguing that Plaintiff’s assertion of a state law claim violates the
Government Claims Act. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.
LEGAL STANDARD
A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether
the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering
demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water
and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer
proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper
judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests
the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153
Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the
face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the
complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of
action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th
at 747.) A complaint will survive demurrer if it sufficiently apprises the
defendant of the issues, and specificity is not required where discovery will
clarify the ambiguities. (See Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp.
(2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor
of the complaint. (Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 713.)
MEET AND CONFER
Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike,
the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who
filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to
strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through
a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised
in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendants
have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (Beach Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)
DISCUSSION
Under the Government Claims Act, “no
suit for money or damages may be brought against a public entity on a cause of
action for which a claim is required to be presented . . . until a written
claim therefor has been presented to the public entity and has been acted upon
by the board, or has been deemed to have been rejected by the board . . . .” (Gov.
Code, § 945.4.) A plaintiff must commence an action within six months after
notice of the rejection of their claim. (Id., § 945.6.) “[F]ailure to
allege facts demonstrating or excusing compliance with the claim presentation
requirement subjects a claim against a public entity to a demurrer for failure
to state a cause of action.” (Lowry v. Port San Luis Harbor Dist. (2020)
56 Cal.App.5th 211, 218.)
Plaintiff alleges that he presented
a claim to the County on January 21, 2021, which was rejected on April 8, 2021.
(SAC ¶ 33.) Defendants argue that Plaintiff’s Penal Code claim, filed December
29, 2022, violates the six-month statute of limitations. However, allegations
in an amended complaint may relate back to a timely original complaint if they “(1)
rest on the same general set of facts, (2) involve the same injury, and (3) refer
to the same instrumentality, as the original one.” (Norgart v. Upjohn Co.
(1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 409.) “An amended complaint relates back to an earlier
complaint if it is based on the same general set of facts, even if the
plaintiff alleges a different legal theory or new cause of action.” (Pointe
San Diego Residential Community, L.P. v. Procopio, Cory, Hargreaves &
Savitch, LLP (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 265, 277.) “[T]he critical inquiry is
whether the defendant had adequate notice of the claim based on the original
pleading.” (Ibid.) “Additionally, in applying the relation-back
analysis, courts should consider the strong policy in this state that
cases should be decided on their merits.” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiff filed the original
complaint on August 23, 2021, within the six-month deadline. The original
complaint, while labeled as one for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleged that
Plaintiff was wrongfully arrested without a warrant or probable cause. (See
Compl. ¶ 9-11, 14-15.) Penal Code section 836 requires probable cause for a
warrantless arrest. Therefore, the SAC does not assert new claims. Instead, it
clarifies and narrows Plaintiff’s claims to false arrest and thereby relates
back to the original complaint. Plaintiff’s attempt to seek recovery through a
second legal theory does not run afoul of the statute of limitations because it
is based on the exact same facts as the original complaint. There is no
separate incident or arrest underlying the Penal Code claim. It is based on the
same arrest underlying the original complaint. In other words, Plaintiff already
asserted a timely claim based on his arrest by filing the original complaint. Plaintiff
has not violated the statute of limitations by clarifying and narrowing his
claims or asserting new legal theories to redress the same injury.
Defendants rely on caselaw holding that
the filing of a state law claim does not toll the statute of limitations for a
federal claim, and vice versa. (See, e.g., McMahon v. Albany Unified
Sch. Dist. (2002) 104 Cal.App.4th 1275, 1292; Javor v. Taggart
(2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 795, 804; Ervin v. Los Angeles County (9th Cir.
1988) 848 F.2d 1018, 1019-1020; Stone v. City and County of San Francisco
(N.D. Cal. 1990) 735 F.Supp. 340, 345.) However, Plaintiff filed a timely
complaint without the benefit of tolling. Additionally, cases discussing
equitable tolling recognize that equitable tolling applies “to situations
involving litigants who, possessing several legal remedies for the same
harm, reasonably and in good faith pursued one.” (Loehr v. Ventura County
Community College Dist. (1983) 147 Cal.App.3d 1071, 1086.) On the other
hand, “equitable tolling is inapplicable to a situation in which a plaintiff
who allegedly suffered several different wrongs pursues only one remedy
as to one of those wrongs.” (Ervin, supra, 848 F.2d at p. 1019.)
As discussed above, Plaintiff has
different legal theories addressing the same harm. The original complaint already
placed Defendants on notice that Plaintiff was accusing them of wrongfully
arresting him without probable cause. The government claim accomplished the
same by alleging that Defendants “unlawfully and wrongfully arrested and
detained” Plaintiff. (See SAC, Ex. 1.) The SAC is based on the exact same
arrest, i.e., the same harm or injury. Therefore, if equitable tolling
applied to this case, it would allow Plaintiff to file the Penal Code claim.
Although Plaintiff initially labeled his
claim as one for malicious prosecution in violation of federal law, that does
not necessarily limit his theories of recovery. It is the substance of a claim,
not its formatting, that matters. (See Williams v. Beechnut Nutrition Corp.
(1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 135, 139, fn. 2.) The government claim and original
complaint both substantively sought redress for Plaintiff’s wrongful arrest,
even if they also erroneously sought recovery for malicious prosecution.
In sum, it is not apparent on the
face of the complaint or from judicially noticeable materials that Plaintiff failed
to comply with the Government Claims Act. Therefore, his complaint cannot be
stricken on this basis.
CONCLUSION
Defendants’ demurrer to the SAC is OVERRULED.