Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 21STCV31040, Date: 2023-08-11 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV31040    Hearing Date: August 11, 2023    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            Plaintiff Octavio Suarez initiated this action on August 23, 2021, filing a complaint for damages for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The First Amended Complaint, filed May 12, 2022, alleged malicious prosecution in violation of Section 1983 against Defendants County of Los Angeles, Los Angeles Sheriff’s Department, Detective Josue Torres, and Sergeant Jose Rojas.

            Plaintiff was arrested and charged with the murder of Miguel Herrera. Plaintiff alleges that he was misidentified by a witness to the incident. Plaintiff alleges that he was wrongfully arrested and prosecuted. The information against Plaintiff was eventually dismissed, and he filed this action for malicious prosecution.

            On November 30, 2022, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings with leave to amend. The Court held that Plaintiff’s claim for malicious prosecution was barred as a matter of law because good cause was found at the preliminary hearing in the criminal case. However, Plaintiff was granted leave to amend to assert false arrest.

            On December 29, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative Second Amended Complaint, asserting (1) false arrest in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and (2) false arrest in violation of California Penal Code section 836. Per the Court’s order, Plaintiff asserts these claims only against Defendants Josue Torres and Jose Rojas, the officers responsible for his arrest.

            On June 12, 2023, Defendants filed the instant motion for summary judgment or adjudication in the alternative. Plaintiff filed his opposition on July 28, 2023. Defendants replied on August 4, 2023.

LEGAL STANDARD

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.) “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.” (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67, citing FPI Development, Inc. v. Nakashima (1991) 231 Cal. App. 3d 367, 381-382.)

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the defendant moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to negate an essential element, or to establish a defense. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2); Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.) Once the defendant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto. To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.) Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.” (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

EVIDENTIARY OBJECTIONS

Plaintiff’s Objections to Defendants’ Evidence:

• Plaintiff’s objections are overruled.

Defendants’ Objections to Plaintiff’s Evidence:

• Objection Nos. 4-14 from the declaration of Octavio Suarez are overruled.
• Objection Nos. 2-9 from the declaration of Angelica Robles are overruled.
• The remaining objections are not material to the Court’s ruling. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(q).)

DISCUSSION

I. Probable Cause

            “A warrantless arrest must be supported by probable cause. Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade someone of ‘reasonable caution’ that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.” (People v. Espino (2016) 247 Cal.App.4th 746, 758-759, internal citations omitted.) “Because the issue of reasonable cause is an objective one, there can be no false arrest if the officers had at least one reasonable ground to arrest an individual, even if the officers' additional reasons were not valid.” (O'Toole v. Superior Court (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 488, 512.) “Where the facts are undisputed, the issue of reasonable cause for an arrest is a question of law.” (Id. at p. 511.)

            Plaintiff’s arrest stemmed from the assault of Miguel Herrera on the night of August 6, 2018. (Def.’s Stmnt. of Undisputed Facts (UF) 1-4.) Deputy Jorge Ortiz responded to the scene and spoke with witness Valdemar Navarrete. (UF 4-5.) Navarrete described the perpetrator as a Hispanic male, around 25 years old, with a thin build and curly blonde hair, wearing a white shirt and blue jeans. (UF 7.) Navarrete further told Deputy Ortiz that the perpetrator visited his mother, Angelica, at a nearby Cindy’s Party Rental store. (UF 8.)

            Defendant Torres communicated with Navarrete as part of his investigation, and Navarrete informed Torres that the perpetrator’s name was Octavio Suarez. (UF 12-13.) Torres then worked with an LASD gang detective and was advised that there was a Lennox 13 gang member by the name of Octavio Suarez, who had a mother named Angelica who worked at Cindy’s Party Rental. (UF 14.) The information that Torres gathered, including Plaintiff’s criminal history of robbery, mother’s information, and physical description, were consistent with the perpetrator who assaulted Herrera. (UF 16.) Torres prepared a six-pack photo lineup, from which Navarrete identified Plaintiff as Herrera’s assaulter. (UF 17-18.) Torres caused Plaintiff to be arrested on August 22, 2018. (UF 21.)  

            Plaintiff in fact has a mother named Angelica who worked at Cindy’s Party Rental around the time of the assault. (UF 26-27.) Plaintiff is a Hispanic male, approximately 5 feet 6 inches tall, weighing about 140 pounds. (UF 32.) Plaintiff was 20 years old at the time of his arrest. (Ibid.)

            The above evidence objectively provides probable cause for Plaintiff’s arrest, regardless of whether Plaintiff actually committed the crime. In particular, “[i]t is reasonable for police officers to act upon identification by an observer of the commission of an offense.” (People v. Livingston (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 630, 635.) Here, it is undisputed that Navarrete identified Plaintiff from a six-pack photo lineup. (UF 18.) Plaintiff disputes Torres’s characterization of Plaintiff’s photo as a booking photo from an arrest, arguing that he had never been previously arrested by LASD as an adult. (Suarez Decl. ¶¶ 12-13.) However, Torres did not necessarily obtain the photo from an LASD arrest. More importantly, Plaintiff does not dispute that it is indeed him in the photo and that Navarrete did in fact identify him. Therefore, the precise source of the photo is not a material fact.

            Plaintiff also disputes Navarrete’s description of him as having curly blonde hair. Plaintiff avers that he has always had straight black hair. (Plntf.’s Resp. to UF 20.) This is not a material distinction because Navarrete later identified Plaintiff from the six-pack even though Plaintiff had black hair in the photo. (See Def.’s Ex. 5, 6.) Navarrete’s purportedly inaccurate description to Deputy Ortiz does not negate the probable cause established by a positive identification in the presence of Torres. (See O'Toole, supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p. 512 [officers only need one basis for probable cause, even if other bases prove to be invalid].) The magistrate from the preliminary hearing found sufficient cause to hold Plaintiff over for trial despite acknowledging the discrepancy in the description of Plaintiff’s hair, due to Navarrete’s independent positive identification. (Prelim. Transcript at 96:15-97:7.)

            Plaintiff also denies ever being a gang member or a part of the Lennox 13 gang. (Plntf.’s Resp. to UF 14, 16.) However, it is not dispositive whether Plaintiff was actually in a gang. Regardless of Plaintiff’s true status as a gang member or not, it is undisputed that Torres received information indicating someone named Octavio Suarez in the Lennox 13 gang, with information matching the description provided by Navarrete. (UF 14, 16.) This supports Torres’s objective belief that Plaintiff was responsible for assaulting Herrera. “It is well settled that an officer may reasonably rely on information received through official channels to support an arrest. An officer may rely on information from other officers within his or her own department and from other departments and jurisdictions.” (People v. Alcorn (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 652, 655.)

            Lastly, Plaintiff disputes that Navarrete provided Plaintiff’s name to Torres, arguing that Navarrete admitted in testimony that he did not tell Torres what Plaintiff’s name was. (Plntf.’s Resp. to UF 12-13.) Navarrete testified that when Torres visited him on August 15, 2018 to present him with the six-pack, they did not discuss any names. (Plntf.’s Ex. A at 52:2-28.) Navarrete did not testify that he never provided Torres with Plaintiff’s name. Navarrete’s testimony does not preclude the possibility that he told Torres the name in a phone call at some other time. (See Torres Decl. ¶ 7.) The evidence is not contradictory and does not raise a triable issue of material fact.    

            In sum, the undisputed evidence establishes as a matter of law that Defendants had probable cause to arrest Plaintiff. The factual disputes that Plaintiff raises are not disputes of material fact that alter the existence of probable cause. For this reason, summary judgment is proper.

II. Collateral Estoppel

“The doctrine of collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings. A prior determination by a tribunal will be given collateral estoppel effect when (1) the issue is identical to that decided in a former proceeding; (2) the issue was actually litigated and (3) necessarily decided; (4) the doctrine is asserted against a party to the former action or one who was in privity with such a party; and (5) the former decision is final and was made on the merits. Federal and state courts have consistently held that the doctrine of collateral estoppel may preclude relitigation in a civil suit of issues that were decided in a prior criminal proceeding.” (Greene, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at pp. 932-33.)

            “As a general rule, each of these requirements will be met when courts are asked to give preclusive effect to preliminary hearing probable cause findings in subsequent civil actions for false arrest and malicious prosecution.” (Wige v. City of L.A. (9th Cir. 2013) 713 F.3d 1183, 1185.) “The quantum of evidence required to support a warrantless arrest is the same as the quantum of evidence required to hold the defendant to stand trial.” (McCutchen v. City of Montclair (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1138, 1146.) “Since a decision to hold the defendant over for trial requires a ruling on the sufficiency of the evidence, absent a showing to the contrary the issue of probable cause to arrest will typically be actually litigated and necessarily decided at the preliminary hearing.” (Id. at p. 1147.)

            Here, the magistrate at the preliminary hearing found sufficient cause to hold Plaintiff over for trial despite acknowledging Navarrete’s initial description of Plaintiff as having blonde hair. As discussed above, the magistrate found sufficient cause because Navarrete independently identified Plaintiff while Plaintiff had black hair.

            Plaintiff argues that the issue of probable cause to arrest was not actually litigated at the preliminary hearing because Torres did not testify at the hearing and could not be cross-examined. Plaintiff cites no legal authority for the proposition that the absence of the arresting officer at a preliminary hearing precludes application of collateral estoppel. None of the cases dealing with this issue relied on the arresting officer’s presence as a dispositive factor in applying or not applying collateral estoppel.

            Because the magistrate at the preliminary hearing found sufficient cause to hold Plaintiff over for trial, that finding serves as collateral estoppel on the issue of probable cause for false arrest. (See McCutchen, supra, 73 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1146-47.) Accordingly, Plaintiff’s claim for false arrest fails as a matter of law for this independent reason.

III. Qualified Immunity

            “An officer who makes an arrest without probable cause . . . may still be entitled to qualified immunity if he reasonably believed there to have been probable cause.” (Rosenbaum v. Washoe County (9th Cir. 2011) 663 F.3d 1071, 1076.) “[A]n official is not entitled to qualified immunity where ‘every reasonable official’ would have understood that he was violating a clearly established right.” (Id. at p. 1078, citing Ashcroft v. al-Kidd (2011) 563 U.S. 731, 741.)

            Based upon the foregoing, Defendants are entitled to qualified immunity.

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is GRANTED.