Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 22STCV00987, Date: 2022-10-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV00987    Hearing Date: October 5, 2022    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On January 10, 2022, Plaintiff Damia Young filed this action against Defendant Alexandria Apartments LLC, asserting (1) breach of habitability, (2) private nuisance, (3) negligence, (4) breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment, and (5) violation of the Business and Professions Code. The complaint arises from an alleged bedbug infestation in Plaintiff’s unit. On July 8, 2022, Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) A complaint will survive demurrer if it sufficiently apprises the defendant of the issues, and specificity is not required where discovery will clarify the ambiguities. (See Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the complaint. (Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 713.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Pitoun Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)

DISCUSSION

I. Demurrer

            a. Breach of the Warranty of Habitability

            “[T]here is a warranty of habitability implied in residential leases in California.” (Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1296.) “The elements of such an affirmative claim are the existence of a material defective condition affecting the premises' habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a reasonable time after the tenant's discovery of the condition, the landlord was given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” (Id. at p. 1297.)

            The complaint alleges as follows: “In early February 2021, Plaintiff noticed the presence of bedbugs at the Subject Property. The pests bit Plaintiff and infested Plaintiff’s personal property, resulting in damage that necessitated that Plaintiff dispose of it. Defendants knew about, but refused to adequately treat, the bedbug problem at the Subject Property within a reasonable time.” (Compl. ¶ 16.) “The defective conditions alleged herein constituted, and continue to constitute, violations of state and local housing laws and posed, and continue to pose, severe health, safety and fire hazards, constituting a continuing breach of the warranty of habitability.” (Id., ¶ 20.) “Defendants had actual and constructive notice of the defective conditions alleged herein, but despite such notice, failed to adequately repair and abate the conditions at the Subject Property.” (Id., ¶ 21.)

            Defendant argues that the claim is inadequately pled because the complaint lacks facts identifying which state and local laws were violated and fails to articulate the hazards posed by bedbugs. (Dem. 3:14-4:6.) However, the breach of habitability does not require a statutory violation, and no specific statute needs to be identified. The hazards of bedbugs may be inferred at the pleading stage, and Plaintiff alleges that he was physically injured. Ultimately, the complaint contains sufficient facts to infer a breach of the implied covenant and to place Defendant on notice of the issues. The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the first cause of action.

            b. Private Nuisance

            “Anything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) “It is settled that where conduct which violates a duty owed to another also interferes with that party's free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” (Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1390.)

            The alleged bedbug infestation satisfies the standard for nuisance. It is injurious to health and interfered with Plaintiff’s use of property. Defendant argues that the complaint’s section on nuisance contains no facts establishing the actual damages caused and that this cause of action merely repeats the negligence claim. (Dem. 4:15-5:8.)

            However, the complaint must be read as a whole, and the nuisance cause of action incorporates previously alleged facts. (Compl. ¶ 27.) Plaintiff has alleged damages in the form of physical and mental injury and property damage. (Id., ¶¶ 16, 18.) The precise extent of the damage can be established in discovery. Defendant cites no authority for the proposition that the nuisance claim should be barred because it utilizes the same facts as the negligence claim. In fact, “[a] plaintiff may plead cumulative or inconsistent causes of action.” (Gherman v. Colburn (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 544, 565.) The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the second cause of action.

            c. Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

            “[E]very lease contains an implied covenant of quiet enjoyment.” (Erlach, supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at p. 1300.) The covenant “insulates the tenant against any act or omission on the part of the landlord, or anyone claiming under him, which interferes with a tenant’s right to use and enjoy the premises for the purposes contemplated by the tenancy.” (Ibid.)

            Defendant argues that the claim fails because Plaintiff has admittedly remained in possession of the premises. (Dem. 5:15-6:8.) However, an action for breach of the covenant of quiet enjoyment does not require the tenant to vacate the premises. (See Andrews v. Mobile Aire Estates (2005) 125 Cal.App.4th 578, 590 [recognizing that “a tenant may elect to stand upon the lease, remain in possession and sue for breach of contract damages”]; Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 292 [acknowledging that “some authorities recognize that a tenant may sue for breach of the covenant while remaining in possession”].) The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fourth cause of action.

            d. UCL

Business and Professions Code section 17200 prohibits unlawful, unfair, or fraudulent business acts or practices. Each of the three prongs is an independent basis for relief. (Smith v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 700, 718.) Unlawful conduct is defined as any practice forbidden by law. (Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 377, 383.) UCL actions alleging unlawful conduct “borrow” from other statutes or common law causes of action outside Section 17200. (Klein v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1383.)

As discussed herein, the complaint properly pleads various causes of action, which can serve as the predicate for a UCL claim. (See Klein, supra, 202 Cal.App.4th at p. 1383.) Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant overcharged for rent while refusing to address the deplorable conditions of the premises. (Compl. ¶ 25.) This is arguably an unfair business practice under the UCL’s broad definition. (See In re Tobacco Cases II (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 779, 789 [recognizing UCL’s broad scope and sweeping coverage].) The demurrer is OVERRULED as to the fifth cause of action.

II. Motion to Strike

            a. Punitive Damages

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).)

            As discussed above, the complaint adequately alleges that Defendant was on notice of the uninhabitable condition of the premises and failed to take any action, instead continuing to profit off of Plaintiff’s rent payments. This sufficiently establishes an inference of malice to support punitive damages. The motion to strike is DENIED as to punitive damages.

            b. Attorneys’ Fees

“Except as attorney’s fees are specifically provided for by statute, the measure and mode of compensation of attorneys and counselors at law is left to the agreement, express or implied, of the parties . . . .” (Code Civ. Proc., § 1021.) Thus, a plaintiff must set forth a statutory or contractual basis for attorney’s fees in order to recover such fees.  

The complaint lacks allegations supporting either a contractual or statutory basis for attorneys’ fees. Plaintiff offers no opposition to this particular contention. The motion to strike is GRANTED as to attorneys’ fees.

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s demurrer is OVERRULED. Defendant’s motion to strike is GRANTED as to attorneys’ fees and DENIED as to punitive damages.