Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 22STCV26562, Date: 2024-04-03 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV26562    Hearing Date: April 3, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On August 16, 2022, Plaintiff Dominique Louissaint filed this employment discrimination action against Defendant County of Los Angeles. Plaintiff, an African-American nurse in the Department of Health Services, alleges that she has been routinely denied promotion on the basis of her race. Plaintiff additionally alleges that she has been subjected to retaliation for reporting unlawful hiring practices.

            On January 22, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant three motions to compel further responses to form interrogatories, special interrogatories, and requests for production. Defendant filed its oppositions on March 20, 2024. Plaintiff filed her replies on March 26, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

Upon receiving responses to its discovery requests, the propounding party may move for an order compelling further responses if the responses are incomplete or evasive, or objections are without merit or too general. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(a), 2031.310(a), 2033.290(a).)

MEET AND CONFER

A motion to compel further must be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration demonstrating an attempt to resolve the matter informally. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 2030.300(b)(1), 2031.310(b), 2033.290(b).)

Defendant served its discovery responses on October 17, 2023. (Simms Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff sent a meet and confer letter on November 22, 2023 with an extension of time to respond. (Simms Decl. ¶ 9.) Defendant agreed to serve supplemental responses, with a corresponding extension of time for Plaintiff to file motions to compel. (Id., ¶ 10.) Plaintiff granted two more extensions in December 2023 and January 2024, with the last deadline being January 16, 2024. (Id., ¶¶ 11-13.) Defendant supplemented some responses but not the ones at issue in this motion. (Id., ¶ 14.) On January 18, 2024, Plaintiff proposed an informal discovery conference (IDC), but Defendant refused. (Id., ¶ 15.)

Defendant argues that Plaintiff failed to meet and confer because she only sent one letter back in November 2023 and filed this motion without any further correspondence. However, Plaintiff’s November 2023 letter sufficiently sets forth Plaintiff’s contentions with regards to the discovery requests at issue. The parties also maintained contact afterwards and agreed on multiple further extensions for Defendant to respond. Plaintiff then proposed an IDC to resolve outstanding issues. Given these circumstances, Plaintiff was not required to reiterate her position in a second letter. The Court finds that Plaintiff has satisfied the meet and confer requirement.   

DISCUSSION

I. Form Interrogatories

An answer to an interrogatory must be as complete and straightforward as possible. (Code Civ. Proc., § 2030.220(a).) A party “is entitled to demand answers to its interrogatories, as a matter of right . . . [and] the burden of justifying any objection and failure to respond remains at all times with the party resisting an interrogatory.” (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 541.) Form Interrogatories are drafted and approved by the Judicial Council and seek basic information fundamental to routine discovery. (See Puerto, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 1250.)

Other than its objection based on vagueness, Defendant does not attempt to justify any of the objections it asserted in response to the subject FROGs. Instead, Defendant argues that the motion is frivolous and moot because Plaintiff failed to meet and confer, and Defendant has served supplemental responses. As discussed above, Plaintiff properly met and conferred prior to filing this motion. The motion is not frivolous just because Defendant served supplemental responses; Defendant only served those responses after Plaintiff filed this motion, demonstrating that the motion was indeed necessary to obtain proper responses. The supplemental responses are not at issue in this motion and have no bearing on the Court’s ruling.

            As to vagueness, Defendant argues that the requests failed to define the term “incident.” However, the FROGs clearly define “incident” as “the circumstances and events surrounding the alleged accident, injury, or other occurrence or breach of contract giving rise to this action or proceeding.” (Simms Decl., Ex. A.) This is a standard definition included in the FROGs drafted by the Judicial Council and is not vague or ambiguous. Defendant is readily capable of reading the complaint and determining the occurrences and injuries giving rise to this action.

II. Special Interrogatories

            As discussed above, Defendant’s arguments regarding meet and confer and supplemental responses are without merit. Defendant stands on its objections based on privacy, relevance, and vagueness.

            a. Privacy

            “The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious.” (Williams v. Sup. Ct. (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552.) The party seeking discovery need not demonstrate a compelling need for the information unless there is “an obvious invasion of an interest fundamental to personal autonomy.” (Id. at p. 556.)

SROG No. 11 asked Defendant to identify all employees working under the same supervisor as Plaintiff who were also reprimanded at the same time as Plaintiff. Defendant fails to demonstrate a reasonable expectation of privacy in mere identifying information, nor does Defendant show that discovery of this information constitutes a serious intrusion. “The disclosure of the names and addresses of potential witnesses is a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery.” (Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249-50.)

b. Relevance

“[A]ny party may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.010.) “‘Relevant’ evidence is evidence ‘having any tendency in reason to prove or disprove any disputed fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action.’” (D.Z. v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 210, 229.)

Given this broad standard of relevance, and the routine nature of witness information, the identifying information sought by the SROGs is relevant.

c. Vagueness

Where “the nature of the information sought is apparent, the proper solution is to provide an appropriate response,” even if “the question is somewhat ambiguous.” (Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, 783.)

Defendant argues that the SROGs are ambiguous because they do not clearly define the term “reprimand.” This is not a credible objection. Given Defendant’s position as an employer, and the nature of the allegations, Defendant clearly understands what is meant by “reprimand.”

III. Requests for Production

The party seeking production of documents bears the initial burden of showing good cause through a fact-specific showing of relevance. (Kirkland v. Superior Court (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 92, 98.) Once this showing is made, the burden shifts to the responding party to justify any objections. (Ibid.) 

Plaintiff’s separate statement sufficiently sets forth good cause for the requests at issue. As discussed above, Defendant’s arguments regarding meet and confer and supplemental responses are without merit. Defendant only stands on its privilege objection as it pertains to RFP No. 19. However, Defendant voluntarily produced documents responsive to RFP No. 19 once a protective order was in place, thus Defendant’s privilege concerns appear to have been assuaged. Otherwise, there is no real dispute that good cause exists for the subject RFPs, or that Defendant’s initial responses were inadequate.

IV. Sanctions

            Defendant’s failure to properly respond is not supported by substantial justification. As such, sanctions are warranted. Plaintiff’s counsel’s hourly rate is $395, which is reasonable. (See Simms Decl. ¶ 2.) Given the simplicity of the motions, the Court finds that 4 hours total is reasonable. Therefore, sanctions are awarded in the amount of $1,580.

CONCLUSION

            Plaintiff’s motions to compel further responses are GRANTED. The Court sanctions Defendant and its counsel in the total amount of $1,580, to be paid within 30 days.