Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 22STCV34515, Date: 2023-02-15 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV34515    Hearing Date: February 15, 2023    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            On October 28, 2022, Plaintiff Pamela Manuel filed this action against Defendant Rita L. Wright arising from a landlord-tenant dispute. The complaint asserts (1) breach of the warranty of habitability, (2) specific performance of negligent maintenance of premises, (3) nuisance, (4) abating nuisance, (5) breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, (6) intentional or reckless infliction of emotional distress, and (7) unfair business practices.

            The complaint stems from multiple alleged uninhabitable conditions, including rodent and insect infestations, defective wiring, defective flooring, defective plumbing, mold, and unmaintained outside grounds. (Compl. ¶ 9.)

            On January 10, 2023, Defendant filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike. Plaintiff has not filed an opposition.

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part of that pleading. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435, subd. (b).) The court may, upon a motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike (1) any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading and (2) all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Id., § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Id., § 437.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendant has complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Prado Decl. ¶¶ 3-5.)

DISCUSSION

I. Specific Performance of Negligent Maintenance

            In the second cause of action, labeled “Specific Performance of Negligent Maintenance of Premises,” Plaintiff seeks “an order compelling defendants to abate the nuisance.” (Compl. ¶ 19.) However, the fourth cause of action is for an order abating the nuisance. (Id., ¶¶ 23-25.) A duplicative pleading may be properly stricken. (Award Metals, Inc. v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1128, 1135.) A pleading is duplicative if it “adds nothing to the complaint by way of fact or theory.” (Ibid.) Though labeled differently, the second cause of action duplicates the relief sought in the fourth cause of action, relies on the same facts, and presents no distinct legal theory. Therefore, the demurrer to the second cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

II. Nuisance

             “Anything which is injurious to health . . . or is indecent or offensive to the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property . . . is a nuisance.” (Civ. Code, § 3479.) “It is settled that where conduct which violates a duty owed to another also interferes with that party's free use and enjoyment of his property, nuisance liability arises.” (Cutujian v. Benedict Hills Estates Assn. (1996) 41 Cal.App.4th 1379, 1390.) “Nuisance liability is not necessarily based on negligence . . . However, ‘where liability for the nuisance is predicated on the omission of the owner of the premises to abate it, rather than on his having created it, then negligence is said to be involved . . . .’” (City of Pasadena v. Superior Court (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 1228, 1236, quoting Lussier v. San Lorenzo Valley Water Dist. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 92, 103-05.)

The third cause of action seeks damages for nuisance, while the fourth cause of action seeks an order abating the nuisance. (Compl. ¶¶ 21-25.) The property is alleged to have suffered from rodent and insect infestations, defective wiring, defective flooring, defective plumbing, mold, and unmaintained outside grounds. (Id., ¶ 9.) Plaintiff has allegedly requested Defendant to repair the premises since January 2018, but Defendant allegedly failed to correct the conditions. (Id., ¶¶ 10, 12.)  

            Defendant argues that the complaint lacks facts demonstrating what Defendant did or did not do to cause interference with Plaintiff’s use of the property. However, the allegations discussed above detail the precise conditions which Defendant allegedly knew about and failed to fix. The alleged conditions could have interfered with Plaintiff’s use of the property.

            Defendant also argues that the complaint does not specifically list the elements of negligence. However, a complaint is not required to recite the elements of a cause of action. The facts alleged are sufficient to establish that Defendant acted negligently in failing to address the defective conditions, which in turn supports a claim for nuisance by omission. (See City of Pasadena, supra, 228 Cal.App.4th at p. 1236.) The nuisance claim does not duplicate a negligence claim, as Plaintiff has not asserted a negligence claim, and Defendant is the one who argues that nuisance by omission must be based on negligence.  

            The demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action is OVERRULED.

III. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

Defendant correctly argues that the complaint fails to allege severe emotional distress. Plaintiff merely alleges that she “has suffered extreme mental anguish and emotional distress . . . .” (Compl. ¶ 28.) These conclusory allegations are insufficient to state a cause of action for IIED. Therefore, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is SUSTAINED without leave to amend.

IV. Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“The covenant of good faith and fair dealing, implied by law in every contract, exists merely to prevent one contracting party from unfairly frustrating the other party’s right to receive the benefits of the agreement actually made.” (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 349-50.)

Defendant contends that the facts in the complaint are insufficient. However, as discussed above, the complaint alleges that Defendant has been on notice of various defective conditions since 2018 and has failed to remediate them. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Bad faith may be reasonably inferred from a knowing failure to fix uninhabitable conditions for years. Therefore, the demurrer to the sixth cause of action is OVERRULED.

V. Punitive Damages

“In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” (Civ. Code, § 3294, subd. (a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id., subd. (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id., subd. (c)(2).)

As discussed above, the allegations establish that Defendant was put on notice of uninhabitable conditions since at least 2018 but failed to address them. (Compl. ¶ 10.) These conditions consist of rodent and insect infestations, defective wiring, defective flooring, defective plumbing, mold, and unmaintained outside grounds. (Id., ¶ 9.) Ignoring defects and causing a tenant to live in such conditions sufficiently constitutes a conscious disregard of Plaintiff’s rights and subjecting Plaintiff to unjust hardship. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 3294(c).)

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s demurrer is SUSTAINED in part as set forth above without leave to amend. Defendant’s motion to strike is DENIED.