Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 22STCV39267, Date: 2024-02-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV39267    Hearing Date: February 21, 2024    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            This employment discrimination action was initiated on December 19, 2022. On January 10, 2023, Plaintiffs Chris Grant, Jorge Sandoval, and Bertha Parra filed the operative First Amended Complaint against Defendant City of Azusa, asserting causes of action for (1) harassment, (2) discrimination, (3) FEHA retaliation, (4) whistleblower retaliation, (5) failure to take corrective action, (6) violation of POBR, and (7) failure to accommodate.

            Plaintiffs Sandoval and Parra are Hispanic and allege that they were harassed and discriminated against due to their race. Parra additionally alleges harassment and discrimination based on her gender. Grant and Sandoval are also over 40 and disabled. Plaintiffs additionally allege discrimination and retaliation because they associated with and resisted the discrimination of Hispanic and female coworkers.

            On January 23, 2024, Defendant filed the instant Pitchess motion for the disclosure of Plaintiff Parra’s personnel records from the Riverside County District Attorney’s Office (RCDA), her current employer. Plaintiff filed her opposition on February 6, 2024. Defendant filed its reply on February 13, 2024.

LEGAL STANDARD

In general, the personnel records of peace officers are protected from discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 832.7. The exclusive means for obtaining these materials is through a Pitchess motion. (County of Los Angeles v. Superior Court (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 1605, 1611.) A Pitchess motion shall (1) identify the proceeding in which discovery or disclosure is sought, the party seeking discovery or disclosure, the peace or custodial officer whose records are sought, the governmental agency which has custody and control of the record, and the time and place at which the motion for discovery or disclosure shall be heard, (2) describe the type of records or information sought, and (3) present affidavits showing good cause for the discovery or disclosure sought. (Evid. Code, § 1043, subd. (b).)

The standard of “good cause” required for Pitchess disclosure is “relatively relaxed” to “insure the production” for trial court review of “all potentially relevant documents.” (People v. Gaines (2009) 46 Cal.4th 172, 179.) Good cause for discovery exists when the party shows (1) materiality to the subject matter of the pending litigation and (2) a reasonable belief that the agency has the type of information sought. (Becerrada v. Superior Court (2005) 131 Cal.App.4th 409, 413.) A sufficient threshold showing is established if the party seeking records demonstrates through affidavits a “plausible factual foundation” for how the records are material to the subject matter of the pending litigation. (Riske v. Superior Court (2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 647, 655.)

If the trial court finds good cause for the discovery, it reviews the pertinent documents in chambers and discloses only that information falling within the statutorily defined standards of relevance. (Evid. Code, § 1045; Warrick v. Superior Court (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1011, 1027.)

DISCUSSION

Defendant seeks the disclosure of the following information provided by Plaintiff Parra when applying for her current position within the RCDA’s Office: (1) her reasons for leaving her employment with the City of Azusa Police Department (Azusa PD); (2) whether she

received positive performance reviews, promotions, special assignments, and increases in

compensation while at the Azusa PD; (3) whether she received discipline, counselling, or

negative performance reviews at the Azusa PD; (4) whether, and why, she disagreed with any

discipline or negative reviews; (5) whether she believed, and why, any discipline, negative reviews, or other conduct at the Azusa PD was discriminatory or harassing; (6) whether she was

planning to sue the City of Azusa; (7) any physical symptoms that she alleges she

experienced because of working conditions at the Azusa PD; and (8) any documents

showing what compensation she has received and is currently receiving as an employee of the

RCDA.

            Defendant argues that this information is relevant to Plaintiff’s claim that she was forced to quit her employment at the Azusa PD because of alleged intolerable working conditions. According to Defendant, “[i]t is reasonable to expect that Parra would have disclosed to the Riverside DA investigator, at the time of her application and intake investigation, information relevant to her reasons for leaving the Azusa PD and statements related to her allegations in this lawsuit.” (Mtn. 9:4-6.) Plaintiff argues that her subjective views are irrelevant because constructive termination is assessed objectively.

            Defendant has sufficiently articulated good cause to the extent of information about Plaintiff’s prior employment at Azusa PD, including her reasons for quitting. Plaintiff’s views regarding her time at Azusa PD are probative to the issue of intolerable working conditions, even if her subjective opinion may not be dispositive. Information regarding Plaintiff’s compensation is also relevant to Plaintiff’s claims for lost wages and future earnings.   

CONCLUSION

            Defendant’s Pitchess motion is GRANTED as to information regarding Plaintiff’s prior employment at Azusa PD, including her reasons for leaving, and information pertaining to Plaintiff’s salary. The Court will conduct an in camera hearing in accordance with statutory requirements.