Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 22STCV41020, Date: 2023-08-16 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV41020 Hearing Date: March 25, 2024 Dept: 32
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NICHOLAS SABBAGH, Plaintiff, v. CULVER 12 LLC, Defendant.
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Case No.: 22STCV38373 Hearing Date: March 25, 2024 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: plaintiff’s and cross-defendants’ motion
for protective order |
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BACKGROUND
On December 8, 2022, Plaintiff
Nicholas Sabbagh filed this action against Defendant Culver 12 LLC, alleging
causes of action for (1) unlawful retention of security deposit, (2) breach of
lease, (3) negligence, and (4) conversion. Plaintiff alleges that he rented a
unit from Defendant and paid a $15,000 security deposit which was supposed to
be returned upon termination of the tenancy. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant
improperly applied expenses against the deposit, resulting in nothing being
returned to Plaintiff. Plaintiff alleges that this amounts to theft of the
security deposit.
On January 5, 2023, Defendant Culver
filed a cross-complaint against Plaintiff, Sachin Tejas Bettadapur, Alexander
Amir Rassouli, and Ashan Naik, alleging breach of lease. Plaintiff and the
other Cross-Defendants resided in the same unit. Culver alleges that the
tenants caused extensive damages to the unit which required more than $18,000
to repair. Culver therefore applied the full security deposit of $15,000
towards the repair. The tenants also allegedly kept a dog in violation of the
no-pet provision in the lease. Culver sues for the damage caused to the
premises by the tenants and their dog.
On March 15, 2023, Bettadapur,
Rassouli, and Naik, the tenants who shared the unit with Plaintiff, filed their
own cross-complaint against Culver, which is substantively identical to
Plaintiff’s complaint.
On February 5, 2024, the Court
granted Culver’s motion to compel further depositions of the tenants on the
grounds that relevant text messages between the tenants were produced without
an opportunity for Culver to question the tenants about them.
On February 28, 2024, Plaintiff and
the other tenants (Moving Parties) filed the instant motion for a protective
order limiting the scope of the depositions. Culver filed its opposition on
March 12, 2024, and Moving Parties filed their reply on the same day.
LEGAL STANDARD
“The court shall limit the scope of
discovery if it determines that the burden, expense, or intrusiveness of that
discovery clearly outweighs the likelihood that the information sought will
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. The court may make this
determination pursuant to a motion for protective order by a party or other
affected person.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 2017.020(a).) “The issuance and
formulation of protective orders are to a large extent discretionary.” (Nativi
v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 316.) “[T]he
burden is on the party seeking the protective order to show good cause for
whatever order is sought.” (Id. at p. 318.)
DISCUSSION
In its February 5, 2024 order, the
Court made the following pertinent findings. Bettadapur and Naik were deposed
without any of the subject messages being produced prior to or during the
depositions. The subject messages were produced minutes before Rassouli’s
deposition and one day before Plaintiff’s deposition.
Moving Parties argue that Plaintiff
and Rassouli need not be further deposed at all because the new messages were
produced before their depositions, and no new messages have been produced since
then. Moving Parties also argue that the further depositions of Bettadapur and
Naik should be limited to the newly produced communications because that was
Culver’s stated purpose for seeking further depositions in the first place.
Culver argues that this motion is an improper attempt at seeking
reconsideration of the Court’s February 5 order and that Moving Parties did in
fact produce additional communications after Plaintiff and Rassouli were
deposed.
First, this motion does not seek to
relitigate the February 5 ruling, but rather to clarify the scope of the
depositions that were ordered. Second, the Court agrees with Moving Parties
that the depositions should be limited to the newly produced communications.
That was the basis for the Court granting Culver’s motion in the first place. Culver
did not contend otherwise in moving to compel further depositions, and it
cannot contend now that it is somehow entitled to depose Moving Parties about
any topic whatsoever. Culver already had a fair opportunity to depose Moving
Parties on other topics. Therefore, further depositions are limited to the
topic of communications that were produced after the initial depositions.
The remaining dispute is whether
Moving Parties produced additional communications after Plaintiff and Rassouli
were deposed, such that those two need to be further deposed along with
Bettadapur and Naik. Culver contends that on February 22, 2024, after Plaintiff
and Rassouli were deposed, Moving Parties produced 120 pages of text messages.
(Shabel Decl. ¶ 7, Ex. 4.) Moving Parties respond that 88 of those 120 pages
were merely duplicates of previously-produced documents. (Verdun Decl. ¶ 3.)
Moving Parties further clarify that the remaining 32 pages are the same text
messages that were produced shortly prior to the depositions of Plaintiff and
Rassouli, but this time from Bettadapur’s phone. (Id., ¶¶ 5-6.) Because
no new substance has been produced since Plaintiff’s and Rassouli’s
depositions, those two need not be deposed again.
CONCLUSION
The motion for protective order
filed by Plaintiff, Rassouli, Bettadapur, and Naik is GRANTED. Plaintiff and
Rassouli shall not be further deposed. The depositions of Bettadapur and Naik
are limited to the newly produced communications.