Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV00641, Date: 2023-05-26 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23STCV00641 Hearing Date: May 26, 2023 Dept: 32
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JAY PAUL DERATANY, et
al., Plaintiffs, v. AG BUILDERS & DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 23STCV00641 Hearing Date: May 26, 2023 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: defendants’ motion to compel arbitration
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BACKGROUND
On January 12, 2023, Plaintiffs Jay
Paul Deratany and Curtis Smith initiated this action against Defendants AG
Builders & Development Corporation (AG Builders), Jose Rivas (Rivas), and
Jon Brouse (Brouse), asserting various claims arising from defective
construction performed on Plaintiffs’ home. The complaint alleges causes of
action for: (1) breach of contract; (2) fraud; (3) accounting; (4) negligence;
(5) fraudulent inducement; (6) ultra vires; and (7) intentional infliction of
emotional distress.
According to the allegations, Plaintiffs
hired Brouse, an architect, to design and implement the remodeling plan, as
well as recommend an appropriate builder and contractor. (Compl. ¶ 2.) Brouse
recommended Rivas and his company, AG Builders, promising that Rivas had the skill
and qualifications to perform the job. (Id., ¶ 5.) In reality, Rivas was
not qualified and failed to properly complete the construction.
On April 24, 2023, Rivas and AG Builders
filed the instant motion to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs filed their opposition
on May 4, 2023. Defendants replied on May 18, 2023.
LEGAL STANDARD
The California Arbitration Act (CAA)
states that “[o]n petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the
existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party to
the agreement refuses to arbitrate that controversy, the court shall order the
petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that
an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists….” (Code Civ. Proc, § 1281.2.)
“The party seeking arbitration bears the burden of proving the existence of an
arbitration agreement, and the party opposing arbitration bears the burden of
proving any defense, such as unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn.
v. Pinnacle Market Development (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 236.)
DISCUSSION
I.
Evidence of Agreement
“The moving party ‘can meet its
initial burden by attaching to the motion or petition a copy of the arbitration
agreement purporting to bear the opposing party's signature.’” (Gamboa v.
Northeast Community Clinic (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 158, 165, quoting Bannister
v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541, 543-44.)
Plaintiffs allege that they entered
into a contract with Rivas and AG Builders on February 26, 2021 with regards to
the construction. (Compl. ¶ 8.) This contract contains an arbitration clause
stating, “All claims, disputes and matters in question arising out of or
relating to this Contract, or the breach thereof, shall be decided by arbitration
in accordance with the Construction Industry Arbitration Rules of the American
Arbitration Association then in effect unless the parties mutually agree
otherwise . . . .” (Melkonian Decl., Ex. 1, § XVIII.) Plaintiffs and Rivas hand-signed
the agreement on February 26, 2021. (Id. at p. 14.)
II.
Illegality
Plaintiffs argue that the contract is
void because Rivas and AG Builders were unlicensed contractors at the time they
entered the contract and performed the services. (Deratany Decl., Ex. A-F.) Plaintiffs
point out that an arbitration clause is unenforceable if it is contained within
an illegal contract. (See Duffens v. Valenti (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 434,
450; Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 29.) However, the
records do not show that Rivas and AG Builders were unlicensed at the time of
the contract in February 2021. (See Deratany Decl., Ex. A-F.) On December 16,
2020, the licensing board withdrew a prior revocation and reinstated AG Builder’s
licensure status. (Rivas Reply Decl. ¶ 5.) AG Builder’s license was then revoked
again in September 23, 2021. (Id., ¶ 6.) However, the license was active
on February 26, 2021, the date of the contract. (Id., ¶ 7.)
Furthermore, Plaintiffs are
equitably estopped from arguing that the contract is unenforceable when Plaintiffs
themselves seek to enforce the contract against Rivas and AG Builders. (See
Compl. ¶¶ 38-40.) “[I]f a plaintiff relies on the terms of an agreement to
assert his or her claims . . . the plaintiff may be equitably estopped from
repudiating the arbitration clause of that very agreement.” (Goldman v.
KPMG, LLP (2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 209, 220.) Plaintiffs cannot “have it both
ways” by seeking to hold Rivas and AG Builders liable on the contract while
absolving themselves of the contract’s arbitration provision on the grounds
that the contract is illegal. (See ibid.)
III.
Fraud
Plaintiffs also argue that an
arbitration clause is unenforceable where there is fraud in the execution of
the agreement. (See Duffens, supra, 161 Cal.App.4th at p. 448.) However,
California law distinguishes between fraud in the execution and fraudulent
inducement. (Id. at p. 449.) Fraud in the execution results in a void contract
because “the promisor is deceived as to the nature of his act, and actually
does not know what he is signing, or does not intend to enter into a contract
at all . . . .” (Ibid.) By contrast, fraudulent inducement occurs when “the
promisor knows what he is signing but his consent is induced by fraud . . . .”
(Ibid.) In such a case, “mutual assent is present and a contract is
formed,” and a party must rescind the contract in order to escape its provisions.
(Ibid.) “[C]laims for fraud in the inducement are arbitrable.” (Brawerman
v. Loeb & Loeb LLP (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 1106, 1131.) “[P]arties to a
predispute arbitration agreement are presumed to have intended arbitration of
controversies, including allegations of fraud in the inducement of the contract
generally, that may allow rescission or reformation of the contract or part of
it.” (Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th
394, 417.)
The situation Plaintiffs describe is
one of fraudulent inducement. Plaintiffs essentially claim that, had they been
aware of Rivas and AG Builder’s lack of qualifications, they would not have
entered into the agreement. However, Plaintiffs still knew what contract they
were signing, and they were aware that it contained an arbitration clause. Having
signed the agreement, Plaintiffs are “presumed to have intended arbitration of
controversies, including allegations of fraud in the inducement of the contract
generally . . . .” (See Rosenthal, supra, 14 Cal.4th at p. 417.) Furthermore,
as discussed above, AG Builders was in fact licensed at the time of the
contract and therefore did not defraud Plaintiff by lying about its licensure
status.
IV.
Scope of Agreement
Lastly, Plaintiffs argue that only
the breach of contract claim is covered by the arbitration clause. According to
Plaintiffs, “[i]t cannot seriously be argued that the parties intended a
contractual arbitration clause to cover non-contract claims.” (Opp. at p. 6.)
However, parties may freely agree to arbitrate any number of claims, including
tort claims. The fact that the arbitration clause is contained in a contract
does not limit its application to that contract. “There is no requirement that
the cause of action arising out of a contractual dispute must be itself
contractual.” (Rice v. Downs (2016) 248 Cal.App.4th 175, 186.)
Here, the arbitration clause covers “[a]ll
claims, disputes and matters in question arising out of or relating to this
Contract, or the breach thereof . . . .” (Melkonian Decl., Ex. 1, § XVIII.) “[C]ourts
have held such arbitration agreements sufficiently broad to include torts, as
well as contractual, liabilities so long as the tort claims ‘have their roots
in the relationship between the parties which was created by the contract.’” (Rice,
supra, 248 Cal.App.4th at p. 186, quoting Izzi v. Mesquite Country Club
(1986) 186 Cal.App.3d 1309, 1315-16.) Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of or relate
to the contract even if they are torts, because all of Plaintiffs’ alleged harm
stems from Rivas and AG Builder’s alleged failure to properly complete the
remodel. These injuries are rooted in the relationship between Plaintiffs and Rivas/AG
Builders, which was created by the contract. Therefore, the arbitration clause
covers all of the claims at issue.
In sum, Defendants have proven by a
preponderance of the evidence that the parties agreed to arbitrate the claims
at issue. Plaintiffs have not demonstrated that the contract is unenforceable
due to illegality or fraud. Therefore, the arbitration clause must be enforced.
CONCLUSION
The motion to compel arbitration
filed by Rivas and AG Builders is GRANTED.