Judge: Daniel S. Murphy, Case: 23STCV01602, Date: 2023-05-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23STCV01602    Hearing Date: May 17, 2023    Dept: 32

BACKGROUND

            This is a landlord-tenant dispute arising from alleged uninhabitable conditions. Plaintiffs are various tenants residing at the subject premises. The operative First Amended Complaint, filed February 16, 2023, asserts breach of the warranty of habitability, negligence, intentional infliction of emotional distress, nuisance, violation of Civil Code section 1942.4, violation of the Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC), and violation of Business and Professions Code section 17200.

            On April 28, 2023, Defendants Monarch Apartments Owner LLC, Crescent Canyon Corp., and Manhattan West Property Management LLC (Doe 1) filed the instant demurrer to the fourth cause of action (emotional distress) and seventh cause of action (LAMC).  

LEGAL STANDARD

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context. (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dept. of Water and Power (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 1216, 1228.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or by proper judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.30, subd. (a).) A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. (SKF Farms v. Superior Court (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 902, 905.) Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed. (Ibid.) The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action. (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) A complaint will survive demurrer if it sufficiently apprises the defendant of the issues, and specificity is not required where discovery will clarify the ambiguities. (See Ludgate Ins. Co. v. Lockheed Martin Corp. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 592, 608.) All reasonable inferences are drawn in favor of the complaint. (Kruss v. Booth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 699, 713.)

MEET AND CONFER

Before filing a demurrer or a motion to strike, the demurring or moving party is required to meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading demurred to or the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purposes of determining whether an agreement can be reached through a filing of an amended pleading that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5.) The Court notes that Defendants have complied with the meet and confer requirement. (See Mahbubani Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.)

DISCUSSION

I. Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

To state a cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish: (1) outrageous conduct by the defendant; (2) the defendant’s intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (3) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (4) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant’s outrageous conduct. (Vasquez v. Franklin Management Real Estate Fund, Inc. (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 819, 832.) “For conduct to be outrageous, it must be so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated by a civilized community.” (Faunce v. Cate (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 172.) “Severe emotional distress [is] emotional distress of such substantial quantity or enduring quality that no reasonable man in a civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Fletcher v. Western Life Insurance Co. (1970) 10 Cal.App.3d 376, 397.)

According to the FAC, the subject property suffered from cockroach infestations, rodent infestations, bedbug infestations, water leaks, mold, and dilapidated structures. (FAC ¶ 19.) The FAC alleges that despite being on notice of these defects from tenant complaints, Defendants ignored the issues in order to save money. (Id., ¶¶ 20-23.) Defendants allegedly lied about repairs in order to continue extracting rent. (Id., ¶ 41.)

Subjecting tenants to uninhabitable living conditions for financial gain constitutes outrageous conduct. Defendants were allegedly aware that Plaintiffs were suffering under these conditions. (See FAC ¶ 21.) It can be reasonably inferred from the allegations that Defendants were aware of the likelihood of emotional distress from living in such conditions, especially considering some of the tenants are children. Defendants’ knowing failure to address the severe conditions constitutes at least reckless disregard for the probability of causing emotional distress. Plaintiffs have detailed their severe emotional distress. (FAC ¶ 56.)

Defendants argue in reply that “reckless disregard” is not the proper standard for IIED. (Reply 6:2-7.) The law is clear that intent may be established either by actual intent to cause emotional distress or by reckless disregard for the risk of doing so. (Vasquez, supra, 222 Cal.App.4th at p. 832.) Defendants acknowledged this standard in their opening brief. (Dem. 7:22-25.) Therefore, the claim is adequately pled.  

II. LAMC

            LAMC section 45.33 defines tenant harassment as, inter alia, the following acts: (2) failing to perform timely repairs required by law; (5) attempting to coerce a tenant to vacate by offers of payment; (8) engaging in any act or omission which interferes with a tenant’s right to use a rental unit or whereby the premises are rendered unfit for human occupation; or (16) any other act or omission that substantially interferes with a tenant’s comfort.

            Defendants argue that this claim fails because there is no indication that they offered money “coercively” to force Plaintiffs out. Not only is this a factual issue, it is also not the sole basis for a LAMC violation. (See FAC ¶ 74.) The conduct discussed above—failing to address uninhabitable conditions—also constitutes tenant harassment because it is an act or omission that interfered with Plaintiffs’ use and enjoyment of the premises or that rendered the premises unfit for occupation. Therefore, this claim is adequately pled.

            In reply, Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to make a sufficient “evidentiary showing” to support the claim, and insist that the evidence from a different case shows Defendants made the necessary repairs. (Reply 6:19-7:23.) This is entirely irrelevant to a demurrer, which only analyzes the sufficiency of the allegations contained in the complaint. The Court cannot take judicial notice of the evidence that Defendants reference. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375 [“While courts take judicial notice of public records, they do not take notice of the truth of matters stated therein”].)

CONCLUSION

            Defendants’ demurrer to the FAC is OVERRULED.